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“NOT LEAST IN TIMES OF TIGHT PUBLIC BUDGETS, CREDIBLE LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS ARE NEEDED. TARGETS HAVE PROVEN TO BE A
KEY ELEMENT FOR TRIGGERING THE VITAL INVESTMENTS WHICH ARE NEEDED FOR A TRANSITION TO A SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SYSTEM.”
introduction
In 2009, together with European leaders, France agreed on a
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction of 80-95% below
1990 levels by 2050. However, credible energy and climate action
to back up this commitment in a concrete way is yet to be
delivered. With today´s policies France and other European
countries are set to fail in meeting their long-term ambition. The
European Commission estimates that a continuation of current
trends and policies would result in only a 40% reduction in GHG
emissions in the energy sector by 2050. In France a long term
scenario estimates (e.g. Enerdata AMS Mesures) a maximum
47% reduction by 2050. Two-thirds of French emissions are
coming from the energy sector.
In France, total final domestic energy consumption levelled around
7,000 PJ/a between 2009 and 2011. The 5% decrease compared
to the early 2000’s level are related to the economic crisis rather
than efficiency measures. The country’s energy system is highly
dependent on fossil and fissile energy resources. With 75% of
electricity production coming from 58 nuclear reactors, it is the
most nuclearized country in the world. Its addiction to nuclear
technology and fossil fuel has not only held it under a permanent
risk of a serious nuclear accident, but also kept it away from the
current renewable energy boom and its benefits for economy,
energy bills and jobs.
This first edition of the French Energy [R]evolution scenario
comes on the cusp of a new energy discourse expected to start in
early 2013. As the public debate has been dominated by the
traditional power sector for some 40 years, Greenpeace
considered it important to present itself as a provider of
independent expertise in alternative energy scenarios. The
Fukushima disaster from March 2011, along with the emerging
signs of climate change impacts, urge us to rethink energy
strategies at global and regional levels. 
Some European states have already committed their people and
policies into massive renewable energy plans and energy
efficiency deals. Meanwhile, France seems to be more than ever
enslaved to nuclear electricity and an always greater energy
demand. While the uptake of clean renewable energy sources has
flattened in recent years in France, the global economic crisis
showed its impact in Europe: the Eurozone debt crisis, overall
decreasing investments and resulting high unemployment, and
decreasing global carbon prices.
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
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At the same time, renewable energy technologies are becoming
increasingly competitive with conventional fuels (although the
latter have been heavily subsidized for decades), which will, in
turn, save energy consumers’ money significantly in the long run,
at a time when financial stringency and planning have become an
imperative for the country.
Renewable energy and increased energy efficiency are the most
straightforward means of both reducing emissions and improving
security of energy supply. France will see its dependency to external
energy suppliers drop to 18% in 2050 instead of today’s 47%.
France, as an important player of the European Union, has to make
a  stand for climate and energy policies that would allow reaching
significantly higher GHG reductions by 2050. Future energy and
climate policies must make clear that high-carbon and nuclear
investments are expensive and will remain so in the future. 
France must also choose to phase out nuclear and provide a
progressive pathway toward a nuclear-free country, transferring
thus its investments and industry towards renewable energy
development. Renouncement to the current nuclear electric
system is a precondition to the development of a more efficient
and renewable energy system. Not least in times of tight public
budgets, a credible long-term commitment is required. 
Targets have proven to be a key element for triggering the vital
investments which are needed for a transition to a sustainable
energy system. This is why the 2030 targets, decided at a
European level, of at least 45% renewable final energy and 30%
energy efficiency are required. This is why France should support
European decision on binding and ambitious 2030 targets for
renewable energy and energy savings
The upcoming debate in France and the resulting investment and
energy policies should draw the outlines of a new trajectory for
energy production and consumption for the next 5 to 10 years. A
failure to commit to an ambitious national energy transition
scheme would set France far behind other countries in Europe
and prevent it from playing a major role in Europe energy future.
France has the second highest  renewable energy potential in
Europe,  as such it should be in position to exceed its 2020
objective of 23% RES. However, renewable energy consumption
showed a slight reduction last year and represented 12% of gross
final energy consumption -  far from the interim target set by
France’s National Action Plan. Over the same period, renewable
energy consumption increased by 20% in the European Union,
reflecting the continued maturing of these technologies, with
deployment progressing from support driven markets to new
competitive segments. 
In the past years, France has adopted stop-and-go strategy to feed-
in-tariffs, and therefore failed to stabilize support schemes and
maintain up-to-date incentives, thus weakening the renewable energy
sector. In the past months, risks of retro-active changes of
renewable energy feed-in-tariffs programms (e.g. in wind sector)
have damaged investor confidence, and significantly increased
investment risks. This has led to very high costs of capital, raising
the costs of projects and ultimately undermining their
competitiveness. Hence, France still has to set up clear
administrative procedures, stable and reliable support and easier
access to capital to guarantee it can at least reach, and preferably
overshoot, its binding 2020 target.
This Energy [R]evolution scenario presents a blueprint for how to
achieve a more sustainable energy system in France now and for
generations to come. Such a profound change translates into a
wide variety of skilled domestic jobs in a France struggling with
record levels of unemployment. 
The publication shows that the Energy [R]evolution scenario
creates 41,000 more direct jobs in energy production by 2020
than the Reference scenario, where little is done to support a
shift to renewable energy. About 160,000 direct sustainable jobs
will all significantly contribute to a reduction in GHG emissions. 
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Josche Muth
SECRETARY GENERAL
EUROPEAN RENEWABLE 
ENERGY COUNCIL (EREC)
DECEMBER 2012
10
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
The expert consensus is that a fundamental shift in the way we
consume and generate energy must begin immediately and be well
underway within the next ten years in order to avert the worst
impacts of climate change.1 The scale of the challenge requires a
complete transformation of the way we produce, consume and
distribute energy, while maintaining economic growth. The five key
principles behind this Energy [R]evolution will be to: 
• Implement renewable solutions, especially through
decentralised energy systems and grid expansions 
• Respect the natural limits of the environment 
• Increase energy consumption efficiency to decrease energy use
while ensuring people's need are met 
• Phase out dirty, unsustainable and dangerous energy sources 
• Create greater equity in the use of resources 
• Decouple economic growth from the consumption of fossil fuels
Decentralised energy systems, where power and heat are produced
close to the point of final use, reduce grid loads and energy losses
in distribution. Investments in ‘climate infrastructure’ such as
smart interactive grids and transmission grids to transport large
quantities of offshore wind and concentrated solar power are
essential. Building up clusters of renewable micro grids, especially
for people living in remote areas, will be a central tool in
providing sustainable electricity to the almost two billion people
around the world who currently do not have access to electricity.
theenergy[r]evolutionforfrance–keyresults
Renewable energy sources account for 8.7% France’s primary
energy demand in 2009. The main source is biomass, which is
mostly used in the heat sector. 
Today, renewables contribute 13% to electricity generation. The
renewable share for heat is around 16%. While biomass is the
main pillar of renewable heat supply today, geothermal heat
pumps and solar thermal collectors will play an important role in
the future. About 51% of the primary energy supply today still
comes from fossil fuels and 41% from nuclear energy. 
The Energy [R]evolution scenario describes development pathways
to a sustainable energy supply, achieving the urgently needed CO2
reduction target and a nuclear phase-out, without unconventional oil
resources. The results of the Energy [R]evolution scenario which will
be achieved through the following measures:
executivesummary
“THE SCALE OF THE CHALLENGE REQUIRES A COMPLETE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WAY WE PRODUCE, CONSUME AND
DISTRIBUTE ENERGY, WHILE MAINTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH.”
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imageSOLAR ENERGY IN ALPES DE HAUTES PROVENCE, FRANCE.
reference
1 IPCC – SPECIAL REPORT RENEWABLES, CHAPTER 1, MAY 2011.
11
• Curbing energy demand: Combining the projections on
population development, GDP growth and energy intensity
results in future development pathways for France’s final
energy demand. Under the Reference scenario, total final
energy demand decreases by 12% from the current 6,212 PJ/a
to 5,532 PJ/a in 2050. In the Energy [R]evolution scenario,
final energy demand decreases by 52% compared to current
consumption and it is expected to reach 2,989 PJ/a by 2050.
• Controlling power demand: Under the Energy [R]evolution
scenario, electricity demand is expected to decrease in both the
industry sector as well as in the residential and service sector,
but to grow in the transport sector (see Figure 5.2). Total
electricity demand will decrease from 424 TWh/a to 
409 TWh/a by the year 2050. Compared to the Reference
scenario, efficiency measures in the industry, residential and
service sectors avoid the generation of about 139 TWh/a. This
reduction can be achieved in particular by introducing highly
efficient electronic devices using the best available technology
in all demand sectors.
• Reducing heating demand: Efficiency gains in the heat supply
sector are even larger. Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario,
demand for heat supply is expected to decrease almost constantly.
Compared to the Reference scenario, consumption equivalent to
1,157 PJ/a is avoided through efficiency gains by 2050. As a
result of energy-related renovation of the existing stock of
residential buildings, as well as the introduction of low energy
standards and ‘passive houses’ for new buildings, enjoyment of the
same comfort and energy services will be accompanied by a much
lower future energy demand.
• Phasing out nuclear: The development of the electricity supply
sector is characterized by a dynamically growing renewable
energy market and an increasing share of renewable electricity.
This will compensate for the phasing out of nuclear energy and
reduce the number of fossil fuel-fired power plants required for
grid stabilization. By 2050, 98% of the electricity produced in
France will come from renewable energy sources. ‘New’
renewables – mainly wind and PV – will contribute 68% of
electricity generation. Already by 2020 the share of renewable
electricity production will be 32% and 77% by 2030. The
installed capacity of renewables will reach 165 GW in 2030
and 189 GW by 2050.
• Future costs of electricity generation: The introduction of
renewable technologies under the Energy [R]evolution scenario
increases the future costs of electricity up to 2030 compared to
the Reference case. However, this difference will be 2.9 €ct/kWh
at most. Because of high prices for conventional fuels, the lower
CO2 intensity of electricity generation, and decreasing specific
investment costs for renewable technologies, electricity generation
costs will become more economically favorable under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario after 2030. By 2050, costs will be 
0.2 €ct/kWh below those in the Reference version.
• The future electricity bill: Under the Reference scenario, on the
other hand, unchecked growth in demand, an increase in fossil
fuel prices and the cost of CO2 emissions result in total
electricity supply costs rising from today’s € 27 billion per year
to more than € 66 billion in 2050. Figure 5.6 shows that the
Energy [R]evolution scenario not only complies with France’s
CO2 reduction targets, but also helps to stabilize energy costs
and relieve the economic pressure on society. Increasing energy
efficiency and shifting energy supply to renewables lead to long
term costs for electricity supply that are more than 22% lower
than in the Reference scenario.
• Future investment in power generation: The Energy
[R]evolution scenario would require an investment of € 490
billion in investment for the Energy [R]evolution scenario to
become reality (including investments for replacement after the
economic lifetime of the plants) - approximately € 12 billion
annually or € 4 billion less than in the Reference scenario (€
494 billion). Under the Reference version, the levels of
investment in conventional power plants adds up to almost 64%
while approximately 36% would be invested in renewable energy
and cogeneration (CHP) until 2050. Under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario, however, France would shift almost 96%
of the entire investment towards renewables and cogeneration.
Until 2030, the fossil fuel share of power sector investments
would be focused mainly on CHP plants.
• Fuel costs savings: Because renewable energy has no fuel costs,
the fuel cost savings in the Energy [R]evolution scenario reach
a total of € 130 billion up to 2050, or € 3.3 billion per year.
These renewable energy sources would then go on to produce
electricity without any further fuel costs beyond 2050, while
the costs for coal and gas will continue to be a burden on
national economies.
• Heating supply: Today, renewables meet 16% of France’s heat
demand, the main contribution coming from the use of
biomass. The existing district heating network needs to be
expanded to allow for a large scale utilization of geothermal
and solar thermal energy. Dedicated support instruments are
required to ensure a dynamic development. In the Energy
[R]evolution scenario, renewables provide 48% of France’s
total heat demand in 2030 and 82% in 2050. Energy
efficiency measures help to reduce the currently growing energy
demand for heating by 45% in 2050 (relative to the reference
scenario), in spite of improving living standards. In the industry,
solar collectors, geothermal energy (incl. heat pumps), as well
as electricity and hydrogen from renewable sources are
increasingly substituting for fossil fuel-fired systems. A shift
from coal and oil to natural gas in the remaining conventional
applications leads to a further reduction of CO2 emissions.
©
 P
A
U
L
 L
A
N
G
R
O
C
K
/Z
E
N
IT
/G
Pimage TEST WINDMILL N90 2500, BUILT BY THE
GERMAN COMPANY NORDEX, IN THE HARBOUR OF
ROSTOCK. THIS WINDMILL PRODUCES 2.5 MEGA WATT
AND IS TESTED UNDER OFFSHORE CONDITIONS. TWO
TECHNICIANS WORKING INSIDE THE TURBINE.
12
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
• Future investments in the heat sector: Also in the heat sector
the Energy [R]evolution scenario would require a major
revision of current investment strategies in heating
technologies. Especially the not yet so common solar and
geothermal and heat pump technologies need enormous
increase in installations, if these potentials are to be tapped for
the heat sector. Installed capacities need to increase by a
factor of 10 for geothermal energy (incl. heat pumps) and even
by a factor of 130 for solar thermal. Renewable heating
technologies are extremely variable, from low tech biomass
stoves and unglazed solar collectors to very sophisticated
enhanced geothermal systems and solar thermal district
heating plants with seasonal storage. Thus it can only roughly
be calculated, that the Energy [R]evolution scenario in total
requires around € 166 billion to be invested in renewable
heating technologies until 2050 (including investments for
replacement after the economic lifetime of the plants) -
approximately € 4 billion per year.
• Future employment in the energy sector: Energy sector jobs in
France grow over the period in both the Energy [R]evolution
and the Reference scenarios. In 2015, the Reference scenario
has 6,000 more jobs than the Energy [R]evolution. In 2020
the Energy [R]evolution scenario has 15,000 more jobs, while
at 2030 the Reference scenario has 19,000 more jobs. There
are approximately 130,000 energy sector jobs in the Reference
scenario and 124,000 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario in
2015, up from 117,000 in 2010. In 2020, there are nearly
159,000 jobs in the Energy [R]evolution scenario, and
143,000 in the Reference scenario. By 2030, there are
approximately 139,000 jobs in the Energy [R]evolution
scenarios, and nearly 158,000 jobs in the Reference scenario.
Jobs in the Reference scenario increase by 34% between 2010
and 2030, almost entirely due to increases in the nuclear
industry. Extremely strong growth in renewable energy leads to
an increase of 35% in total energy sector jobs in the Energy
[R]evolution Scenario between 2010 and 2020. Energy sector
jobs then fall to 2030, but remain 18% above the 2010 level.
Renewable energy accounts for 65% of energy jobs by 2030,
with biomass having the greatest share (25%), followed by
wind, solar heat and PV.
• Transport: A key target in France is to introduce incentives and
solutions for people to shift transport use to efficient modes
like rail, light rail and buses, especially in the expanding large
metropolitan areas. Together with rising prices for fossil fuels,
these changes reduce the huge growth in car sales projected
under the Reference scenario. Energy demand from the
transport sector is reduced by 732 PJ/a in 2050 compared to
today's levels, saving 49% compared to the Reference scenario.
Energy demand in the transport sector will therefore decrease
between 2009 and 2050 by 59% to 768 PJ/a. Highly efficient
propulsion technology with hybrid, plug-in hybrid and battery-
electric power trains will bring large efficiency gains. By 2030,
electricity will provide 9% of the transport sector’s total
energy demand in the Energy [R]evolution, while in 2050 the
share will be 58%.
• Primary energy consumption: Under the E[R] scenario, primary
energy demand will decrease by 63% from today's 10,883 PJ/a
to 4,040 PJ/a. Compared to the Reference scenario, overall
primary energy demand will be reduced by 63% in 2050 under
the Energy [R]evolution scenario (Reference scenario:
10,971PJ in 2050). The Energy [R]evolution version aims to
phase out coal and oil as fast as technically and economically
possible.  This is made possible mainly by replacement of coal
power plants with renewables and a fast introduction of very
efficient electric vehicles in the transport sector to replace oil
combustion engines. This leads to an overall renewable primary
energy share of 40% in 2030 and 84% in 2050. Nuclear
energy is phased out just after 2030.
• Development of CO2 emissions: Whilst France’s emissions of CO2
will decrease by 49% between 2009 and 2050 under the Reference
scenario, under the Energy [R]evolution scenario they will decrease
from 384 million tonnes in 2009 to 20 million tonnes in 2050
Annual per capita emissions will drop from 5.9 tonnes to 0.3
tonnes. In spite of the phasing out of nuclear energy and increasing
demand, CO2 emissions will decrease in the electricity sector. In the
long run efficiency gains and the increased use of renewable
electricity in vehicles will reduce emissions in the transport sector.
With a share of 42 % of CO2, the transport sector will be the
largest sources of emissions in 2050. By 2050, France’s CO2
emissions are 95% below 1990 levels.
policychanges
To make the Energy [R]evolution real and to avoid dangerous
climate change, Greenpeace, GWEC and EREC demand that the
following policies and actions are implemented in the energy sector
in all European countries, including France:
1. Phase out all subsidies for fossil fuels and nuclear energy.
2. Internalise the external (social and environmental) costs of
energy production through ‘cap and trade’ emissions trading.
3. Mandate strict efficiency standards for all energy consuming
appliances, buildings and vehicles.
4. Establish legally binding targets for renewable energy and
combined heat and power generation.
5. Reform the electricity markets by guaranteeing priority
access to the grid for renewable power generators.
6. Provide defined and stable returns for investors, for example
by feed-in tariff schemes.
7. Implement better labeling and disclosure mechanisms to
provide more environmental product information.
8. Increase research and development budgets for renewable
energy and energy efficiency
13
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1.1franceclimateandenergypolicyrecommendations
The European Energy [R]evolution scenario published in 2012
presented European decision-makers with a cost-effective and
sustainable pathway for our economy, while tackling the
challenges of climate change and the security of energy supply. It
underlines that a fully renewable and efficient energy system
would allow Europe to develop a sound energy economy, create
high quality jobs, boost technology development, secure global
competitiveness and trigger industrial leadership.
At the same time, the drive towards renewables and the smart
use of energy would deliver the necessary greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG) cuts in the upper range of 80 to 95% by 2050
compared with 1990 levels, which Europe will have to realise in
the fight against climate change.
Although it has become a pressing necessity, the Energy
[R]evolution will not happen without much needed political
leadership: The European Union, France -as a central member in
the EU scene, and other members, will have to set the framework
for a sustainable energy pathway. The next step on this road is the
adoption of a 2030 climate and energy package with ambitious
targets on emission reductions, renewable energy and energy
savings. In France, the 2013 public energy debate and the
resulting energy transition law will have to set the framework for
a sustainable energy for the country.
In that context, France should be a leader by becoming an example
in Europe and pushing for ambitious climate and energy policies.
France should actively promote a continuation of the positive
triple targets principle for 2030 in Europe which will provide
industry certainty, mobilize investment in renewable and energy
saving technologies, and secure the essential climate ambition. 
At present, a wide range of energy-market failures still
discourage the shift towards a clean energy system. It is high
time European decision-makers  demonstrate commitment to
remove these barrier towards a clean energy future, create the
regulatory conditions for an efficient and renewable energy
system, and stimulate governments, businesses, industries and
citizens to opt for renewable energy and its smart use.
Greenpeace propose four steps to which France should commit
and promote within the European Union:
1. Adopt legally binding targets for emission reductions, energy
savings and renewable energy
Commit to legally binding emission reductions of at least 30% by
2020 in the EUTo contribute to limiting global temperature
increase below two degrees Celsius (2°C) the EU should reduce its
GHG emissions domestically by at least 30% by 2020 compared
to 1990 levels. For 2030, the Energy [R]evolution scenario shows
that France energy sectors, including power generation, heating and
cooling as well as transport, can make a significant contribution
with a 51% greenhouse gas emissions reduction.
France should support a legally binding target of 45% renewable
energy for 2030 in the EU Through the Renewable Energy
Directive, France has committed to a national legally binding
target of 23% renewable energy by 2020. To secure the full
benefits that renewable energy offers the economy, employment,
energy security, technological leadership and emission reductions,
a legally binding target of 45% renewable energy by 2030 is
required in Europe and the Energy [R]evolution scenario shows
France can reach a minimum level of 48%.
Set a legally binding target for energy savings for 2030.Saving
energy makes sense both from an environmental and an economic
perspective. A high level of energy efficiency is fundamental for
climate action and competitiveness. France must support an
ambitious, binding energy savings target for 2030 to move
towards a resource-efficient energy system.
2. Remove barriers to a renewable and efficient energy system
Reform the electricity market and network management After
decades of state subsidies for conventional energy sources, the
entire electricity market and network have been developed to suit
centralised nuclear power production. As an important step
towards the transformation of the power sector, France should
secure full ownership unbundling of transmission and distribution
system operations from power production and supply activities.
Today, although supposedly neutral, the transmissions system
operator RTE remains a branch of the supplier EDF.  Any future
investment plans on grids should prioritise  trajectories
integrating a high share of renewables, significant consumption
reduction to calibrate the urgent and required modernization of
the power grid system. 
This is the most effective way to provide fair market access and
overcome existing discriminatory practices against new market
entrants, such as renewable energy producers. 
Moreover, France among the members of the European Union
should ensure the implementation of the guidelines proposed
under the trans-European energy infrastructure regulation. These
conditions are necessary to develop grid connections for
renewable energy, including offshore, as well as for smart grid
management and active demand side management.
To facilitate this modernization at the European level, the Agency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) should be
strengthened and the mandate of national energy regulators
should be reviewed. Both ACER and the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) should
develop a strategic interconnection plan until 2050 which enables
the development of a fully renewable electricity supply.
In parallel, electricity market regulation should ensure that
investments in balancing capacity and flexible power production
facilitate the integration of renewable power sources, while phasing
out inflexible ‘baseload’ power supply and preventing the introduction
of supporting payments in the form of capacity payments.
Phase out all subsidies and other support measures for environmentally
damaging energy and transport technologies Government support is
still propping up conventional energy technologies, hindering the
uptake of renewable energy sources and energy savings. France
should stop with the following 10 fossil fuels subsidies:
• tax and VAT exemption on jet fuel 
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• tax benefits on diesel fuel
• tax refund of fuel tax (TIC) for road haulers
• tax scale measures favoring powerful cars over efficient cars 
• energy tax exemptions for oil refinery
• reductions of polluting activities tax (TGAP) on waste
reprocessing 
• partial exemption of tax on industrial biofuels
• reduced rate on TICPE on diesel fuel for non-road usage in
construction and agriculture sectors 
• specific VAT rate on recuperative energy (from fossil waste)
• zero interest loans (PTZ) that subsidise mainly private house
building in suburban areas that  increase urban sprawl 
• A total 20b€/a can be thus diverted from fossil fuels subsidies to
implementing the energy revolution
The French government has always encouraged the development of
nuclear energy. The nuclear sector profits from cost under-
evaluation of power stations decommissioning and radioactive
waste management. In its commitment to help the nuclear
industry, French government decided that a major part of waste
(covering 95% of nuclear fuel) will no more be considered as
such. The nuclear industry also benefits from government financing
of R&D and education infrastructure.
Liability coverage for installations in the nuclear energy sector is
so low that any damage or major accident would have to be
covered almost completely by state funds. This is a clear
competitive advantage given to the nuclear power sector. The
European commission considers that the total of these financial
advantages is four times greater than the financial support given
to the renewable energy sector in France.
Phase out nuclear power and close existing loopholes for nuclear
waste Nuclear is a dangerous and expensive technology. France
has to acknowledge the future of electricity production is without
nuclear and therefore the government will have to:
• decide to a complete nuclear phase out
• stop Flamanville’s EPR construction 
• give up with the Penly EPR project
• produce a progressive nuclear plants shut down plan
• reallocate public research funds as well as the state-own
company EDF's investment toward energy efficiency and
renewable energy development
• stop nuclear reactors or nuclear factories export projects
• give up the nuclear waste reprocessing strategy and the plutonium
reprocessing in MOX nuclear fuel
3. Implement effective policies for a sustainable energy economy
Support renewable energy and apply the Renewable Energy Directive
With the adoption of the Renewable Energy Directive in 2009,
European member states committed to legally binding targets,
adding up to a share of at least 20% renewable energy in the EU
by 2020 and to a framework for the support of clean energy. Since
then, many member states have experienced significant growth in
the deployment of renewable energy and current member state
plans submitted to the Commission indicate that the EU might
even exceed its 2020 target. Today, however, France is not certain
to reach its binding target as the support for renewable
development has been continuously changing in the past year. 
In the electricity sector, feed-in tariffs systems have been decided
but their design has proven to be not entirely effective (solar),
and unstable (wind, solar), and fail to create the condition of a
broad uptake of renewable power technologies. 
Today, at least 42% of the French energy demand is used for heating
and cooling. The Renewable Energy Directive created a renewable
energy for heating and cooling obligation in new and refurbished
buildings. Investment subsidies and tax credits are among the
instruments available to support renewable heating and cooling. 
In order to empower the sector and make use of the widely
untapped potential, an action plan for renewable heating and
cooling is needed. Such a plan should include an assessment of
the domestic heating and cooling demand as well as best-practice
examples on how to support the sector.
The support of renewable energy in the transport sector should
focus primarily on the use and development of sustainable
renewable energy solutions, including renewable electricity in,
first hybrid and then electric, road vehicles and electric trains. At
the same time, a clear signal must be sent to the markets that the
future of green transport does not include those biofuels that are
socially and environmentally unsustainable.
The continued implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive is
central to sustaining the growth of renewable energy in the EU and
achieving the 20% target in 2020. France still has the possibility to
reach (and even overshoot) its 2020 renewable objective if it
commits immediately to setting a stable and transparent support
scheme including: revised feed-in-tariffs, facilitated administrative
procedures and specific project subsidies (via bidding). 
Also, France has lately recalled its commitment to reduce housing
consumption but still has to detail the level of its ambitions
(objectives and renovation timetables). France could seize the
opportunity to set a standard in Europe by widening the scope of
its ambitions not only to buildings but also to transport, and energy
efficiency products, to reduce energy bills. It should also  provide
the industry and construction sectors a supporting plan that
guarantees jobs and economic returns. France should therefore:
• Support and commit to an European strict and legally binding
2020 consumption reduction objective.
• Precise clear objectives for a housing thermal insulation plan
and  including a timetable of deliveries
• The use of electric convector heater (add the technical term)in
new and renovated buildings should be phased out 
• Support, at the European level, car efficiency and eco-design
directives
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In addition, France should support the European Union
commitment to:
• Implement the Energy Efficiency Directive and set energy efficiency
standards for vehicles, consumer appliances, buildings and power
production The EU has set itself a 20% energy efficiency target by
2020, compared to business-as-usual. The Commission should
ensure that the Energy Efficiency Directive is implemented robustly
and without delay by member states to ensure maximum energy
savings are attained. Additional measures should be proposed as
soon as possible to bridge the remaining gap to the 20% target,
and binding targets should be adopted if member states fail to
deliver. A large part of energy savings can be achieved through
efficiency standards for vehicles, consumer products and buildings.
However, current EU legislation in this field represents an
incoherent patchwork of measures, which does not add up to a
clear and consistent division of responsibility and fails to deliver on
the EU’s energy savings potential. Efforts should be stepped up in
each area. With regard to road vehicles, the EU should regulate for
an average of 60g CO2/km for new passenger cars by 2025, ensure
an equivalent level of improvements in light commercial vehicles,
and rapidly introduce fuel efficiency regulation for trucks.
• Effectively implement the EU’s fuel standard Another flagship
climate change mitigation measure, the EU’s low carbon fuel
standard, should be implemented across fuel production from both
renewable and fossil energy sources. The agreed target of reducing
the carbon intensity of transport fuels by 6% between 2010 and
2020 will only be met if all direct and indirect lifecycle emissions
are properly accounted for. In a first phase, fuels should be
distinguished on the basis of the feedstock they are produced
from (e.g. crude oil, tar sands, natural gas or rapeseed), whilst a
methodology for further differentiation is being developed.
• Create a robust sustainability framework for bioenergy -Member
states plan to use significant quantities of bioenergy to meet their
renewable targets. The availability of sustainable bioenergy is
limited and therefore the European Union and individual
governments should ensure this scarce resource is used in the
most effective manner. The European Union and individual
governments should therefore ensure the full and timely
implementation of sustainability criteria for biofuels and biomass,
and address related indirect land use change (ILUC) impacts. 
• Initiate robust and harmonised EU green taxation A harmonisation
and strengthening of taxes on carbon emissions and energy use
should be implemented in all EU member states, in particular for
sectors not covered by the EU ETS (such as transport and
agriculture). Taxing energy use is crucial to achieve energy
security and lower the consumption of natural resources. Green
taxation would also deliver more jobs, because labour-intensive
production would gain a competitive advantage. This effect would
even be stronger if member states used revenues of green taxation
to reduce labour costs (e.g. by reducing taxes on income).
4. Ensure that the transition is financed
In addition to the 20 billion €/a fossil fuel subsidies that should be
reallocated to energy transition financing (see point 2, page 15),
France can create new and build up existing funding measures:
• ETS allowance auction incomes Under the ETS directive,
emissions allowance for different energy sctors will be
auctioned.  The income resulting from these auctions should be
allocated with half going to funding energy transition in France
and with the other half going towards climate action in
developing countries. 
• Contribution climat énergie (Carbon and Energy Tax) France is second
to last on taxation for encouraging  sustainable development in
European Union ranking. The carbon and energy tax, or contribution
climat énergie in French, must therefore urgently be set up. It should
tax non-renewable energy consumption (for energy related emissions)
and on direct GHG emissions (for other origin of emissions).
• Hauler eco-tax This aims to collect tax on hauler traffic on
public roads depending on their size and mileage. 
• Tax on financial transactions Initially planned to mainly fund
the fight against climate change, its income has been diverted.
Ministers should reallocate it in the same  way as with the
ETS income (see above).
France has to support the following three recommendations at EU level:
• Put climate action and sustainable energy at the centre of the
Multiannual Financial Framework  Ambitious emission reductions in
the EU are technically and economically feasible, and can even
deliver significant net benefits for the European economy. However,
before the Energy [R]evolution starts paying off, major
investments are required. The 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial
Framework should “mainstream” the political priorities of climate
action and sustainable energy, thus ensuring future EU budgets can
allocate the necessary funds to energy system modernisation,
energy infrastructure and energy efficiency technology.
• Support innovation and research in energy saving technologies and
renewable energy Innovation will play an important role in making
the Energy [R]evolution more attractive. Direct public support is
often necessary to speed up the deployment of new technologies.
The European Union, national governments, as well as public
finance institutions should ensure that current renewable energy
and efficiency initiatives are successful and support additional
investments in research and development for more efficient
appliances and building techniques, new types of renewable energy
production such as tidal and wave power, smart grid technology,
as well as low emitting transport options. 
• Create an Industrial Innovation Fund Energy-intensive industry sectors
such as the steel, cement and paper sector have a significant unused
potential for energy savings of at least 35% and emission reductions
of close to 95% by 2050. The EU must provide the right policy
framework to leverage investments in cleaner and more efficient
production processes while strengthening industrial competitiveness.
To push innovation and deployment of green and efficient
technologies in energy intensive sectors to a larger scale, a portion of
the ETS auctioning revenue should go to an Industrial Innovation
Fund dedicated to cleaner and innovate production processes (e.g.
magnesium-based cement production, coke-free steel production). 
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The expert consensus is that a fundamental shift in the way we
consume and generate energy must begin immediately and be well
underway within the next ten years in order to avert the worst
impacts of climate change.4 The scale of the challenge requires a
complete transformation of the way we produce, consume and
distribute energy, while maintaining economic growth. Nothing
short of such a revolution will enable us to limit global warming
to a rise in temperature of lower than 2°C, above which the
impacts become devastating. This chapter explains the basic
principles and strategic approach of the Energy [R]evolution
concept, which have formed the basis for the scenario modelling
since the very first Energy [R]evolution scenario published in
2005. However, this concept has been constantly improved as
technologies develop and new technical and economical
possibilities emerge. 
Current electricity generation relies mainly on burning fossil fuels
in very large power stations which generate carbon dioxide and
also waste much of their primary input energy. More energy is
lost as the power is moved around the electricity network and is
converted from high transmission voltage down to a supply
suitable for domestic or commercial consumers. The system is
vulnerable to disruption: localised technical, weather-related or
even deliberately caused faults can quickly cascade, resulting in
widespread blackouts. Whichever technology generates the
electricity within this old fashioned configuration, it will inevitably
be subject to some, or all, of these problems. At the core of the
Energy [R]evolution therefore there are changes both to the way
that energy is produced and distributed. 
2.1keyprinciples
The Energy [R]evolution can be achieved by adhering 
to five key principles:
1. Respect natural limits – phase out fossil fuels by the end of this
centuryWe must learn to respect natural limits. There is only so
much carbon that the atmosphere can absorb. Each year we emit
almost 30 billion tonnes of carbon equivalent; we are literally
filling up the sky. Geological resources of coal could provide
several hundred years of fuel, but we cannot burn them and keep
within safe limits. Oil and coal development must be ended. 
The global Energy [R]evolution scenario has a target to
reduce energy related CO2 emissions to a maximum of 
3.5 Gigatonnes (Gt) by 2050 and phase out over 80% of
fossil fuels by 2050.
2. Equity and fair access to energy As long as there are natural
limits there needs to be a fair distribution of benefits and costs
within societies, between nations and between present and future
generations. At one extreme, a third of the world’s population
has no access to electricity, whilst the most industrialised
countries consume much more than their fair share.
The effects of climate change on the poorest communities
are exacerbated by massive global energy inequality. If we
are to address climate change, one of the principles must be
equity and fairness, so that the benefits of energy services –
such as light, heat, power and transport – are available for
all: north and south, rich and poor. Only in this way can we
create true energy security, as well as the conditions for
genuine human wellbeing.
The global Energy [R]evolution scenario has a target to
achieve energy equity as soon as technically possible. By
2050 the average per capita emission should be between 0.5
and 1 tonne of CO2. 
3. Implement clean, renewable solutions and decentralise energy
systems There is no energy shortage. All we need to do is use
existing technologies to harness energy effectively and
efficiently. Renewable energy and energy efficiency measures
are ready, viable and increasingly competitive. Wind, solar
and other renewable energy technologies have experienced
double digit market growth for the past decade.5
Just as climate change is real, so is the renewable energy sector.
Sustainable, decentralised energy systems produce fewer carbon
emissions, are cheaper and are less dependent on imported fuel.
They create more jobs and empower local communities.
Decentralised systems are more secure and more efficient. This
is what the Energy [R]evolution must aim to create.
To stop the earth’s climate spinning out of control, most of
the world’s fossil fuel reserves – coal, oil and gas – must
remain in the ground. Our goal is for humans to live within
the natural limits of our small planet. 
4. Decouple growth from fossil fuel use Starting in the developed
countries, economic growth must be fully decoupled from
fossil fuel usage. It is a fallacy to suggest that economic
growth must be predicated on their increased combustion.
We need to use the energy we produce much more efficiently,
and we need to make the transition to renewable energy and
away from fossil fuels quickly in order to enable clean and
sustainable growth.
5. Phase out dirty, unsustainable energyWe need to phase out
coal and nuclear power. We cannot continue to build coal
plants at a time when emissions pose a real and present
danger to both ecosystems and people. And we cannot continue
to fuel the myriad nuclear threats by pretending nuclear power
can in any way help to combat climate change. There is no role
for nuclear power in the Energy [R]evolution.
“THE STONE AGE DID NOT END FOR LACK OF STONE, AND THE OIL
AGE WILL END LONG BEFORE THE WORLD RUNS OUT OF OIL.”
Sheikh Zaki Yamani, former Saudi Arabian oil minister
references
4 IPCC – SPECIAL REPORT RENEWABLES, CHAPTER 1, MAY 2011. 
5 REN 21, RENEWABLE ENERGY STATUS REPORT 2012, JUNE 2012. 
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2.2the“3stepimplementation”
In 2009, renewable energy sources accounted for 13% of the
world’s primary energy demand. Biomass, which is mostly used
for heating, was the main renewable energy source. The share of
renewable energy in electricity generation was 18%. About 81%
of primary energy supply today still comes from fossil fuels.6
Now is the time to make substantial structural changes in the energy
and power sector within the next decade. Many power plants in
industrialised countries, such as the USA, Japan and the European
Union, are nearing retirement; more than half of all operating power
plants are over 20 years old. At the same time developing countries,
such as China, India, South Africa and Brazil, are looking to satisfy
the growing energy demand created by their expanding economies.
Within this decade, the power sector will decide how new
electricity demand will be met, either by fossil and nuclear fuels
or by the efficient use of renewable energy. The Energy
[R]evolution scenario puts forward a policy and technical model
for renewable energy and cogeneration combined with energy
efficiency to meet the world’s needs.
Both renewable energy and cogeneration on a large scale and
through decentralised, smaller units – have to grow faster than
overall global energy demand. Both approaches must replace old
generating technologies and deliver the additional energy required
in the developing world. 
A transition phase is required to build up the necessary
infrastructure because it is not possible to switch directly from a
large scale fossil and nuclear fuel based energy system to a full
renewable energy supply. Whilst remaining firmly committed to the
promotion of renewable sources of energy, we appreciate that
conventional natural gas, used in appropriately scaled cogeneration
plants, is valuable as a transition fuel, and can also drive cost-
effective decentralisation of the energy infrastructure. With warmer
summers, tri-generation which incorporates heat-fired absorption
chillers to deliver cooling capacity in addition to heat and power,
will become a valuable means of achieving emissions reductions.
The Energy [R]evolution envisages a development pathway which
turns the present energy supply structure into a sustainable system.
There are three main stages to this.
Step 1: energy efficiency and equity The Energy [R]evolution
makes an ambitious exploitation of the potential for energy
efficiency. It focuses on current best practice and technologies
that will become available in the future, assuming continuous
innovation. The energy savings are fairly equally distributed over
the three sectors – industry, transport and domestic/business.
Intelligent use, not abstinence, is the basic philosophy. 
The most important energy saving options are improved heat
insulation and building design, super efficient electrical machines and
drives, replacement of old-style electrical heating systems by
renewable heat production (such as solar collectors) and a reduction
in energy consumption by vehicles used for goods and passenger
traffic. Industrialised countries currently use energy in the most
inefficient way and can reduce their consumption drastically without
the loss of either housing comfort or information and entertainment
electronics. The global Energy [R]evolution scenario depends on
energy saved in OECD countries to meet the increasing power
requirements in developing countries. The ultimate goal is stabilisation
of global energy consumption within the next two decades. At the
same time, the aim is to create ‘energy equity’ – shifting towards a
fairer worldwide distribution of efficiently-used supply.
A dramatic reduction in primary energy demand compared to the
Reference scenario – but with the same GDP and population
development – is a crucial prerequisite for achieving a significant
share of renewable energy sources in the overall energy supply
system, compensating for the phasing out of nuclear energy and
reducing the consumption of fossil fuels.
reference
6 ‘IEA WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011, PARIS NOVEMBER 2011. 
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figure2.1: centralisedgenerationsystemswastemorethantwothirdsoftheiroriginalenergyinput
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LOST THROUGH INEFFICIENT
GENERATION AND HEAT WASTAGE
3.5 units 
LOST THROUGH TRANSMISSION
AND DISTRIBUTION
13 units 
WASTED THROUGH
INEFFICIENT END USE
38.5 units >>
OF ENERGY FED TO NATIONAL GRID
35 units >>
OF ENERGY SUPPLIED
22 units
OF ENERGY
ACTUALLY UTILISED
imageWIND TURBINES AT THE NAN WIND FARM IN
NAN’AO. GUANGDONG PROVINCE HAS ONE OF THE
BEST WIND RESOURCES IN CHINA AND IS ALREADY
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Step 2: the renewable energy [r]evolution Decentralised energy and
large scale renewables In order to achieve higher fuel efficiencies
and reduce distribution losses, the Energy [R]evolution scenario
makes extensive use of Decentralised Energy (DE).This term refers
to energy generated at or near the point of use.
Decentralised energy is connected to a local distribution network
system, supplying homes and offices, rather than the high voltage
transmission system. Because electricity generation is closer to
consumers, any waste heat from combustion processes can be
piped to nearby buildings, a system known as cogeneration or
combined heat and power. This means that for a fuel like gas, all
the input energy is used, not just a fraction as with traditional
centralised fossil fuel electricity plant. 
Decentralised energy also includes stand-alone systems entirely
separate from the public networks, for example heat pumps, solar
thermal panels or biomass heating. These can all be
commercialised for domestic users to provide sustainable, low
emission heating. Some consider decentralised energy
technologies ‘disruptive’ because they do not fit the existing
electricity market and system. However, with appropriate changes
they can grow exponentially with overall benefit and
diversification for the energy sector.
A huge proportion of global energy in 2050 will be produced by
decentralised energy sources, although large scale renewable
energy supply will still be needed for an energy revolution. Large
offshore wind farms and concentrating solar power (CSP) plants
in the sunbelt regions of the world will therefore have an
important role to play.
Cogeneration (CHP) The increased use of combined heat and
power generation (CHP) will improve the supply system’s energy
conversion efficiency, whether using natural gas or biomass. In
the longer term, a decreasing demand for heat and the large
potential for producing heat directly from renewable energy
sources will limit the need for further expansion of CHP. 
Renewable electricityThe electricity sector will be the pioneer of
renewable energy utilisation. Many renewable electricity
technologies have been experiencing steady growth over the past 20
to 30 years of up to 35% annually and are expected to consolidate
at a high level between 2030 and 2050. By 2050, under the
Energy [R]evolution scenario, the majority of electricity will be
produced from renewable energy sources. The anticipated growth of
electricity use in transport will further promote the effective use of
renewable power generation technologies.
1
2
3
4
5
1. PHOTOVOLTAIC, SOLAR FAÇADES WILL BE A DECORATIVE ELEMENT ON
OFFICE AND APARTMENT BUILDINGS. PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS WILL
BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE AND IMPROVED DESIGN WILL ENABLE
ARCHITECTS TO USE THEM MORE WIDELY.
2. RENOVATION CAN CUT ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF OLD BUILDINGS BY AS
MUCH AS 80% - WITH IMPROVED HEAT INSULATION, INSULATED
WINDOWS AND MODERN VENTILATION SYSTEMS.
3. SOLAR THERMAL COLLECTORS PRODUCE HOT WATER FOR BOTH THEIR
OWN AND NEIGHBOURING BUILDINGS.
4. EFFICIENT THERMAL POWER (CHP) STATIONS WILL COME IN 
A VARIETY OF SIZES - FITTING THE CELLAR OF A DETACHED HOUSE OR
SUPPLYING WHOLE BUILDING COMPLEXES OR APARTMENT BLOCKS WITH
POWER AND WARMTH WITHOUT LOSSES IN TRANSMISSION.
5. CLEAN ELECTRICITY FOR THE CITIES WILL ALSO COME FROM FARTHER
AFIELD. OFFSHORE WIND PARKS AND SOLAR POWER STATIONS IN
DESERTS HAVE ENORMOUS POTENTIAL.
city
figure2.2: adecentralisedenergyfuture
EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES, APPLIED IN A DECENTRALISED WAY AND COMBINED WITH EFFICIENCY MEASURES AND ZERO EMISSION DEVELOPMENTS, CAN
DELIVER LOW CARBON COMMUNITIES AS ILLUSTRATED HERE. POWER IS GENERATED USING EFFICIENT COGENERATION TECHNOLOGIES PRODUCING BOTH HEAT
(AND SOMETIMES COOLING) PLUS ELECTRICITY, DISTRIBUTED VIA LOCAL NETWORKS. THIS SUPPLEMENTS THE ENERGY PRODUCED FROM BUILDING
INTEGRATED GENERATION. ENERGY SOLUTIONS COME FROM LOCAL OPPORTUNITIES AT BOTH A SMALL AND COMMUNITY SCALE. THE TOWN SHOWN HERE MAKES
USE OF – AMONG OTHERS – WIND, BIOMASS AND HYDRO RESOURCES. NATURAL GAS, WHERE NEEDED, CAN BE DEPLOYED IN A HIGHLY EFFICIENT MANNER. 
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Renewable heating In the heat supply sector, the contribution of
renewable energy will increase significantly. Growth rates are
expected to be similar to those of the renewable electricity sector.
Fossil fuels will be increasingly replaced by more efficient modern
technologies, in particular biomass, solar collectors and
geothermal. By 2050, renewable energy technologies will satisfy
the major part of heating and cooling demand.
Transport Before new technologies including hybrid and electric
cars can seriously enter the transport sector, other electricity
users need to make large efficiency gains. In this study, biomass
is primarily committed to stationary applications; the use of
biofuels for transport is limited by the availability of sustainably
grown biomass and only for heavy duty vehicles, ships and
aviation. In contrast to previous versions of Energy [R]evolution
scenarios, biofuels are entirely banned now for use in private
cars.7 Electric vehicles will therefore play an even more
important role in improving energy efficiency in transport and
substituting for fossil fuels.
Overall, to achieve an economically attractive growth of
renewable energy sources requires a balanced and timely
mobilisation of all technologies. Such a mobilisation depends on
the resource availability, cost reduction potential and
technological maturity. When combined with technology-driven
solutions, lifestyle changes - like simply driving less and using
more public transport – have a huge potential to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.
New business model The Energy [R]evolution scenario will also
result in a dramatic change in the business model of energy
companies, utilities, fuel suppliers and the manufacturers of
energy technologies. Decentralised energy generation and large
solar or offshore wind arrays which operate in remote areas,
without the need for any fuel, will have a profound impact on the
way utilities operate in 2020 and beyond.
Today’s power supply value chain is broken down into clearly
defined players but a global renewable power supply will
inevitably change this division of roles and responsibilities. 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of how the value chain would
change in a revolutionised energy mix.
The current model is a relatively small number of large power
plants that are owned and operated by utilities or their
subsidiaries, generating electricity for the population. Under the
Energy [R]evolution scenario, around 60 to 70% of electricity
will be made by small but numerous decentralised power plants.
Ownership will shift towards more private investors, the
manufacturer of renewable energy technologies and EPC
companies (engineering, procurement and construction) away
from centralised utilities. In turn, the value chain for power
companies will shift towards project development, equipment
manufacturing and operation and maintenance.
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7 SEE CHAPTER 9. 
table2.1: powerplantvaluechain
TRANSMISSION TO
THE CUSTOMER
TASK 
& MARKET PLAYER
CURRENT SITUATION
POWER MARKET
Market player
Power plant 
engineering companies
Utilities
Mining companies
Grid operator
FUEL SUPPLYOPERATION &
MAINTENANCE
OWNER OF THE
POWER PLANT
INSTALLATIONMANUFACTURE OF
GEN. EQUIPMENT
PROJECT
DEVELOPMENT
Grid operation will move
towards state controlled
grid companies or
communities due to
liberalisation.
A few large multinational
oil, gas and coal mining
companies dominate:
today approx 75-80% 
of power plants need 
fuel supply.
Relatively view power plants owned and 
sometimes operated by utilities.
Coal, gas and nuclear power stations are larger than renewables. Average
number of power plants needed per 1 GW installed only 1 or 2 projects.
2020 AND BEYOND
POWER MARKET
Market player
Renewable power plant 
engineering companies
Private & public investors
Grid operator
Grid operation will move
towards state controlled
grid companies or
communities due to
liberalisation.
By 2050 almost all power
generation technologies -
accept biomass - will
operate without the need
of fuel supply.
Many projects will be owned by private households
or investment banks in the case of larger projects.
Renewable power plants are small in capacity, the amount of projects 
for project development, manufacturers and installation companies per 
installed 1 GW is bigger by an order of magnitude. In the case of PV 
it could be up to 500 projects, for onshore wind still 25 to 50 projects.
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image COWS FROM A FARM WITH A BIOGAS PLANT
IN ITTIGEN BERN, SWITZERLAND. THE FARMER
PETER WYSS PRODUCES ON HIS FARM WITH A
BIOGAS PLANT, GREEN ELECTRICITY WITH DUNG
FROM COWS, LIQUID MANURE AND WASTE FROM
FOOD PRODUCTION.
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Simply selling electricity to customers will play a smaller role, as
the power companies of the future will deliver a total power plant
and the required IT services to the customer, not just electricity.
They will therefore move towards becoming service suppliers for
the customer. Moreover, the majority of power plants will not
require any fuel supply, so mining and other fuel production
companies will lose their strategic importance.
The future pattern under the Energy [R]evolution will see more
and more renewable energy companies, such as wind turbine
manufacturers, becoming involved in project development,
installation and operation and maintenance, whilst utilities will
lose their status. Those traditional energy supply companies which
do not move towards renewable project development will either
lose market share or drop out of the market completely.
Step 3: optimised integration – renewables 24/7 A complete
transformation of the energy system will be necessary to
accommodate the significantly higher shares of renewable energy
expected under the Energy [R]evolution scenario. The grid network
of cables and sub-stations that brings electricity to our homes and
factories was designed for large, centralised generators running at
huge loads, providing ‘baseload’ power. Until now, renewable
energy has been seen as an additional slice of the energy mix and
had had adapt to the grid’s operating conditions. If the Energy
[R]evolution scenario is to be realised, this will have to change.
Because renewable energy relies mostly on natural resources,
which are not available at all times, some critics say this makes it
unsuitable for large portions of energy demand. Existing practice
in a number of countries has already shown that this is false. 
Clever technologies can track and manage energy use patterns,
provide flexible power that follows demand through the day, use
better storage options and group customers together to form
‘virtual batteries’. With current and emerging solutions, we can
secure the renewable energy future needed to avert catastrophic
climate change. Renewable energy 24/7 is technically and
economically possible, it just needs the right policy and the
commercial investment to get things moving and ‘keep the lights
on’.8 Further adaptations to how the grid network operates will
allow integration of even larger quantities of renewable capacity.
Changes to the grid required to support decentralised energy Most
grids around the world have large power plants in the middle
connected by high voltage alternating current (AC) power lines
and smaller distribution network carries power to final
consumers. The centralised grid model was designed and planned
up to 60 years ago, and brought great benefit to cities and rural
areas. However the system is very wasteful, with much energy
lost in transition. A system based on renewable energy, requiring
lots of smaller generators, some with variable amounts of power
output will need a new architecture. 
The overall concept of a smart grid is one that balances fluctuations
in energy demand and supply to share out power effectively among
users. New measures to manage demand, forecasting the weather
for storage needs, plus advanced communication and control
technologies will help deliver electricity effectively. 
Technological opportunities Changes to the power system by 2050
will create huge business opportunities for the information,
communication and technology (ICT) sector. A smart grid has
power supplied from a diverse range of sources and places and it
relies on the collection and analysis of a lot of data. Smart grids
require software, hardware and data networks capable of
delivering data quickly, and responding to the information that
they contain. Several important ICT players are racing to
smarten up energy grids across the globe and hundreds of
companies could be involved with smart grids.
There are numerous IT companies offering products and services
to manage and monitor energy. These include IBM, Fujitsu,
Google, Microsoft and Cisco. These and other giants of the
telecommunications and technology sector have the power to
make the grid smarter, and to move us faster towards a clean
energy future. Greenpeace has initiated the ‘Cool IT’ campaign to
put pressure on the IT sector to make such technologies a reality.
2.3thenewelectricitygrid
In the future power generators will be smaller and distributed
throughout the grid, which is more efficient and avoids energy losses
during long distance transmission. There will also be some concentrated
supply from large renewable power plants. Examples of the large
generators of the future are massive wind farms already being built in
Europe’s North Sea and plans for large areas of concentrating solar
mirrors to generate energy in Southern Europe. 
The challenge ahead will require an innovative power system
architecture involving both new technologies and new ways of
managing the network to ensure a balance between fluctuations
in energy demand and supply. The key elements of this new power
system architecture are micro grids, smart grids and an efficient
large scale super grid. The three types of system will support and
interconnect with each other (see Figure 2.3, page 25). 
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8 THE ARGUMENTS AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS OUTLINED HERE ARE EXPLAINED IN MORE DETAIL IN
THE EUROPEAN RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL/GREENPEACE REPORT, “[R]ENEWABLES 24/7:
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED TO SAVE THE CLIMATE”, NOVEMBER 2009.
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2.3.1hybridsystems
While grid in the developed world supplies power to nearly 100%
of the population, many rural areas in the developing world rely
on unreliable grids or polluting electricity, for example from
stand-alone diesel generators. This is also very expensive for
small communities.
The standard approach of extending the grid used in developed
countries is often not economic in rural areas of developing
countries where potential electricity use is low and there are long
distances to existing grid.
Electrification based on renewable energy systems with a hybrid
mix of sources is often the cheapest as well as the least polluting
alternative. Hybrid systems connect renewable energy sources
such as wind and solar power to a battery via a charge controller,
which stores the generated electricity and acts as the main power
supply. Back-up supply typically comes from a fossil fuel, for
example in a wind-battery-diesel or PV-battery-diesel system.
Such decentralised hybrid systems are more reliable, consumers
can be involved in their operation through innovative technologies
and they can make best use of local resources. They are also less
dependent on large scale infrastructure and can be constructed
and connected faster, especially in rural areas. 
Finance can often be an issue for relatively poor rural
communities wanting to install such hybrid renewable systems.
Greenpeace’s funding model, the Feed-in Tariff Support
Mechanism (FTSM), allows projects to be bundled together so
the financial package is large enough to be eligible for
international investment support. In the Pacific region, for
example, power generation projects from a number of islands, an
entire island state such as the Maldives or even several island
states could be bundled into one project package. This would
make it large enough for funding as an international project by
OECD countries. In terms of project planning, it is essential that
the communities themselves are directly involved in the process.
box2.2:definitionsandtechnicalterms
The electricity ‘grid’ is the collective name for all the cables,
transformers and infrastructure that transport electricity from
power plants to the end users.
Micro grids supply local power needs. Monitoring and control
infrastructure are embedded inside distribution networks and
use local energy generation resources. An example of a
microgrid would be a combination of solar panels, micro
turbines, fuel cells, energy efficiency and information/
communication technology to manage the load, for example 
on an island or small rural town.
Smart grids balance demand out over a region. A ‘smart’
electricity grid connects decentralised renewable energy
sources and cogeneration and distributes power highly
efficiently. Advanced types of control and management
technologies for the electricity grid can also make it run more
efficiently overall. For example, smart electricity meters show
real-time use and costs, allowing big energy users to switch off
or turn down on a signal from the grid operator, and avoid
high power prices. 
Super grids transport large energy loads between regions. This
refers to interconnection - typically based on HVDC
technology - between countries or areas with large supply and
large demand. An example would be the interconnection of all
the large renewable based power plants in the North Sea.
Baseload is the concept that there must be a minimum,
uninterruptible supply of power to the grid at all times,
traditionally provided by coal or nuclear power. The Energy
[R]evolution challenges this, and instead relies on a variety of
‘flexible’ energy sources combined over a large area to meet
demand. Currently, ‘baseload’ is part of the business model for
nuclear and coal power plants, where the operator can produce
electricity around the clock whether or not it is actually needed.
Constrained power refers to when there is a local oversupply of
free wind and solar power which has to be shut down, either
because it cannot be transferred to other locations (bottlenecks)
or because it is competing with inflexible nuclear or coal power
that has been given priority access to the grid. Constrained power
is available for storage once the technology is available.
Variable power is electricity produced by wind or solar power
depending on the weather. Some technologies can make
variable power dispatchable, e.g. by adding heat storage to
concentrated solar power.
Dispatchable is a type of power that can be stored and
‘dispatched’ when needed to areas of high demand, e.g. gas-
fired power plants or hydro power plants.
Interconnector is a transmission line that connects different parts of
the electricity grid. Load curve is the typical pattern of electricity
through the day, which has a predictable peak and trough that can
be anticipated from outside temperatures and historical data.
Node is a point of connection in the electricity grid between
regions or countries, where there can be local supply feeding
into the grid as well.
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image GEMASOLAR IS A 15 MWE SOLAR-ONLY
POWER TOWER PLANT, EMPLOYING MOLTEN SALT
TECHNOLOGIES FOR RECEIVING AND STORING
ENERGY. IT’S 16 HOUR MOLTEN SALT STORAGE
SYSTEM CAN DELIVER POWER AROUND THE CLOCK.
IT RUNS AN EQUIVALENT OF 6,570 FULL HOURS
OUT OF 8,769 TOTAL. FUENTES DE ANDALUCÍA
SEVILLE, SPAIN.
2.3.2smartgrids
The task of integrating renewable energy technologies into
existing power systems is similar in all power systems around the
world, whether they are large centralised networks or island
systems. The main aim of power system operation is to balance
electricity consumption and generation. 
Thorough forward planning is needed to ensure that the available
production can match demand at all times. In addition to
balancing supply and demand, the power system must also be
able to:
• Fulfil defined power quality standards – voltage/frequency -
which may require additional technical equipment, and
• Survive extreme situations such as sudden interruptions of
supply, for example from a fault at a generation unit or a
breakdown in the transmission system. 
Integrating renewable energy by using a smart grid means moving
away from the concept of baseload power towards a mix of
flexible and dispatchable renewable power plants. In a smart grid,
a portfolio of flexible energy providers can follow the load during
both day and night (for example, solar plus gas, geothermal, wind
and demand management) without blackouts. 
What is a smart grid? Until now, renewable power technology
development has put most effort into adjusting its technical
performance to the needs of the existing network, mainly by
complying with grid codes, which cover such issues as voltage
frequency and reactive power. However, the time has come for the
power systems themselves to better adjust to the needs of
variable generation. This means that they must become flexible
enough to follow the fluctuations of variable renewable power, for
example by adjusting demand via demand-side management
and/or deploying storage systems.
The future power system will consist of tens of thousands of
generation units such as solar panels, wind turbines and other
renewable generation, partly within the distribution network,
partly concentrated in large power plants such as offshore wind
parks. The power system planning will become more complex due
to the larger number of generation assets and the significant
share of variable power generation causing constantly changing
power flows. 
Smart grid technology will be needed to support power system
planning. This will operate by actively supporting day-ahead
forecasts and system balancing, providing real-time information
about the status of the network and the generation units, in
combination with weather forecasts. It will also play a significant
role in making sure systems can meet the peak demand and make
better use of distribution and transmission assets, thereby keeping
the need for network extensions to the absolute minimum.
To develop a power system based almost entirely on renewable
energy sources requires a completely new power system
architecture, which will need substantial amounts of further work
to fully emerge.9 Figure 2.3 shows a simplified graphic
representation of the key elements in future renewable-based
power systems using smart grid technology. 
A range of options are available to enable the large-scale
integration of variable renewable energy resources into the power
supply system. Some features of smart grids could be:
Managing level and timing of demand for electricity. Changes to
pricing schemes can give consumers financial incentives to reduce or
shut off their supply at periods of peak consumption, a system that
is already used for some large industrial customers. A Norwegian
power supplier even involves private household customers by sending
them a text message with a signal to shut down. Each household
can decide in advance whether or not they want to participate. In
Germany, experiments are being conducted with time flexible tariffs
so that washing machines operate at night and refrigerators turn off
temporarily during periods of high demand. 
Advances in communications technology. In Italy, for example, 30
million ‘smart meters’ have been installed to allow remote meter
reading and control of consumer and service information. Many
household electrical products or systems, such as refrigerators,
dishwashers, washing machines, storage heaters, water pumps and
air conditioning, can be managed either by temporary shut-off or by
rescheduling their time of operation, thus freeing up electricity load
for other uses and dovetailing it with variations in renewable supply.
Creating Virtual Power Plants (VPP). Virtual power plants
interconnect a range of real power plants (for example solar, wind
and hydro) as well as storage options distributed in the power
system using information technology. A real life example of a VPP
is the Combined Renewable Energy Power Plant developed by
three German companies.10 This system interconnects and controls
11 wind power plants, 20 solar power plants, four CHP plants
based on biomass and a pumped storage unit, all geographically
spread around Germany. The VPP monitors (and anticipates
through weather forecasts) when the wind turbines and solar
modules will be generating electricity. Biogas and pumped storage
units are used to make up the difference, either delivering
electricity as needed in order to balance short term fluctuations or
temporarily storing it.11 Together, the combination ensures
sufficient electricity supply to cover demand. 
Electricity storage options. Pumped storage is the most
established technology for storing energy from a type of
hydroelectric power station. Water is pumped from a lower
elevation reservoir to a higher elevation during times of low cost,
off-peak electricity. During periods of high electrical demand, the
stored water is released through turbines. Taking into account
evaporation losses from the exposed water surface and conversion
losses, roughly 70 to 85% of the electrical energy used to pump
the water into the elevated reservoir can be regained when it is
released. Pumped storage plants can also respond to changes in
the power system load demand within seconds. Pumped storage
has been successfully used for many decades all over the world.
In 2007, the European Union had 38 GW of pumped storage
capacity, representing 5% of total electrical capacity.
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
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9 SEE ALSO ECOGRID PHASE 1 SUMMARY REPORT, AVAILABLE AT:
HTTP://WWW.ENERGINET.DK/NR/RDONLYRES/8B1A4A06-CBA3-41DA-9402-
B56C2C288FB0/0/ECOGRIDDK_PHASE1_SUMMARYREPORT.PDF.
10 SEE ALSO HTTP://WWW.KOMBIKRAFTWERK.DE/INDEX.PHP?ID=27.
11 SEE ALSO HTTP://WWW.SOLARSERVER.DE/SOLARMAGAZIN/ANLAGEJANUAR2008_E.HTML.
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figure2.3: thesmart-gridvisionfortheenergy[r]evolution
A VISION FOR THE FUTURE – A NETWORK OF INTEGRATED MICROGRIDS THAT CAN MONITOR AND HEAL ITSELF.
PROCESSORS
EXECUTE SPECIAL PROTECTION
SCHEMES IN MICROSECONDS
SENSORS (ON ‘STANDBY’)
– DETECT FLUCTUATIONS AND
DISTURBANCES, AND CAN SIGNAL
FOR AREAS TO BE ISOLATED
SENSORS (‘ACTIVATED’)
– DETECT FLUCTUATIONS AND
DISTURBANCES, AND CAN SIGNAL
FOR AREAS TO BE ISOLATED
SMART APPLIANCES
CAN SHUT OFF IN RESPONSE 
TO FREQUENCY FLUCTUATIONS
DEMAND MANAGEMENT
USE CAN BE SHIFTED TO OFF-PEAK
TIMES TO SAVE MONEY
GENERATORS
ENERGY FROM SMALL GENERATORS
AND SOLAR PANELS CAN REDUCE
OVERALL DEMAND ON THE GRID
STORAGE ENERGY GENERATED AT
OFF-PEAK TIMES COULD BE STORED
IN BATTERIES FOR LATER USE
DISTURBANCE IN THE GRID
CENTRAL POWER PLANT
OFFICES WITH
SOLAR PANELS
WIND FARM
ISOLATED MICROGRID
SMART HOMES
INDUSTRIAL PLANT
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image AERIAL VIEW OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST
OFFSHORE WINDPARK IN THE NORTH SEA HORNS
REV IN ESBJERG, DENMARK.
Vehicle-to-Grid. Another way of ‘storing’ electricity is to use it to
directly meet the demand from electric vehicles. The number of
electric cars and trucks is expected to increase dramatically under
the Energy [R]evolution scenario. The Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G)
concept, for example, is based on electric cars equipped with
batteries that can be charged during times when there is surplus
renewable generation and then discharged to supply peaking capacity
or ancillary services to the power system while they are parked.
During peak demand times cars are often parked close to main load
centres, for instance outside factories, so there would be no network
issues. Within the V2G concept a Virtual Power Plant would be built
using ICT technology to aggregate the electric cars participating in
the relevant electricity markets and to meter the charging/de-
charging activities. In 2009, the EDISON demonstration project was
launched to develop and test the infrastructure for integrating
electric cars into the power system of the Danish island of Bornholm. 
2.3.3thesupergrid
Greenpeace simulation studies Renewables 24/7 (2010) and Battle
of the Grids (2011) have shown that extreme situations with low
solar radiation and little wind in many parts of Europe are not
frequent, but they can occur. The power system, even with massive
amounts of renewable energy, must be adequately designed to cope
with such an event. A key element in achieving this is through the
construction of new onshore and offshore super grids. 
The Energy [R]evolution scenario assumes that about 70% of all
generation is distributed and located close to load centres. The
remaining 30% will be large scale renewable generation such as
large offshore wind farms or large arrays of concentrating solar
power plants. A North Sea offshore super grid, for example, would
enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the power
system across the whole North Sea region, linking the UK, France,
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. By
aggregating power generation from wind farms spread across the
whole area, periods of very low or very high power flows would be
reduced to a negligible amount. A dip in wind power generation in
one area would be balanced by higher production in another area,
even hundreds of kilometres away. Over a year, an installed
offshore wind power capacity of 68.4 GW in the North Sea would
be able to generate an estimated 247 TWh of electricity.12
2.3.4baseloadblocksprogress
Generally, coal and nuclear plants run as so-called base load,
meaning they work most of the time at maximum capacity
regardless of how much electricity consumers need. When
demand is low the power is wasted. When demand is high
additional gas is needed as a backup. 
However, coal and nuclear cannot be turned down on windy days so
wind turbines will get switched off to prevent overloading the system.
The recent global economic crisis triggered a drop in energy demand
and revealed system conflict between inflexible base load power,
especially nuclear, and variable renewable sources, especially wind
power, with wind operators told to shut off their generators. In
Northern Spain and Germany, this uncomfortable mix is already
exposing the limits of the grid capacity. If Europe continues to
support nuclear and coal power alongside a growth in renewables,
clashes will occur more and more, creating a bloated, inefficient grid. 
Despite the disadvantages stacked against renewable energy it has
begun to challenge the profitability of older plants. After
construction costs, a wind turbine is generating electricity almost
for free and without burning any fuel. Meanwhile, coal and nuclear
plants use expensive and highly polluting fuels. Even where
nuclear plants are kept running and wind turbines are switched
off, conventional energy providers are concerned. Like any
commodity, oversupply reduces prices across the market. In energy
markets, this affects nuclear and coal too. We can expect more
intense conflicts over access to the grids over the coming years. 
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
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references
12 GREENPEACE REPORT, ‘NORTH SEA ELECTRICITY GRID [R]EVOLUTION’, SEPTEMBER 2008.
13 BATTLE OF THE GRIDS, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, FEBRUARY 2011.
box2.3: doweneedbaseloadpowerplants?13
Power from some renewable plants, such as wind and solar,
varies during the day and week. Some see this as an
insurmountable problem, because up until now we have
relied on coal or nuclear to provide a fixed amount of
power at all times. In current policy-making there is a
struggle to determine which type of infrastructure or
management we choose and which energy mix to favour as
we move away from a polluting, carbon intensive energy
system. Some important facts include:
• electricity demand fluctuates in a predictable way.
• smart management can work with big electricity users, so
their peak demand moves to a different part of the day,
evening out the load on the overall system.
• electricity from renewable sources can be stored and
‘dispatched’ to where it is needed in a number of ways,
using advanced grid technologies.
Wind-rich countries in Europe are already experiencing
conflict between renewable and conventional power. In Spain,
where a lot of wind and solar is now connected to the grid,
gas power is stepping in to bridge the gap between demand
and supply. This is because gas plants can be switched off or
run at reduced power, for example when there is low
electricity demand or high wind production. As we move to a
mostly renewable electricity sector, gas plants will be needed
as backup for times of high demand and low renewable
production. Effectively, a kWh from a wind turbine displaces
a kWh from a gas plant, avoiding carbon dioxide emissions.
Renewable electricity sources such as thermal solar plants
(CSP), geothermal, hydro, biomass and biogas can gradually
phase out the need for natural gas. (See Case Studies, section
2.4 for more). The gas plants and pipelines would then
progressively be converted for transporting biogas.
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figure2.4: atypicalloadcurvethroughouteurope,
showselectricityusepeakingandfallingonadailybasis
Time (hours/days)
L
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d 
(M
W
/G
W
) 
DEMAND
Current supply system 
• Low shares of fluctuating renewable energy
• The ‘base load’ power is a solid bar at the bottom of the graph. 
• Renewable energy forms a ‘variable’ layer because sun and wind
levels changes throughout the day.
• Gas and hydro power which can be switched on and off in
response to demand. This is sustainable using weather
forecasting and clever grid management.
• With this arrangement there is room for about 25 percent
variable renewable energy. 
To combat climate change much more than 25 percent renewable
electricity is needed.
Time of day (hour)
0h 6h 12h 18h 24h
G
W
 
LOAD CURVE
‘FLEXIBLE POWER’.
GRID OPERATOR
COMBINES GAS 
& HYDRO 
FLUCTUATING 
RE POWER
BASELOAD
Supply system with more than 25 percent fluctuating renewable
energy > base load priority
• This approach adds renewable energy but gives priority to 
base load.
• As renewable energy supplies grow they will exceed the demand
at some times of the day, creating surplus power.
• To a point, this can be overcome by storing power, moving
power between areas, shifting demand during the day or
shutting down the renewable generators at peak times. 
Does not work when renewables exceed 50 percent of the mix, and
can not provide renewable energy as 90- 100% of the mix. Time of day (hour)
0h 6h 12h 18h 24h
G
W
 
LOAD CURVE
SURPLUS RE 
- SEE FOLLOWING
OPTIONS
BASELOAD
PRIORITY: NO
CURTAILMENT
OF COAL OR
NUCLEAR POWER
BASELOAD
figure2.5: theevolvingapproachtogrids
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
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One of the key conclusions from Greenpeace research is that in
the coming decades, traditional power plants will have less and
less space to run in baseload mode. With increasing penetration
of variable generation from wind and photovoltaic in the
electricity grid, the remaining part of the system will have to run
in more ‘load following’ mode, filling the immediate gap between
demand and production. This means the economics of base load
plants like nuclear and coal will change fundamentally as more
variable generation is introduced to the electricity grid. 
Supply system with more than 25 percent fluctuating renewable
energy – renewable energy priority
• This approach adds renewables but gives priority to clean energy.
• If renewable energy is given priority to the grid, it “cuts into”
the base load power. 
• Theoretically, nuclear and coal need to run at reduced capacity or
be entirely turned off in peak supply times (very sunny or windy). 
• There are technical and safety limitations to the speed, scale
and frequency of changes in power output for nuclear and coal-
CCS plants. 
Technically difficult, not a solution. Time of day (hour)
0h 6h 12h 18h 24h
G
W
 
LOAD CURVE
RE PRIORITY:
CURTAILMENT OF
BASELOAD POWER
- TECHNICALLY
DIFFICULT IF NOT
IMPOSSIBLE
The solution: an optimised system with over 90% renewable 
energy supply
• A fully optimised grid, where 100 percent renewables operate
with storage, transmission of electricity to other regions, demand
management and curtailment only when required. 
• Demand-side management (DSM) effectively moves the highest
peak and ‘flattens out’ the curve of electricity use over a day.
Works!
Time of day (hour)
0h 6h 12h 18h 24h
G
W
 
LOAD CURVE 
WITH NO DSM
LOAD CURVE WITH
(OPTION 1 & 2)
RE POWER
IMPORTED FROM
OTHER REGIONS &
RE POWER FROM
STORAGE PLANTS
SUPPLY 
- WIND + SOLAR
PV
WIND
BIOENERGY, HYDRO, 
CSP & GEOTHERMAL
figure2.5: theevolvingapproachtogridscontinued
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2.4casestudy:ayearafterthegermannuclear
phaseout
On 30 May 2011, the German environment minister, Norbert
Röttgen, announced the Germany would close its eight oldest
nuclear plants and phase out the remaining nine reactors by
2022. The plan is to replace most of the generating capacity of
these nine reactors with renewables. The experience so far gives a
real example of the steps needed for a global Energy
[R]evolution at a national scale.
2.4.1targetandmethod
The German government expects renewables to generate 35% of
German electricity by 2020.14 The German Federal Environment
Agency believes that the phase out would be technically feasible
from 2017, requiring only 5 GW of additional combined heat-
and-power or combined cycle gas plant (other than those already
under construction) to meet peak time demand.15
2.4.2carbondioxideemissionstrends
The German energy ambassador, Dr. Georg Maue, reported to a
meeting in the British Parliament in February 2012 that
Germany was still on track to meet its CO2 reduction targets of
40% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels. Figures for
Germany’s 2011 greenhouse gas emissions were not available for
this report, although the small growth in use of lignite fuels is
likely to have increased emissions in the short term.
However, the decision to phase out nuclear energy has renewed
the political pressure to deliver a secure climate-friendly energy
policy and ensure Germany still meets its greenhouse targets. The
Energiewende (‘energy transition’) measures include 
€ 200 billion investment in renewable energy over the next
decade, a major push on energy efficiency and an accelerated roll
out of infrastructure to support the transition.16 Germany has
also become an advocate for renewables at the European level.17
In the longer-term, by deploying a large amount of renewable
capability Germany should be able to continue reducing its
emissions at this accelerated rate and its improved industrial
production should make it more viable for other countries to
deliver greater and faster emissions reductions. 
2.4.3shortfallfromfirstroundofclosures
The oldest eight nuclear reactors were closed immediately and
based on figures available it looks like the ‘shortfall’ will be
covered by a mix of lower demand, increasing renewable energy
supply, and a small part by fossil-fuelled power. 
In 2011 only 18% of the country’s energy generation came from
nuclear.18 In the previous year, nuclear energy’s contribution had
already fallen from 22% to 18%, a shortfall covered mostly by
renewable electricity which increased from 16% to 20% in the
same period, while use of lignite (a greenhouse-intensive fossil
fuel) increased from 23% to 25%.
In the first half of 2011, Germany was a net exporter of electricity
(Figure 2.9), exporting 29 billion kWh and importing 24 kWh.19
Complete figures for electricity imports and exports in the second
half of 2011 are not yet available, once nuclear reactors were
decommissioned, however it is known that Germany exported
electricity to France during a cold spell in February 2012.20
Inside Germany, the demand for energy is falling.21 Between 2010
and 2011 energy demand dropped by 5%, because the mild
weather reduced demand for gas heating. While the British
government is planning for electricity demand in the UK to
double by 2050, the German government expects a cut of 25%
from 2008 levels.22 Total energy demand is expected to halve over
the same time period.
2.4.4therenewableenergysectoringermany
Germany has successfully increased the share of renewable
energy constantly over the last twenty years (see Figures 2.6 and
2.7), and the sector was employing over 350,000 employees by
the end of 2011. The back bone of this development has been the
Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz – EEG); a
feed-in law which guarantees a fixed tariff per kWh for 20 years.
The tariffs are different for each technology and between smaller
and larger, to reflect their market penetration rates.
references
14 HTTP://WWW.UMWELTDATEN.DE/PUBLIKATIONEN/FPDF-L/4147.PDF
15 HTTP://WWW.UMWELTDATEN.DE/PUBLIKATIONEN/FPDF-L/4147.PDF
16 HTTP://WWW.ERNEUERBARE-ENERGIEN.DE/INHALT/47872/3860/
17 HTTP://WWW.ERNEUERBARE-ENERGIEN.DE/INHALT/48192/3860/
18 THE GERMAN ASSOCIATION OF ENERGY AND WATER INDUSTRIES (BDEW), 16 DECEMBER 2011.
HTTP://WWW.BDEW.DE/INTERNET.NSF/ID/EN_?OPEN&CCM=900010020010
19 HTTP://WWW.BDEW.DE/INTERNET.NSF/ID/8EF9E5927BDAAE28C12579260029ED3B/$FILE/110912%
20RICHTIGSTELLUNG%20IMPORT-EXPORT-ZAHLEN_ENGLISCH.PDF 
20 HTTP://WWW.REUTERS.COM/ARTICLE/2012/02/14/EUROPE-POWER-SUPPLY-IDUSL5E8DD87020120214 
21 HTTP://WWW.AG-ENERGIEBILANZEN.DE/COMPONENTEN/DOWNLOAD.PHP?FILEDATA=1329148695.PDF&
FILENAME=AGEB_PRESSEDIENST_09_2011EN.PDF&MIMETYPE=APPLICATION/PDF 
22 HTTP://WWW.BMU.DE/FILES/ENGLISH/PDF/APPLICATION/PDF/ENERGIEKONZEPT_BUNDESREGIERUNG_EN.PDF
(PAGE 5)
2.4.5energyandclimatetargets
The German government agreed on short, medium and long term
– binding - targets for renewable, energy efficiency and
greenhouse gas reduction (Table 2.2). 
2.4.6detailsofthegermannuclearphase-outplan
The following figure shows where the nuclear power stations are
located and when they will be shut down. The last nuclear reactor
will be closed down in 2022.
2.4.7no‘blackouts’
The nuclear industry has implied there would be a “black-out” in
winter 2011 - 2012, or that Germany would need to import
electricity from neighbouring countries, when the first set of
reactors were closed. Neither event happened, and Germany
actually remained a net- export of electricity during the first
winter. The table below shows the electricity flow over the borders.
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
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figure2.6: renewableenergysourcesasashareofenergysupplyingermany
•2002• 2004• 2006• 2007• 2008
• 2009• 2010• 2011•TARGET 2020
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a TARGETS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES ACT (EEG). RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES HEAT ACT (EEWärmeG). EU-DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC.
b TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF ENGINE FUELS, EXCLUDING FUEL IN AIR TRAFFIC.
c CALCULATED USING EFFICIENCY METHOD; SOURCE: WORKING GROUP ON ENERGY BALANCES e.V. (AGEB); RES: RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES; SOURCE: BMU-KI III 1 ACCORDING TO
WORKING GROUP ON RENEWABLE ENERGY-STATISTICS (AGEE-STAT); AS AT: MARCH 2012; ALL FIGURES PROVISIONAL.
figure2.7: renewableenergysourcesintotalfinal
energyconsumptioningermany2011/2010
•HYDROPOWER• BIOMASS• SOLAR THERMAL ENERGY• BIOGENIC FUELS
•WIND ENERGY• PHOTOVOLTAICS• GEOTHERMAL ENERGY
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PRODUCED; DEVIATIONS IN THE TOTALS ARE DUE TO ROUNDING; SOURCE: BMU-KI III 1 ACCORDING TO
WORKING GROUP ON RENEWABLE ENERGY-STATISTICS (AGEE-STAT); AS AT: MARCH 2012; ALL FIGURES
PROVISIONAL.
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figure 2.8: phaseoutofnuclearenergy
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table2.2: germangovernmentshort,mediumandlongtermbindingtargets
2020
2030
2040
2040
EFFICIENCYCLIMATE
GREENHOUSE
GASES (VS 1990)
- 40%
- 55%
- 70%
- 85-95%
PRIMARY
ENERGY
CONSUMPTION
-20%
-50%
ENERGY
PRODUCTIVITY
Increase to
2.1% annum
BUILDING
MODERNISATION
Double the rate
1%-2%
RENEWABLE ENERGIES
OVERALL SHARE 
(Gross final energy
consumption)
18%
30%
45%
60%
SHARE OF
ELECTRICITY
35%
50%
65%
80%
figure 2.9: electricityimports/exportsgermany
JANUARY TO NOVEMBER 2011. (VOLUME MEASURE IN MILLION KWH)
France 
Czech Rep.
Austria
Denmark
Netherlands
Switzerland
Sweden
Luxembourg
Poland
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000
Million
kWh
Million
kWh
NET EXPORT IN
2011: 3.7 TWH
IMPORT FROM...
+18,679
+7,195
-8,922
+1,496
+5,530
-9,563
+1,073
-4,254
-3,872
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000
EXPORT TO...
2011 BROKDORF
2011 BRUNSBÜTTEL
2011 KRÜMMEL
2011 GROHNDE
2015 GRAFENRHEINFELD
2011/2011 BIBLIS A/B
2011 UNTERWESER
2022 EMSLAND
2011/2022 NECKARWESTHEIM 1/2
2017/2021 GRUNDREMMINGEN B/C
2011/2022 ISAR 1/2
2011/2019 PHILIPPSBURG 1/2
• Seven oldest plants plus
Krümmel: immediate
decommissioning
• Gradual phasing out of
nuclear power by 2022
• Shutdown years: 2015,
2017, 2019, 2021, 2022
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BIOENERGY VILLAGE OF JUEHNDE. IT IS THE FIRST
COMMUNITY IN GERMANY THAT PRODUCES ALL OF
ITS ENERGY NEEDED FOR HEATING AND
ELECTRICITY, WITH CO2 NEUTRAL BIOMASS.
source UMWELTBUNDESAMT (UBA) 2012, GERMAN MINISTRY FOR ENVIRONMENT 
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implementingtheenergy[r]evolution
image AT THE END OF FEBRUARY SNOW IS MELTING IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE, HINTING AT THE SPRING THAT IS COMING. IN THE FALSE-COLOR IMAGE, WATER IS BLACK
AND DARK BLUE. SNOW IS LIGHT BLUE, AND CLOUDS ARE A LIGHTER SHADE OF BLUE. VEGETATION IS BRIGHT GREEN.
RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT
PLANNING BASICS
RENEWABLE ENERGY 
FINANCING BASICS
investments
inrenewables
areinvestments
inthefuture.”
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3.1renewableenergyprojectplanningbasics
The renewable energy market works significantly different than the
coal, gas or nuclear power market. The table below provides an
overview of the ten steps from “field to an operating power plant”
for renewable energy projects in the current market situation. Those
steps are similar for each renewable energy technology, however
step 3 and 4 are especially important for wind and solar projects.
In developing countries the government and the mostly state-owned
utilities might directly or indirectly take responsibilities of the
project developers. The project developer might also work as a
subdivision of a state-owned utility. 
table3.1: howdoesthecurrentrenewableenergymarketworkinpractice?
P = Project developer, M = Meteorological Experts, I = Investor, U = utility.
STEP WHAT WILL BE DONE? NEEDED INFORMATION / POLICY 
AND/OR INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
WHO?
Step 1:
Site identification
Identify the best locations for generators (e.g. wind
turbines) and pay special attention to technical and
commercial data, conservation issues and any
concerns that local communities may have.
Resource analysis to identify possible sites
Policy stability in order to make sure that the policy
is still in place once Step 10 has been reached. 
Without a certainty that the renewable electricity
produced can be fed entirely into the grid to a reliable
tariff, the entire process will not start. 
P
Step 2:
Securing land 
under civil law
Secure suitable locations through purchase and
lease agreements with land owners.
Transparent planning, efficient authorisation 
and permitting.
P
Step 3:
Determining 
site specific
potential
Site specific resource analysis (e.g. wind
measurement on hub height) from independent
experts. This will NOT be done by the project
developer as (wind) data from independent experts
is a requirement for risk assessments by investors.
See above.P + M
Step 4:
Technical planning/
micrositing
Specialists develop the optimum configuration or
sites for the technology, taking a wide range of
parameters into consideration in order to achieve
the best performance. 
See above.P
Step 5:
Permit process
Organise all necessary surveys, put together the
required documentation and follow the whole
permit process.
Transparent planning, efficient authorisation 
and permitting.
P
Step 6:
Grid connection
planning
Electrical engineers work with grid operators to
develop the optimum grid connection concept.
Priority access to the grid.
Certainty that the entire amount of electricity
produced can be feed into the grid.
P + U
Step 7:
Financing
Once the entire project design is ready and the
estimated annual output (in kWh/a) has been
calculated, all permits are processed and the total
finance concept (incl. total investment and profit
estimation) has been developed, the project
developer will contact financial institutions to either
apply for a loan and/or sell the entire project.
Long term power purchase contract.
Prior and mandatory access to the grid.
Site specific analysis (possible annual output).
P + I
Step 8:
Construction
Civil engineers organise the entire construction phase.
This can be done by the project developer or another.
EPC (Engineering, procurement & construction)
company – with the financial support from the investor.
Signed contracts with grid operator.
Signed contract with investors.
P + I
Step 9:
Start of operation
Electrical engineers make sure that the power
plant will be connected to the power grid.
Prior access to the grid (to avoid curtailment).P + U
Step 10:
Business and
operations
management
Optimum technical and commercial operation of
power plants/farms throughout their entire
operating life – for the owner (e.g. a bank).
Good technology & knowledge (A cost-saving
approach and “copy + paste engineering” will be more
expensive in the long-term).
P + U + I
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3.2renewableenergyfinancingbasics
The Swiss RE Private Equity Partners have provided an
introduction to renewable energy infrastructure investing
(September 2011) which describes what makes renewable energy
projects different from fossil-fuel based energy assets from a
finance perspective:
• Renewable energy projects have short construction periods
compared to conventional energy generation and other
infrastructure assets. Renewable projects have limited ramp-up
periods, and construction periods of one to three years, compared
to ten years to build large conventional power plants.
• The Renewable Energy Directive granted priority of dispatch to
renewable energy producers. Under this principle, grid
operators are usually obliged to connect renewable power
plants to their grid and for retailers or other authorised entities
to purchase all renewable electricity produced.
• Renewable projects present relatively low operational
complexity compared to other energy generation assets or other
infrastructure asset classes. Onshore wind and solar PV
projects in particular have well established operational track
records. This is obviously less the case for biomass or offshore
wind plants.
• Renewable projects typically have non-recourse financining,
through a mix of debt and equity. In contrast to traditional
corporate lending, project finance relies on future cash flows
for interest and debt repayment, rather than the asset value or
the historical financial performance of a company. Project
finance debt typically covers 70–90% of the cost of a project,
is non-recourse to the investors, and ideally matches the
duration of the underlying contractual agreements.
• Renewable power typically has predictable cash flows and it is
not subject to fuel price volatility because the primary energy
resource is generally freely available. Contractually guaranteed
tariffs, as well as moderate costs of erecting, operating and
maintaining renewable generation facilities, allow for high
profit margins and predictable cash flows.
• Renewable electricity remuneration mechanisms often include
some kind of inflation indexation, although incentive schemes
may vary on a case-by-case basis. For example, several tariffs
in the EU are indexed to consumer price indices and adjusted
on an annual basis (e.g. Italy). In projects where specific
inflation protection is not provided (e.g. Germany), the
regulatory framework allows selling power on the spot market,
should the power price be higher than the guaranteed tariff.
• Renewable power plants have expected long useful lives (over
20 years). Transmission lines usually have economic lives of
over 40 years. Renewable assets are typically underpinned by
long-term contracts with utilities and benefit from
governmental support and manufacturer warranties.
• Renewable energy projects deliver attractive and stable sources
of income, only loosely linked to the economic cycle. Project
owners do not have to manage fuel cost volatility and projects
generate high operating margins with relatively secure revenues
and generally limited market risk. 
• The widespread development of renewable power generation
will require significant investments in the electricity network.
As discussed in Chapter 2 future networks (smart grids) will
have to integrate an ever-increasing, decentralised, fluctuating
supply of renewable energy. Furthermore, suppliers and/or
distribution companies will be expected to deliver a
sophisticated range of services by embedding digital grid
devices into power networks. 
Opportunites
Power generation Transmission & storage
Investors benefits
figure3.1: returncharacteristicsofrenewableenergies
source
SWISS RE PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERS.
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image A LARGE SOLAR SYSTEM OF 63M2 RISES ON
THE ROOF OF A HOTEL IN CELERINA, SWITZERLAND.
THE COLLECTOR IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE HOT
WATER AND HEATING SUPPORT AND CAN SAVE
ABOUT 6,000 LITERS OF OIL PER YEAR. THUS, THE CO2
EMISSIONS AND COMPANY COSTS CAN BE REDUCED.
Risk assessment and allocation is at the centre of project finance.
Accordingly, project structuring and expected return are directly
related to the risk profile of the project. The four main risk factors
to consider when investing in renewable energy assets are: 
• Regulatory risks refer to adverse changes in laws and
regulations, unfavourable tariff setting and change or breach of
contracts. As long as renewable energy relies on government
policy dependent tariff schemes, it will remain vulnerable to
changes in regulation. However a diversified investment across
regulatory jurisdictions, geographies, and technologies can help
mitigate those risks.
• Construction risks relate to the delayed or costly delivery of an
asset, the default of a contracting party, or an
engineering/design failure. Construction risks are less prevalent
for renewable energy projects because they have relatively
simple design. However, construction risks can be mitigated by
selecting high-quality and experienced turnkey partners, using
proven technologies and established equipment suppliers as well
as agreeing on retentions and construction guarantees. 
• Financing risks refer to the inadequate use of debt in the
financial structure of an asset. This comprises the abusive use
of leverage, the exposure to interest rate volatility as well as
the need to refinance at less favourable terms. 
• Operational risks include equipment failure, counterparty default
and reduced availability of the primary energy source (e.g. wind,
heat, radiation). For renewable assets a lower than forecasted
resource availability will result in lower revenues and profitability
so this risk can damage the business case. For instance, abnormal
wind regimes in Northern Europe over the last few years have
resulted in some cases in breach of coverage ratios and in the
inability of some projects to pay dividends to shareholders.
REGULATORY RISKS CONSTRUCTION RISKS
figure3.2: overviewriskfactorsforrenewable
energyprojects
FINANCING RISKS OPERATIONAL RISKS
source
SWISS RE PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERS.
Stage
Strategy
RISKS
DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
EARLY-STAGE GREENFIELD LATE-STAGE GREENFIELD BROWNFIELD
figure3.3: investmentstagesofrenewableenergyprojects
source
SWISS RE PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERS.
• Site identification
• Approval & permitting process
• Land procurement
• Technical planning
• Financing close
• Equipment procurement
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• Construction
• Commissioning
• Operations
• Maintenance
• Refinancing
• Refurbishment/Repowering
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Despite the relatively strong growth in renewable energies in
some countries, there are still many barriers which hinder the
rapid uptake of renewable energy needed to achieve the scale of
development required. The key barriers to renewable energy
investment identified by Greenpeace through a literature review23
and interviews with renewable energy sector financiers and
developers are shown in Figure 3.4. 
There are broad categories of common barriers to renewable energy
development that are present in many countries, however the nature
of the barriers differs significantly. At the local level, political and
policy support, grid infrastructure, electricity markets and planning
regulations have to be negotiated for new projects.
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
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3.2.1overcomingbarrierstofinanceandinvestment
forrenewableenergy
table3.2: categorisationofbarrierstorenewableenergyinvestment
CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY EXAMPLE BARRIERS
Barriers to finance Cost barriers
Insufficient information and experience
Financial structure
Project and industry scale
Investor confidence
Costs of renewable energy to generate
Market failures (e.g. insufficient carbon price)
Energy prices
Technical barriers
Competing technologies (gas, nuclear, CCS and coal)
Overrated risks
Lack of experienced investors 
Lack of experienced project developers
Weak finance sectors in some countries
Up-front investment cost
Costs of debt and equity
Leverage
Risk levels and finance horizon
Equity/credit/bond options
Security for investment
Relative small industry scale
Smaller project scale
Confidence in long term policy
Confidence in short term policy
Confidence in the renewable energy market
Other investment
barriers
Government renewable energy policy and law
System integration and infrastructure
Lock-in of existing technologies
Permitting and planning regulation
Government economic position and policy 
Skilled human resources 
National governance and legal system
Renewable energy targets
Feed-in tariffs
Framework law stability
Local content rules
Access to grid
Energy infrastructure
Overall national infrastructure quality
Energy market
Contracts between generators and users
Subsidies to other technologies 
Grid lock-in
Skills lock-in
Lobbying power
Favourability
Transparency
Public support
Monetary policy e.g. interest rates
Fiscal policy e.g. stimulus and austerity
Currency risks
Tariffs in international trade
Lack of training courses
Political stability
Corruption
Robustness of legal system
Litigation risks
Intellectual property rights
Institutional awareness
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It is uncertainty of policy that is holding back investment more than
an absence of policy support mechanisms. In the short term,
investors aren’t confident rules will remain unaltered and aren’t
confident that renewable energy goals will be met in the longer
term, let alone increased. 
When investors are cautious about taking on these risks, it drives up
investment costs and the difficulty in accessing finance is a barrier
to renewable energy project developers. Contributing factors include
a lack of information and experience among investors and project
developers, involvement of smaller companies and projects and a
high proportion of up-front costs. 
Grid access and grid infrastructure are also major barriers to
developers, because they are not certain they will be able to sell all the
electricity they generate in many countries, during project development.
Both state and private utilities are contributing to blocking
renewable energy through their market power and political power,
maintaining ‘status quo’ in the grid, electricity markets for
centralised coal and nuclear power and lobbying against pro-
renewable and climate protection laws.
The sometimes higher cost of renewable energy relative to competitors
is still a barrier, though many are confident that it will be overcome in
the coming decades. The Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources
and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN) identifies cost as the most
significant barrier to investment24 and while it exists, renewable energy
will rely on policy intervention by governments in order to be
competitive, which creates additional risks for investors. It is important
to note though, that in some regions of the world specific renewable
technologies are broadly competitive with current market energy prices
(e.g. onshore wind in Europe).
Concerns over planning and permit issues are significant, though vary
significantly in their strength and nature depending on the jurisdiction.
3.2.2howtoovercomeinvestmentbarriers
forrenewableenergy
To see an Energy [R]evolution will require a mix of policy
measures, finance, grid, and development. In summary:
• Additional and improved policy support mechanisms for
renewable energy are needed in all countries and regions.
• Building confidence in the existing policy mechanisms may be just as
important as making them stronger, particularly in the short term.
• Improved policy mechanisms can also lower the cost of finance,
particularly by providing longer durations of revenue support
and increasing revenue certainty.25
• Access to finance can be increased by greater involvement of
governments and development banks in programs like loan
guarantees and green bonds as well as more active private investors. 
• Grid access and infrastructure needs to be improved through
investment in smart, decentralised grids.
• Lowering the cost of renewable energy technologies directly will
require industry development and boosted research and development.
• A smoother pathway for renewable energy needs to be established
through planning and permit issues at the local level.
references
23 SOURCES INCLUDE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) (2011) SPECIAL REPORT ON
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (SRREN), 15TH JUNE 2011. UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP), BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE (BNEF) (2011). GLOBAL
TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2011, JULY 2011. RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (REN21) (2011). RENEWABLES 2011, GLOBAL STATUS REPORT, 12 JULY, 2011. ECOFYS,
FRAUNHOFER ISI, TU VIENNA EEG, ERNST & YOUNG (2011). FINANCING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE
EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET BY ORDER OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG ENERGY, 2ND OF JANUARY, 2011.
24 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) (2011) SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (SRREN). 15TH JUNE 2011. CHP. 11, P.24.
25 CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE (2011):THE IMPACTS OF POLICY ON THE FINANCING OF RENEWABLE
PROJECTS: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS, 3 OCTOBER 2011.
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figure3.4: keybarrierstorenewableenergyinvestment
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image SOVARANI KOYAL LIVES IN SATJELLIA ISLAND AND IS ONE OF THE MANY PEOPLE
AFFECTED BY SEA LEVEL RISE: “NOWADAYS, HEAVY FLOODS ARE GOING ON HERE. THE WATER
LEVEL IS INCREASING AND THE TEMPERATURE TOO. WE CANNOT LIVE HERE, THE HEAT IS
BECOMING UNBEARABLE. WE HAVE RECEIVED A PLASTIC SHEET AND HAVE COVERED OUR
HOME WITH IT. DURING THE COMING MONSOON WE SHALL WRAP OUR BODIES IN THE PLASTIC TO
STAY DRY. WE HAVE ONLY A FEW GOATS BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THEY ARE. WE ALSO
HAVE TWO CHILDREN AND WE CANNOT MANAGE TO FEED THEM.”
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scenarioforafutureenergysupply
SCENARIO BACKGROUND
POPULATION DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
OIL AND GAS PRICE PROJECTIONS
COST OF CO2 EMISSIONS
COST PROJECTIONS FOR EFFICIENT
FOSSIL FUEL GENERATION AND CCS
COST PROJECTIONS FOR RENEWABLE
HEATING TECHNOLOGIES
ASSUMPTIONS FOR FOSSIL FUEL
PHASE OUT
REVIEW: GREENPEACE SCENARIO
PROJECTS OF THE PAST
HOW DOES THE E[R] SCENARIO
COMPARE TO OTHER SCENARIOS
4
4
image BLUSTERY WEATHER SPREADS ACROSS EUROPE BLASTING EVEN THE NORMALLY BALMY SPAIN WITH SNOW AND FREEZING TEMPERATURES. THE SNOW IS CENTERED
ON THREE AREAS: THE CANTABRIAN MOUNTAINS ON THE NORTHERN COAST, THE CENTER OF THE COUNTRY NEAR THE CAPITAL, MADRID, AND IN THE PYRENEES MOUNTAINS
ON THE FRENCH BORDER. THE SNOW IS TURQUOISE, WHILE CLOUD IS WHITE. 
towards
asustainable
energysupply
system.”
“
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Moving from principles to action for energy supply that mitigates
against climate change requires a long-term perspective. Energy
infrastructure takes time to build up; new energy technologies
take time to develop. Policy shifts often also need many years to
take effect. In most world regions the transformation from fossil
to renewable energies will require additional investment and
higher supply costs over about twenty years. However, there will
be tremendous economic benefits in the long term, due to much
lower consumption of increasingly expensive, rare or imported
fuels. Any analysis that seeks to tackle energy and environmental
issues therefore needs to look ahead at least half a century. 
Scenarios are necessary to describe possible development paths,
to give decision-makers a broad overview and indicate how far
they can shape the future energy system. Two scenarios are used
here to show the wide range of possible pathways in each world
region for a future energy supply system: 
• Reference scenario, reflecting a continuation of current trends
and policies.
• The Energy [R]evolution scenario, designed to achieve a set of
environmental policy targets. 
The Reference scenario is based on the AMS Mesure scenario,
prepared by Enerdata for the french DG Climate and Energy. It
only integrates French policies that exist by the 1st January
2010. It is so far the most faithful scenario to the DG’s vision for
energy, although since the 2012 elections a new vision on
electricity, reducing nuclear power’s share to 50%, has been
defined. This scenario basically integrates policies framed by the
Grenelle’s process (started in 2007) although it does not meet its
initial targets. As the scenario ends in 2030, it has extended by
extrapolating its key macroeconomic and energy indicators
forward to 2050. This provides a baseline for comparison with the
Energy [R]evolution scenario.
The global Energy [R]evolution scenario has a key target to
reduce worldwide carbon dioxide emissions from energy use down
to a level of below 4 Gigatonnes per year by 2050 in order to
hold the increase in average global temperature under +2°C. A
second objective is the global phasing out of nuclear energy. The
Energy [R]evolution scenarios published by Greenpeace in 2007,
2008 and 2010 included ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ scenarios, the less
ambitious target was for 10 Gigatonnes CO2 emissions per year
by 2050. However, this 2012 revision only focuses on the more
ambitious “advanced” Energy [R]evolution scenario first
published in 2010. 
This global carbon dioxide emission reduction target translates
into a carbon budget for Europe (EU 27) and this into a carbon
budget for France: the basis of this Energy [R]evolution for
France. To achieve the target, the scenario includes significant
efforts to fully exploit the large potential for energy efficiency,
using currently available best practice technology. At the same
time, all cost-effective renewable energy sources are used for heat
and electricity generation as well as the production of biofuels.
The general framework parameters for population and GDP
growth remain unchanged from the Reference scenario.
Efficiency in use of electricity and fuels in industry and “other
sectors” has been completely re-evaluated using a consistent
approach based on technical efficiency potentials and energy
intensities. The resulting consumption pathway is close to the
projection of the earlier editions. One key difference for the new
Energy [R]evolution scenario is it incorporates stronger efforts to
develop better technologies to achieve CO2 reduction. There is lower
demand factored into the transport sector (compared to the basic
scenario in 2008 and 2010), from a change in driving patterns and
a faster uptake of efficient combustion vehicles and a larger share
of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles after 2025. This scenario
contains a lower use of biofuels for private vehicles following the
latest scientific reports that indicate that biofuels might have a
higher greenhouse gas emission footprint than fossil fuels. Current
EU sustainability standards for biofuels are insufficient to avoid
competition with food growing and to avoid deforestation.
The new Energy [R]evolution scenario also foresees a shift in the
use of renewables from power to heat, thanks to the enormous
and diverse potential for renewable power. Assumptions for the
heating sector include a fast expansion of the use of district heat
and more electricity for process heat in the industry sector. More
geothermal heat pumps are also included, which leads to a higher
overall electricity demand, when combined with a larger share of
electric cars for transport. A faster expansion of solar and
geothermal heating systems is also assumed. Hydrogen generated
by electrolysis and renewable electricity is introduced in this
scenario as third renewable fuel in the transport sector after
2025, complementary to biofuels and direct use of renewable
electricity. Hydrogen is also applied as a chemical storage
medium for electricity from renewables and used in industrial
combustion processes and cogeneration for provision of heat and
electricity, as well, and for short periods also reconversion into
electricity. Hydrogen generation can have high energy losses,
however the limited potentials of biofuels and probably also
battery electric mobility makes it necessary to have a third
renewable option. Alternatively, this renewable hydrogen could be
converted into synthetic methane or liquid fuels depending on
economic benefits (storage costs vs. additional losses) as well as
technology and market development in the transport sector
(combustion engines vs. fuel cells).
In all sectors, the latest market development projections of the
renewable energy industry27 have been taken into account. The fast
introduction of electric vehicles, combined with the implementation
of smart grids and fast expansion of super grids allows a high
share of fluctuating renewable power generation (photovoltaic and
wind) to be employed.  In the global secenario, renewable energy
would pass 30% of the global energy supply just after 2020. The
Energy [R]evolution scenario for France shows that renewable
energy would pass 15% of France's energy supply before 2020.
The quantities of biomass power generators and large hydro
power remain limited in the new Energy [R]evolution scenarios,
for reasons of ecological sustainability. 
reference
27 SEE EREC (‘RE-THINKING 2050’), GWEC, EPIA ET AL.
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AT MIDDELGRUNDEN NEAR COPENHAGEN, DENMARK.
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These scenarios by no means claim to predict the future; they
simply describe and compare two potential development
pathways out of the broad range of possible ‘futures’. The Energy
[R]evolution scenarios are designed to indicate the efforts and
actions required to achieve their ambitious objectives and to
illustrate the options we have at hand to change our energy
supply system into one that is truly sustainable.
4.1scenariobackground
The scenarios in this report were jointly commissioned by
Greenpeace and the European Renewable Energy Council from
the Systems Analysis group of the Institute of Technical
Thermodynamics, part of the German Aerospace Center (DLR).
The supply scenarios were calculated using the MESAP/PlaNet
simulation model adopted in the previous Energy [R]evolution
studies.28 The new energy demand projections were developed
from the University of Utrecht, Netherlands, based on an analysis
of the future potential for energy efficiency measures in 2012.
The biomass potential calculated for previous editions, judged
according to Greenpeace sustainability criteria, has been
developed by the German Biomass Research Centre in 2009 and
has been further reduced for precautionary principles. The future
development pathway for car technologies is based on a special
report produced in 2012 by the Institute of Vehicle Concepts,
DLR for Greenpeace International. Finally the Institute for
Sustainable Futures (ISF) analysed the employment effects of
the Energy [R]evolution and Reference scenarios. 
4.1.1statusandfutureprojectionsforrenewable
heatingtechnologies
EREC and DLR undertook detailed research about the current
renewable heating technology markets, market forecasts, cost
projections and state of the technology development. The cost
projection as well as the technology option have been used as an
input information for this new Energy [R]evolution scenario.
4.2populationdevelopment
Future population development is an important factor in energy
scenario building because population size affects the size and
composition of energy demand, directly and through its impact on
economic growth and development. The Energy [R]evolution
scenario uses the UNEP World Population Prospect 2010
projection for population development.
4.3economicgrowth
Economic growth is a key driver for energy demand. Since 1971,
each 1% increase in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has
been accompanied by a 0.6% increase in primary energy
consumption. The decoupling of energy demand and GDP growth
is therefore a prerequisite for an energy revolution. Most global
energy/economic/environmental models constructed in the past
have relied on market exchange rates to place countries in a
common currency for estimation and calibration. This approach
has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years,
and an alternative has been proposed in the form of purchasing
power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Purchasing power parities
compare the costs in different currencies of a fixed basket of
traded and non-traded goods and services and yield a widely-
based measure of the standard of living. This is important in
analysing the main drivers of energy demand or for comparing
energy intensities among countries. 
Although PPP assessments are still relatively imprecise
compared to statistics based on national income and product
trade and national price indexes, they are considered to provide a
better basis for a scenario development.29 Thus all data on
economic development in WEO 2011 refers to purchasing power
adjusted GDP. However, as WEO 2011 only covers the time period
up to 2035, the projections for 2035-2050 for the Energy
[R]evolution scenario are based on our own estimates. 
Prospects for GDP growth have decreased considerably since the
previous study, due to the financial crisis at the beginning of 2009,
although underlying growth trends continue much the same. GDP
growth in all regions is expected to slow gradually over the coming
decades. World GDP is assumed to grow on average by 3.8% per
year over the period 2009-2030, compared to 3.1% from 1971 to
2007, and on average by 3.1% per year over the entire modelling
period (2009-2050). China and India are expected to grow faster
than other regions, followed by the Middle East, Africa, remaining
Non-OECD Asia, and Eastern Europe/Eurasia. The Chinese
economy will slow as it becomes more mature, but will
nonetheless become the largest in the world in PPP terms early in
the 2020s. GDP in Europe (EU 27) is assumed to grow by on
average 1.6% per year while France’s economy is projected to
grow 1.2% per year over the projection period. 
table 4.1: populationdevelopmentprojections
(IN MILLIONS) 
source UNEP WORLD POPULATION PROSPECT 2010.
2015
67
2009
65
2020
69
2030
72
2040
74
2050
76France
references
28 ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION: A SUSTAINABLE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK’, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL,
2007, 2008 AND 2010.
29 NORDHAUS, W, ‘ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF OUTPUT IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL
MODELS: PURCHASING POWER PARITY OR MARKET EXCHANGE RATES?’, REPORT PREPARED FOR IPCC
EXPERT MEETING ON EMISSION SCENARIOS, US-EPA WASHINGTON DC, JANUARY 12-14, 2005.
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image FIRE BOAT RESPONSE CREWS BATTLE THE
BLAZING REMNANTS OF THE OFFSHORE OIL RIG
DEEPWATER HORIZON APRIL 21, 2010. MULTIPLE
COAST GUARD HELICOPTERS, PLANES AND
CUTTERS RESPONDED TO RESCUE THE DEEPWATER
HORIZON’S 126 PERSON CREW.
4.4oilandgaspriceprojections
The recent dramatic fluctuations in global oil prices have resulted
in slightly higher forward price projections for fossil fuels. Under
the 2004 ‘high oil and gas price’ scenario from the European
Commission, for example, an oil price of just € 28 per barrel (/bbl)
was assumed in 2030. More recent projections of oil prices by
2035 in the IEA’s WEO 2011 range from € 80/bbl in the 450
ppm scenario up to € 116/bbl in current policies scenario.
Since the first Energy [R]evolution study was published in 2007,
however, the actual price of oil has reached over € 83/bbl for the
first time, and in July 2008 reached a record high of more than 
€ 116/bbl. Although oil prices fell back to € 83/bbl in September
2008 and around € 66/bbl in April 2010, prices have increased
to more than € 91/bbl in early 2012. Thus, the projections in the
IEA Current Policies scenario might still be considered too
conservative. Taking into account the growing global demand for
oil we have assumed a price development path for fossil fuels
slightly higher than the IEA WEO 2011 “Current Policies” case
extrapolated forward to 2050 (see Table 4.3). 
As the supply of natural gas is limited by the availability of
pipeline infrastructure, there is no world market price for gas. In
most regions of the world the gas price is directly tied to the
price of oil. Gas prices are therefore assumed to increase to €20-
25/GJ by 2050.
table 4.2: gdpdevelopmentprojections
(AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES)
source2009-2035: IEA WEO 2011 AND 2035-2050: DLR, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION (2012)
2020-2035
3.2%
2.3%
1.4%
1.8%
1.5%
3.2%
5.8%
4.2%
3.2%
2.8%
3.7%
4.4%
2009-2020
4.2%
2.7%
2.4%
2.1%
1.6%
4.2%
7.6%
8.2%
5.2%
4.0%
4.3%
4.5%
2035-2050
2.2%
1.2%
0.5%
1.0%
1.0%
1.9%
3.1%
2.7%
2.6%
2.2%
2.8%
4.2%
2009-2050
3.1%
2.0%
1.3%
1.6%
1.2%
3.0%
5.3%
4.7%
3.5%
2.9%
3.5%
4.4%
REGION
World
OECD Americas
OECD Asia
Oceania
Europe (EU 27)
France
Eastern Europe/
Eurasia
India
China
Non OECD 
Asia
Latin 
America
Middle East
Africa
table4.3: developmentprojectionsforfossilfuelandbiomasspricesin€2010
UNIT
barrel
barrel
barrel
barrel
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
tonne
tonne
tonne
tonne
GJ
GJ
GJ
2000
29
4.20
3.10
5.11
34.76
2005
42
1.94
3.77
3.79
41.38
2007
63
2.71
5.27
5.30
57.93
6.21
2.76
2.27
2008
98
100.96
2010
65
65
65
65
3.84
6.55
9.61
3.84
6.55
9.61
3.84
6.55
9.61
3.84
6.55
9.61
81.93
81.93
81.93
6.46
2.85
2.35
2015
80
88
93
5.15
8.21
10.39
5.33
8.56
11.09
7.03
11.77
13.42
82.76
86.89
104.85
6.88
2.94
2.68
2020
80
88
93
5.68 
8.56
10.48
6.12
9.61
11.78
8.97
13.89
15.79
76.96
90.20
115.03
7.71
3.19
2.94
2025
80
88
93
6.98
8.56
10.48
6.72
10.39
12.40
10.39
15.08
17.07
68.69
93.51
134.31
8.04
3.39
3.14
2030
80
112
126
7.32
8.47
10.57
7.32
11.00
12.92
12.06
16.17
18.31
61.24
96.00
141.51
8.38
3.61
3.35
2040
126
15.18
18.45
20.79
164.69
8.63
3.94
3.86
2035
80
116
126
6.81
8.21
10.57
7.86
11.35
13.27
13.61
17.30
19.55
56.27
97.65
150.04
8.51
3.77
3.61
2050
126
19.89
21.82
24.64
170.73
8.81
4.36
4.10
FOSSIL FUEL
Crude oil imports
Historic prices (from WEO)
WEO “450 ppm scenario”
WEO Current policies
Energy [R]evolution 2012
Natural gas imports
Historic prices (from WEO)
United States
Europe
Japan LNG
WEO 2011 “450 ppm scenario”
United States
Europe
Japan LNG
WEO 2011 Current policies
United States
Europe
Japan LNG
Energy [R]evolution 2012
United States
Europe
Japan LNG
OECD steam coal imports
Historic prices (from WEO)
WEO 2011 “450 ppm scenario”
WEO 2011 Current policies
Energy [R]evolution 2012
Biomass (solid) 
Energy [R]evolution 2012
OECD Europe
OECD Asia Oceania & North America
Other regions
source IEA WEO 2009 & 2011 own assumptions and 2035-2050: DLR, Extrapolation (2012).
4.5costofCO2 emissions
The costs of CO2 allowances needs to be included in the
calculation of electricity generation costs. Projections of
emissions costs are even more uncertain than energy prices, and a
broad range of future estimates has been made in studies. Other
projections have assumed higher CO2 costs than than those
included in this Energy [R]evolution study (57 €2010/tCO2)30,
reflecting estimates of the total external costs of CO2 emissions.
The CO2 cost estimates in the 2010 version of the global 
Energy [R]evolution were rather conservative (42 €2008/t). 
CO2 costs are applied in Kyoto Protocol Non-Annex B countries
only from 2030 on.
4.6costprojectionsforefficientfossilfuel
generationandcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)
Further cost reduction potentials are assumed for fuel power
technologies in use today for coal, gas, lignite and oil. Because
they are at an advanced stage of market development the
potential for cost reductions is limited, and will be achieved
mainly through an increase in efficiency.31
There is much speculation about the potential for carbon capture
and storage (CCS) to mitigate the effect of fossil fuel
consumption on climate change, even though the technology is
still under development. 
CCS means trapping CO2 from fossil fuels, either before or after
they are burned, and ‘storing’ (effectively disposing of) it in the
sea or beneath the surface of the earth. There are currently three
different methods of capturing CO2: ‘pre-combustion’, ‘post-
combustion’ and ‘oxyfuel combustion’. However, development is at
a very early stage and CCS will not be implemented - in the best
case - before 2020 and will probably not become commercially
viable as a possible effective mitigation option until 2030. 
Cost estimates for CCS vary considerably, depending on factors such
as power station configuration, technology, fuel costs, size of project
and location. One thing is certain, however: CCS is expensive. It
requires significant funds to construct the power stations and the
necessary infrastructure to transport and store carbon. The IPCC
special report on CCS assesses costs at €12-62 per ton of captured
CO232, while a 2007 US Department of Energy report found
installing carbon capture systems to most modern plants resulted in
a near doubling of costs.33 These costs are estimated to increase the
price of electricity in a range from 21-91%.34
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
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references
30 KREWITT, W., SCHLOMANN, B., EXTERNAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION FROM RENEWABLE
ENERGIES COMPARED TO ELECTRICITY GENERATION FROM FOSSIL ENERGY SOURCES, GERMAN FEDERAL
MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, BERLIN 2006.
31 GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING: CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE’, GOERNE, 2007.
32 ABANADES, J C ET AL., 2005, PG 10.
33 NATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES, 2007.
34 RUBIN ET AL., 2005A, PG 40.
35 RAGDEN, P ET AL., 2006, PG 18.
36 HEDDLE, G ET AL., 2003, PG 17.
37 PARFOMAK, P & FOLGER, P, 2008, PG 5 AND 12.
38 RUBIN ET AL., 2005B, PG 4444.
table4.4: assumptionsonCO2 emissionscostdevelopment
forAnnex-BandNon-Annex-BcountriesoftheUNFCCC.
(€2010/tCO2)
2015
11
0
2010
0
0
2020
19
0
2030
30
30
2040
42
42
2050
57
57
COUNTRIES
Annex-B countries
Non-Annex-B countries
Pipeline networks will also need to be constructed to move CO2 to
storage sites. This is likely to require a considerable outlay of
capital.35 Costs will vary depending on a number of factors,
including pipeline length, diameter and manufacture from
corrosion-resistant steel, as well as the volume of CO2 to be
transported. Pipelines built near population centres or on difficult
terrain, such as marshy or rocky ground, are more expensive.36
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
estimates a cost range for pipelines of € 0.8 – 6.6/tonne of CO2
transported. A United States Congressional Research Services
report calculated capital costs for an 11 mile pipeline in the
Midwestern region of the US at approximately € 5 million. The
same report estimates that a dedicated interstate pipeline
network in North Carolina would cost upwards of € 4 billion due
to the limited geological sequestration potential in that part of
the country.37 Storage and subsequent monitoring and verification
costs are estimated by the IPCC to range from € 0.4-6.6/tCO2
(for storage) and € 0.1-0.25/tCO2. The overall cost of CCS could
therefore be a major barrier to its deployment. 38
For the above reasons, CCS power plants are not included in our
economic analysis.
Table 4.5 summarises our assumptions on the technical and
economic parameters of future fossil-fuelled power plant
technologies. Based on estimates from WEO 2010, we assume that
further technical innovation will not prevent an increase of future
investment costs because raw material costs and technical
complexity will continue to increase. Also, improvements in power
plant efficiency are outweighed by the expected increase in fossil fuel
prices, which would increase electricity generation costs significantly.
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Max. efficiency (%)
Investment costs (€2010/kW)
CO2 emissions a)(g/kWh)
Max. efficiency (%)
Investment costs (€2010/kW)
CO2 emissions a)(g/kWh)
Max. efficiency (%)
Investment costs (€2010/kW)
CO2 emissions a)(g/kWh)
Coal-fired condensing
power plant
Lignite-fired condensing
power plant
Natural gas 
combined cycle
2030 2040 2050POWER PLANT
table4.5: developmentofefficiencyandinvestmentcostsforselectednewpowerplanttechnologies
202020152009
50
1,004
670
44.5
1,167
898
62
530
325
52
987
644
45
1,141
888
63
503
320
53
953
632
45
1,116
888
64
477
315
48
1,029
697
44
1,192
908
61
556
330
46
1,046
728
43
1,219
929
59
569
342
45
1,085
744
41
1,278
975
57
587
354
source
WEO 2010, DLR 2010 a)CO2 emissions refer to power station outputs only; life-cycle emissions are not considered. 
4.7costprojectionsforrenewableenergytechnologies
The different renewable energy technologies available today all
have different technical maturity, costs and development potential.
Whereas hydro power has been widely used for decades, other
technologies, such as the gasification of biomass or ocean energy,
have yet to find their way to market maturity. Some renewable
sources by their very nature, including wind and solar power,
provide a variable supply, requiring coordination with the grid
network. But although in many cases renewable energy
technologies are ‘distributed’ - their output being generated and
delivered locally to the consumer – in the future we can also have
large-scale applications like offshore wind parks, photovoltaic
power plants or concentrating solar power stations.
It is possible to develop a wide spectrum of options to market
maturity, using the individual advantages of the different
technologies, and linking them with each other, and integrating
them step by step into the existing supply structures. This
approach will provide a complementary portfolio of
environmentally friendly technologies for heat and power supply
and the provision of transport fuels.
Many of the renewable technologies employed today are at a
relatively early stage of market development. As a result, the
costs of electricity, heat and fuel production are generally higher
than those of competing conventional systems - a reminder that
the environmental and social costs of conventional power
production are not reflected in market prices. It is expected,
however that large cost reductions can come from technical
advances, manufacturing improvements and large-scale
production, unlike conventional technologies. The dynamic trend
of cost developments over time plays a crucial role in identifying
economically sensible expansion strategies for scenarios spanning
several decades.
To identify long-term cost developments, learning curves have
been applied to the model calculations to reflect how the cost of
a particular technology can change in relation to the cumulative
production volumes. For many technologies, the learning factor
(or progress ratio) is between 0.75 for less mature systems to
0.95 and higher for well-established technologies. A learning
factor of 0.9 means that costs are expected to fall by 10% every
time the cumulative output from the technology doubles.
Empirical data shows, for example, that the learning factor for
PV solar modules has been fairly constant at 0.8 over 30 years
whilst that for wind energy varies from 0.75 in the UK to 0.94 in
the more advanced German market.
Assumptions on future costs for renewable electricity technologies
in the Energy [R]evolution scenario are derived from a review of
learning curve studies, for example by Lena Neij and others39, from
the analysis of recent technology foresight and road mapping
studies, including the European Commission funded NEEDS
project (New Energy Externalities Developments for
Sustainability)40 or the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2008,
projections by the European Renewable Energy Council published
in April 2010 (“Re-Thinking 2050”) and discussions with experts
from different sectors of the renewable energy industry.
references
39 NEIJ, L, ‘COST DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES FOR POWER GENERATION - A STUDY BASED
ON EXPERIENCE CURVES AND COMPLEMENTARY BOTTOM-UP ASSESSMENTS’, ENERGY POLICY 36
(2008), 2200-2211.
40 WWW.NEEDS-PROJECT.ORG.
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4.7.1photovoltaics(PV)
The worldwide photovoltaics (PV) market has been growing at
over 40% per annum in recent years and the contribution is
starting to make a significant contribution to electricity
generation. Photovoltaics are important because of its
decentralised / centralised character, its flexibility for use in an
urban environment and huge potential for cost reduction. The PV
industry has been increasingly exploiting this potential during the
last few years, with installation prices more than halving in the
last few years. Current development is focused on improving
existing modules and system components by increasing their
energy efficiency and reducing material usage. Technologies like
PV thin film (using alternative semiconductor materials) or dye
sensitive solar cells are developing quickly and present a huge
potential for cost reduction. The mature technology crystalline
silicon, with a proven lifetime of 30 years, is continually
increasing its cell and module efficiency (by 0.5% annually),
whereas the cell thickness is rapidly decreasing (from 230 to 180
microns over the last five years). Commercial module efficiency
varies from 14 to 21%, depending on silicon quality and
fabrication process.
The learning factor for PV modules has been fairly constant over
the last 30 years with costs reducing by 20% each time the
installed capacity doubles, indicating a high rate of technical
learning. Assuming a globally installed capacity of 1,500 GW by
between 2030 and 2040 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario, and
with an electricity output of 2,600 TWh/a, we can expect that
generation costs of around 4-8 €cents/kWh (depending on the
region) will be achieved. During the following five to ten years,
PV will become competitive with retail electricity prices in many
parts of the world, and competitive with fossil fuel costs by 2030. 
4.7.2concentratingsolarpower(CSP)
Solar thermal ‘concentrating’ power stations (CSP) can only use
direct sunlight and are therefore dependent on very sunny
locations. Southern Europe has a technical potential for this
technology which far exceeds local demand. The various solar
thermal technologies have good prospects for further development
and cost reductions. Because of their more simple design, ‘Fresnel’
collectors are considered as an option for additional cost trimming.
The efficiency of central receiver systems can be increased by
producing compressed air at a temperature of up to 10,000C°,
which is then used to run a combined gas and steam turbine.
Thermal storage systems are a way for CSP electricity
generators to reduce costs. The Spanish Andasol 1 plant, for
example, is equipped with molten salt storage with a capacity of
7.5 hours. A higher level of full load operation can be realised by
using a thermal storage system and a large collector field.
Although this leads to higher investment costs, it reduces the cost
of electricity generation. 
Depending on the level of irradiation and mode of operation, it is
expected that long term future electricity generation costs of 5-8
€cents/kWh can be achieved. This presupposes rapid market
introduction in the next few years.
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E[R]
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.6: photovoltaics(PV)costassumptions
INCLUDING ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR GRID INTEGRATION OF UP TO 25% OF PV INVESTMENT
202020152009
967
11
785
11
799
11
1,246
16
1,733
29
2,817
40
E[R]
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.7: concentratingsolarpower(CSP)costassumptions
INCLUDING COSTS FOR HEAT STORAGE AND ADDITIONAL SOLAR FIELDS
202020152009
4,334
173
3,982
159
3,630
145
5,000
200
6,501
260
8,667
335
O & M = Operation and maintenance.O & M = Operation and maintenance.
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4.7.3windpower
Within a short period of time, the dynamic development of wind
power has resulted in the establishment of a flourishing global
market. In Europe, favorable policy incentives were the early
drivers for the global wind market. The boom in demand for wind
power technology has nonetheless led to supply constraints. As a
consequence, the cost of new systems has increased. The industry
is continuously expanding production capacity, however, so it is
already resolving the bottlenecks in the supply chain. Taking into
account market development projections, learning curve analysis
and industry expectations, we assume that investment costs for
wind turbines will reduce by 25% for onshore and 50% for
offshore installations up to 2050.
4.7.4biomass
The crucial factor for the economics of using biomass for energy
is the cost of the feedstock, which today ranges from a negative
for waste wood (based on credit for waste disposal costs avoided)
through inexpensive residual materials to the more expensive
energy crops. The resulting spectrum of energy generation costs is
correspondingly broad. One of the most economic options is the
use of waste wood in steam turbine combined heat and power
(CHP) plants. Gasification of solid biomass, on the other hand,
which has a wide range of applications, is still relatively
expensive. In the long term it is expected that using wood gas
both in micro CHP units (engines and fuel cells) and in gas-and-
steam power plants will have the most favorable electricity
production costs. Converting crops into ethanol and ‘bio diesel’
made from rapeseed methyl ester (RME) has become
increasingly important in recent years, for example in Brazil, the
USA and Europe –although its climate benefit is disputed.
Processes for obtaining synthetic fuels from biogenic synthesis
gases will also play a larger role.
A large potential for exploiting modern technologies exists in
Latin and North America, Europe and the Transition Economies,
either in stationary appliances or the transport sector. In the long
term, Europe and the Transition Economies could realise 20-50%
of the potential for biomass from energy crops, whilst biomass
use in all the other regions will have to rely on forest residues,
industrial wood waste and straw. In Latin America, North
America and Africa in particular, an increasing residue potential
will be available.
In other regions, such as the Middle East and all Asian regions,
increased use of biomass is restricted, either due to a generally
low availability or already high traditional use. For the latter,
using modern, more efficient technologies will improve the
sustainability of current usage and have positive side effects, such
as reducing indoor pollution and the heavy workloads currently
associated with traditional biomass use. 
E[R]
Wind turbine offshore 
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW ∙ a)
Wind turbine onshore
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.8: windpowercostassumptions
INCLUDING ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR GRID INTEGRATION OF UP TO 25% OF INVESTMENT
202020152009
2,275
99
967
42
2,056
94
972
44
1,767
81
1,016
46
2,871
122
975
41
4,171
155
1,125
42
4,875
173
1,422
51
E[R]
Biomass power plant
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW ∙ a)
Biomass CHP
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.9: biomasscostassumptions
202020152009
2,124
127
2,914
204
2,037
123
2,686
189
1,994
120
2,551
179
2,199
132
3,337
234
2,329
140
3,815
268
2,653
160
4,500
315
O & M = Operation and maintenance.O & M = Operation and maintenance.
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image A TRUCK DROPS ANOTHER LOAD OF WOOD
CHIPS AT THE BIOMASS POWER PLANT IN
LELYSTAD, THE NETHERLANDS.
E[R]
Ocean energy power plant
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.11: oceanenergycostassumptions
202020152009
1,733
69
1,439
58
1,281
51
2,492
100
3,489
140
5,466
219
O & M = Operation and maintenance.
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4.7.5geothermal
Geothermal energy has long been used worldwide for supplying
heat, and since the beginning of the last century for electricity
generation. Geothermally generated electricity was previously
limited to sites with specific geological conditions, but further
intensive research and development work widened potential sites.
In particular the creation of large underground heat exchange
surfaces - Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS) - and the
improvement of low temperature power conversion, for example
with the Organic Rankine Cycle, could make it possible to
produce geothermal electricity anywhere. Advanced heat and
power cogeneration plants will also improve the economics of
geothermal electricity.
A large part of the costs for a geothermal power plant come
from deep underground drilling, so further development of
innovative drilling technology is expected. Assuming a global
average market growth for geothermal power capacity of 15%
per year up to 2020, adjusting to 12% beyond 2030, the result
would be a cost reduction potential of 7% by 2050: 
• for conventional geothermal power, from 12 €cents/kWh to
about 7 €cents/kWh; 
• for EGS, despite the presently high figures (about 17 – 25
€cents/kWh), electricity production costs - depending on the
payments for heat supply - are expected to come down to around 
6 €cents/kWh in the long term. 
Because of its non-fluctuating supply and a grid load operating
almost 100% of the time, geothermal energy is considered to be
a key element in a future supply structure based on renewable
sources. Up to now we have only used a marginal part of the
potential. Shallow geothermal drilling, for example, can deliver of
heating and cooling at any time anywhere, and can be used for
thermal energy storage.
4.7.6oceanenergy
Ocean energy, particularly offshore wave energy, is a significant
resource, and has the potential to satisfy an important percentage
of electricity supply worldwide. Globally, the potential of ocean
energy has been estimated at around 90,000 TWh/year. The most
significant advantages are the vast availability and high
predictability of the resource and a technology with very low
visual impact and no CO2 emissions. Many different concepts and
devices have been developed, including taking energy from the
tides, waves, currents and both thermal and saline gradient
resources. Many of these are in an advanced phase of research
and development, large scale prototypes have been deployed in
real sea conditions and some have reached pre-market
deployment. There are a few grid connected, fully operational
commercial wave and tidal generating plants. 
The cost of energy from initial tidal and wave energy farms has
been estimated to be in the range of 20-80 €cents/kWh41, and for
initial tidal stream farms in the range of 11-22 €cents/kWh.
Generation costs of 7-8 €cents/kWh are expected by 2030. Key
areas for development will include concept design, optimisation of
the device configuration, reduction of capital costs by exploring
the use of alternative structural materials, economies of scale
and learning from operation. According to the latest research
findings, the learning factor is estimated to be 10-15% for
offshore wave and 5-10% for tidal stream. In the long term,
ocean energy has the potential to become one of the most
competitive and cost effective forms of generation. In the next
few years a dynamic market penetration is expected, following a
similar curve to wind energy.
Because of the early development stage any future cost estimates
for ocean energy systems are uncertain. Present cost estimates are
based on analysis from the European NEEDS project.42
4
scen
a
rio
sfo
ra
fu
tu
reen
erg
ysu
p
p
ly
|
C
O
S
T
 P
R
O
JE
C
T
IO
N
S
 F
O
R
 R
E
N
E
W
A
B
L
E
 E
N
E
R
G
Y
 T
E
C
H
N
O
L
O
G
IE
S
references
41 G.J. DALTON, T. LEWIS (2011): PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF 5 WAVE
ENERGY DEVICES OFF THE WEST COAST OF IRELAND; EWTEC 2011.
42 WWW.NEEDS-PROJECT.ORG.
E[R]
Geothermal power plant
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/ a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.10: geothermalcostassumptions
202020152009
4,821
240
4,007
224
3,446
212
7,042
316
9,318
406
11,159
504
O & M = Operation and maintenance.
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image ANDASOL 1 SOLAR POWER STATION IS EUROPE’S
FIRST COMMERCIAL PARABOLIC TROUGH SOLAR POWER
PLANT. IT WILL SUPPLY UP TO 200,000 PEOPLE WITH
CLIMATE-FRIENDLY ELECTRICITY AND SAVE ABOUT
149,000 TONNES OF CARBON DIOXIDE PER YEAR
COMPARED WITH A MODERN COAL POWER PLANT.
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4.7.7hydropower
Hydropower is a mature technology with a significant part of its global
resource already exploited. There is still, however, some potential left
both for new schemes (especially small scale run-of-river projects with
little or no reservoir impoundment) and for repowering of existing sites.
There is likely to be some more potential for hydropower with the
increasing need for flood control and the maintenance of water supply
during dry periods. Sustainable hydropower makes an effort to
integrate plants with river ecosystems while reconciling ecology with
economically attractive power generation. 
4.7.8summaryofrenewableenergycostdevelopment
Figure 4.1 summarises the cost trends for renewable power
technologies derived from the respective learning curves. It is
important to note that the expected cost reduction is not a
function of time, but of cumulative capacity (production of units),
so dynamic market development is required. Most of the
technologies will be able to reduce their specific investment costs
to between 30% and 60% of current once they have achieved full
maturity (after 2040).
Reduced investment costs for renewable energy technologies lead
directly to reduced heat and electricity generation costs, as shown
in Figure 4.2. Generation costs today are around 7 to 29
€cents/kWh for the most important technologies, including
photovoltaic. In the long term, costs are expected to converge at
around 5 to 10 €cents/kWh. These estimates depend on site-
specific conditions such as the local wind regime or solar
irradiation, the availability of biomass at reasonable prices or the
credit granted for heat supply in the case of combined heat and
power generation.
E[R]
Investment costs (€/kWp)
O & M costs €/(kW/a)
2030 2040 2050SCENARIO
table4.12: hydropowercostassumptions
202020152009
2,766
111
2,866
115
2,953
118
2,647
106
2,568
103
2,457
98
O & M = Operation and maintenance.
figure4.1: futuredevelopmentofinvestmentcostsfor
renewableenergytechnologies (NORMALISED TO 2010 COST LEVELS) 
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figure4.2: expecteddevelopmentofelectricity
generationcostsfromfossilfuelandrenewableoptions
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4.8costprojectionsforrenewable
heating technologies
Renewable heating has the longest tradition of all renewable
technologies. EREC and DLR carried out a survey on costs of
renewable heating technologies in Europe, which analyses
installation costs of renewable heating technologies, ranging from
direct solar collector systems to geothermal and ambient heat
applications and biomass technologies. The report shows that some
technologies are already mature and compete on the market –
especially simple heating systems in the domestic sector. However,
more sophisticated technologies, which can provide higher shares of
heat demand from renewable sources, are still under development
and rather expensive. Market barriers slow down the further
implementation and cost reduction of renewable heating systems,
especially for heating networks. Nevertheless, significant learning
rates can be expected if renewable heating is increasingly
implemented as projected in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
4.8.1solarthermaltechnologies
Solar collectors depend on direct solar irradiation, so the yield
strongly depends on the location. In very sunny regions, simple
thermosiphon systems can provide total hot water demand in
households at around 400 €/m2 installation costs. In parts of
Europe with less sun, where additional space heating is needed,
installation cost for pumped systems are twice as high. In these
areas, economies of scales can decrease solar heating costs
significantly. Large scale solar collector system are known from 
250-600 €/m2, depending on the share of solar energy in the
whole heating system and the level of storage required. 
4.8.2deepgeothermalapplications
Deep geothermal heat from aquifers or reservoirs can be used
directly in hydrothermal heating plants to supply heat demand
close to the plant or in a district heating network for several
different types of heat. Due to the high drilling costs deep
geothermal energy is mostly feasible for large applications in
combination with heat networks. It is already economic feasible
and has been in use for a long time, where aquifers can be found
near the surface. In Europe deep geothermal applications are being
developed for heating purposes at investment costs from
500€/kWth (shallow) to 3000 €/kWth (deep), with the costs
strongly dependent on the drilling depth. 
4.8.3heatpumps
Heat pumps typically provide hot water or space heat for heating
systems with relatively low supply temperature or can serve as a
supplement to other heating technologies. They have become
increasingly popular for underfloor heating in buildings. Economies of
scale are less important than for deep geothermal, so there is focus on
small household applications with investment costs from 
500-1,600 €/kW for ground water systems and higher costs from
1,200-3,000 €/kW for ground source or aerothermal systems.
4.8.4biomassapplications
There is broad portfolio of modern technologies for heat production
from biomass, ranging from small scale single room stoves to heating
or CHP-plants in MW scale. Investments costs show a similar
variety: simple log wood stoves can be obtained from 100 €/kW,
more sophisticated automated heating systems that cover the whole
heat demand of a building are significantly more expensive. Log
wood or pellet boilers range from 400-1200 €/kW, with large
applications being cheaper than small systems.
Economy of scales apply to heating plants above 500kW, with
investment cost between 400 and 700 €/kW. Heating plants can
deliver process heat or provide whole neighbourhoods with heat. Even
if heat networks demand additional investment, there is great
potential to use solid biomass for heat generation in both small and
large heating centers linked to local heating networks.
Heat from cogeneration (CHP) is another option with a broad range
of technologies at hand. It is a very varied energy technology –
applying to co-firing in large coal-fired cogeneration plants; biomass
gasification combined with CHP or biogas from wet residues. But the
costs for heat are often mainly dependent on the power production. 
Main biomass input into renewable heating today is solid biomass –
wood in various specifications from waste wood and residues to
pellets from short rotation forestry. Biomass costs are as versatile: In
Europe biomass costs ranged from 1-6 €/GJ for sawmill products,
over 2-7 €/GJ for log wood to 6-18 €/GJ for wood pellets.43
Cost reductions expected vary strongly within each technology sector,
depending on the maturity of a specific technology. E.g. Small wood
stoves will not see significant cost reductions, while there is still
learning potential for automated pellet heating systems. Cost for
simple solar collectors for swimming pools might be already
optimised, whereas integration in large systems is neither
technological nor economical mature. Table 4.13 shows average
development pathways for a variety of heat technology options.
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table4.13: overviewoverexpectedinvestmentcosts
pathwaysforheatingtechnologies(IN €2010/KWTH
* WITHOUT NETWORK
2020
1,900
1,455
849
684
814
679
485
485
2040
1,508
1,288
670
540
814
601
429
429
2050
1,328
1,212
570
460
814
566
404
404
Geothermal distict heating*
Heat pumps
Small solar collector systems
Large solar collector systems
Solar district heating*
Small biomass heating systems
Large biomass heating systems
Biomass district heating*
2030
1,700
1,369
759
612
814
639
456
456
2015
2,000
1,500
886
714
814
700
500
500
references
43 OLSON, O. ET AL. (2010): WP3-WOOD FUEL PRICE STATISTICS IN EUROPE - D.31. SOLUTIONS FOR
BIOMASS FUEL MARKET BARRIERS AND RAW MATERIAL AVAILABILITY. EUBIONET3. UPPSALA,
SWEDEN, SWEDISH UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES.
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figure 4.4: coalscenario:basedeclineof2%peryear
andnewprojects
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4.9assumptionsforfossilfuelphaseout
More than 80% of the current energy supply is based on fossil
fuels. Oil dominates the entire transport sector; oil and gas make
up the heating sector and coal is the most-used fuel for power.
Each sector has different renewable energy and energy efficiency
technologies combinations which depend on the locally available
resources, infrastructure and to some extent, lifestyle. The
renewable energy technology pathways use in this scenario are
based on currently available “off-the-shelf” technologies, market
situations and market projections developed from renewable
industry associations such as the Global Wind Energy Council, the
European Photovoltaic Industry Association and the European
Renewable Energy Council, the DLR and Greenpeace International. 
In line with this modeling, the Energy [R]evolution needs to map
out a clear pathway to phase-out oil in the short term and gas in
the mid to long term. This pathway has been identified on the
basis of a detailed analysis of the global conventional oil
resources, current infrastructure of those industries, the
estimated production capacities of existing oil wells and the
investment plans know by end 2011. Those remaining fossil fuel
resources between 2012 and 2050 form the oil pathway, so no
new deep sea and arctic oil exploration, no oil shale and tar sand
mining for two reasons: 
• First and foremost, to limit carbon emissions to save the climate.
• Second, financial resources must flow from 2012 onwards in
the development of new and larger markets for renewable
energy technologies and energy efficiency to avoid “locking-in”
new fossil fuel infrastructure. 
4.9.1oil–productiondeclineassumptions
Figure 4.3 shows the remaining production capacities with an
annual production decline between 2.5% and 5% and the
additional production capacities assuming all new projects planned
for 2012 to 2020 will go ahead. Even with new projects, the
amount of remaining conventional oil is very limited and therefore
a transition towards a low oil demand pattern is essential.
4.9.2coal–productiondeclineassumptions
While there is an urgent need for a transition away from oil and
gas to avoid “locking-in” investments in new production wells, the
climate is the clearly limiting factor for the coal resource, not its
availability. All existing coal mines – even without new expansions
of mines – could produce more coal, but its burning puts the
world on a catastrophic climate change pathway.
2000
figure 4.3: globaloilproduction1950to2011
andprojectiontill2050
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4.10review:greenpeacescenarioprojections
ofthepast
Greenpeace has published numerous projections in cooperation
with renewable industry associations and scientific institutions in
the past decade. This section provides an overview of the
projections between 2000 and 2011 and compares them with
real market developments and projections of the IEA World
Energy Outlook – our Reference scenario. 
4.10.1thedevelopmentoftheglobalwindindustry
Greenpeace and the European Wind Energy Association published
“Windforce 10” for the first time in 1999– a global market
projection for wind turbines until 2030. Since then, an updated
prognosis has been published every second year. Since 2006 the
report has been renamed to “Global Wind Energy Outlook” with
a new partner – the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC) – a
new umbrella organisation of all regional wind industry
associations. Figure 4.5 shows the projections made each year
between 2000 and 2010 compared to the real market data. The
graph also includes the first two Energy [R]evolution (ER)
editions (published in 2007 and 2008) against the IEA’s wind
projections published in World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2000,
2002, 2005 and 2007. 
The projections from the “Wind force 10” and “Windforce 12”
were calculated by BTM consultants, Denmark. The “Windforce
10” (2001 - 2011) projection for the global wind market was
actually 10% lower than the actual market development. All
following editions where around 10% above or below the real
market. In 2006, the new “Global Wind Energy Outlook” had two
different scenarios, a moderate and an advanced wind power
market projections calculated by GWEC and Greenpeace
International. The figures here show only the advanced
projections, as the moderate were too low. However, these very
projections were the most criticised at the time, being called
“over ambitious” or even “impossible”. 
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figure4.5: windpower:shorttermprognosisvsrealmarketdevelopment-globalcummulativecapacity
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INDIA’S SUNDARBANS COAST LIES FLOODED AFTER
CYCLONE AILA. INUNDATING AND DESTROYING
NEARBY ROADS AND HOUSES WITH SALT WATER.
In contrast, the IEA “Current Policy” projections seriously under
estimated the wind industry’s ability to increase manufacturing
capacity and reduce costs. In 2000, the IEA published
projections of global installed capacity for wind turbines of
32,500 MW for 2010. This capacity had been connected to the
grid by early 2003, only two-and-a-half years later. By 2010, the
global wind capacity was close to 200,000 MW; around six times
more than the IEA’s assumption a decade earlier. 
Only time will tell if the GPI/DLR/GWEC longer-term projections
for the global wind industry will remain close to the real market.
However the International Energy Agency’s World Energy
Outlook projections over the past decade have been constantly
increased and keep coming close to our progressive growth rates.
figure4.6: windpower:longtermmarketprojectsuntil2030
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4.10.2thedevelopmentoftheglobalsolar
photovoltaicindustry
Inspired by the successful work with the European Wind Energy
Association (EWEA), Greenpeace began working with the
European Photovoltaic Industry Association to publish “Solar
Generation 10” – a global market projection for solar
photovoltaic technology up to 2020 for the first time in 2001.
Since then, six editions have been published and EPIA and
Greenpeace have continuously improved the calculation
methodology with experts from both organisations.
Figure 4.7 shows the actual projections for each year between
2001 and 2010 compared to the real market data, against the
first two Energy [R]evolution editions (published in 2007 and
2008) and the IEA’s solar projections published in World Energy
Outlook (WEO) 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2007. The IEA did not
make specific projections for solar photovoltaic in the first
editions analysed in the research, instead the category
“Solar/Tidal/Other” are presented in Figure 4.7 and 4.8.
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figure4.7: photovoltaics:shorttermprognosisvsrealmarketdevelopment-globalcummulativecapacity
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In contrast to the wind projections, all the SolarGeneration
projections have been too conservative. The total installed
capacity in 2010 was close to 40,000 MW about 30% higher
than projected in SolarGeneration published ten years earlier.
Even SolarGeneration 5, published in 2008, under-estimated the
possible market growth of photovoltaic in the advanced scenario.
In contrast, the IEA WEO 2000 estimations for 2010 were
reached in 2004. 
The long-term projections for solar photovoltaic are more
difficult than for wind because the costs have dropped
significantly faster than projected. For some OECD countries,
solar has reached grid parity with fossil fuels in 2012 and other
solar technologies, such as concentrated solar power plants
(CSP), are also headed in that direction. Therefore, future
projections for solar photovoltaic do not just depend on cost
improvements, but also on available storage technologies. Grid
integration can actually be a bottle-neck to solar that is now
expected much earlier than estimated.
figure4.8: photovoltaic:longtermmarketprojectsuntil2030
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4.11howdoestheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
comparetootherscenarios?
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a
ground-breaking new “Special Report on Renewables” (SRREN)
in May 2011. This report showed the latest and most
comprehensive analysis of scientific reports on all renewable
energy resources and global scientifically accepted energy
scenarios. The Energy [R]evolution was among three scenarios
chosen as an indicative scenario for an ambitious renewable
energy pathway. The following summarises the IPCC’s view. 
Four future pathways, the following models were 
assessed intensively: 
• International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2009,
(IEA WEO 2009)
• Greenpeace Energy [R]evolution 2010, (ER 2010) 
• ReMIND-RECIPE
• MiniCam EMF 22
The World Energy Outlook of the International Energy Agency was
used as an example baseline scenario (least amount of development
of renewable energy) and the other three treated as “mitigation
scenarios”, to address climate change risks. The four scenarios
provide substantial additional information on a number of technical
details, represent a range of underlying assumptions and follow
different methodologies. They provide different renewable energy
deployment paths, including Greenpeace’s “optimistic application
path for renewable energy assuming that . . . the current high
dynamic (increase rates) in the sector can be maintained”. 
The IPCC notes that scenario results are determined partly by
assumptions, but also might depend on the underlying modelling
architecture and model specific restrictions. The scenarios
analysed use different modelling architectures, demand
projections and technology portfolios for the supply side. The full
results are provided in Table 4.14, but in summary:
• The IEA baseline has a high demand projection with low
renewable energy development.
• ReMind-RECIPE, MiniCam EMF 22 scenarios portrays a high
demand expectation and significant increase of renewable energy
is combined with the possibility to employ CCS and nuclear. 
• The ER 2010 relies on and low demand (due to a significant
increase of energy efficiency) combined with high renewable
energy deployment, no CCS employment and a global nuclear
phase-out by 2045. 
Both population increase and GDP development are major
driving forces on future energy demand and therefore at least
indirectly determining the resulting shares of renewable energy.
The IPCC analysis shows which models use assumptions based on
outside inputs and what results are generated from within the
models. All scenarios take a 50% increase of the global
population into account on baseline 2009. Regards gross
domestic product (GDP), all assume or calculate a significant
increase in terms of the GDP. The IEA WEO 2009 and the ER
2010 model uses forecasts of International Monetary Fund (IMF
2009) and the Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) as inputs to project GSP. The other two
scenarios calculate GDP from within their model. 
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table4.14: overviewofkeyparameteroftheillustrativescenariosbasedonassumptions
thatareexogenoustothemodelsrespectiveendogenousmodelresults
UNIT
billion
k$2005/capita
EJ/yr
MJ/$2005
%
Gt CO2/y
kg CO2/GJ
STATUS 
QUO
2007
6.67
10.9
469
6.5
13
27.4
58.4
2030
al
+
+
8.31
17.4
674
4.5
14
38.5
57.1
2050(1)
all
+
+
8.31
17.4
674
4.5
14
38.5
57.1
2030
generec 
solar
+
+
8.32
12.4
590
5.7
32
26.6
45.0
2050
generec 
solar
+
+
9.19
18.2
674
4.0
48
15.8
23.5
2030
generec solar - 
no ocean energy
+
+
8.07
9.7
608
7.8
24
29.9
49.2
2050
>no ocean
energy
+
+
8.82
13.9
690
5.6
31
12.4
18.0
2030
all
-
+
8.31
17.4
501
3.3
39
18.4
36.7
2050
all
-
-
9.15
24.3
466
1.8
77
3.3
7.1
CATEGORY
SCENARIO NAME
MODEL
Technology pathway
Renewables
CCS
Nuclear
Population
GDP/capita
Input/Indogenous model results
Energy demand (direct equivalent)
Energy intensity
Renewable energy
Fossil & industrial CO2 emissions
Carbon intensity
source
DLR/IEA 2010: IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 does not cover the years 2031 till 2050. As the IEA’s projection only covers a time horizon up to 2030 for this scenario exercise, an extrapolation of the scenario has been used which was provided by the
German Aerospace Agency (DLR) by extrapolating the key macroeconomic and energy indicators of the WEO 2009 forward to 2050 (Publication filed in June 2010 to Energy Policy).
BASELINE
IEA WEO 2009
CAT III+IV
(>450-660PPM)
ReMind
ReMind
CAT I+II
(<440 PPM)
MiniCam
EMF 22
CAT I+II
(<440 PPM)
ER 2010
MESAP/PlaNet
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FUTURE INVESTMENTS IN THE
POWER SECTOR
HEATING SUPPLY
FUTURE INVESTMENTS IN THE
HEAT SECTOR
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT IN THE
ENERGY SECTOR
TRANSPORT
DEVELOPMENT OF CO2 EMISSIONS
PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION
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5.1 energydemandbysector
Combining the projections on population development, GDP
growth and energy intensity results in future development
pathways for France’s final energy demand. These are shown in
Figure 5.1 for the Reference and the Energy [R]evolution
scenario. Under the Reference scenario, total final energy demand
decreases by 12% from the current 6,212 PJ/a to 5,532 PJ/a in
2050. In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, final energy demand
decreases by 52% compared to current consumption and it is
expected to reach 2,989 PJ/a by 2050.
Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario, electricity demand is
exptected to decrease in both the industry sector as well as in the
residential and service sector, but to grow in the transport sector
(see Figure 5.2). Total electricity demand will decrease from 
424 TWh/a to 409 TWh/a by the year 2050. Compared to the
Reference scenario, efficiency measures in the industry,
residential and service sectors avoid the generation of about 
139 TWh/a. This reduction can be achieved in particular by
introducing highly efficient electronic devices using the best
available technology in all demand sectors.
Efficiency gains in the heat supply sector are even larger. Under
the Energy [R]evolution scenario, demand for heat supply is
expected to decrease almost constantly (see Figure 5.4).
Compared to the Reference scenario, consumption equivalent to
1,157 PJ/a is avoided through efficiency gains by 2050. As a
result of energy-related renovation of the existing stock of
residential buildings, as well as the introduction of low energy
standards and ‘passive houses’ for new buildings, enjoyment of the
same comfort and energy services will be accompanied by a much
lower future energy demand.
figure5.1: totalfinalenergydemandbysectorunderthereferencescenario
andtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario (‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION COMPARED TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO)
• ‘EFFICIENCY’• OTHER SECTORS• INDUSTRY•TRANSPORTPJ/a 0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
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figure5.2: developmentofelectricitydemandbysector
intheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
(‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION COMPARED TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO)
• ‘EFFICIENCY’•TRANSPORT • OTHER SECTORS• INDUSTRY
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figure5.3: developmentofthetransportdemandby
sectorintheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
•‘EFFICIENCY’• DOMESTIC NAVIGATION• DOMESTIC AVIATION• ROAD (HDV)• ROAD (PC & LDV)• RAIL
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figure5.4: developmentofheatdemandbysectorinthe
energy[r]evolution scenario
(‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION COMPARED TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO)
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image A WINDTURBINE CLOSE TO A ELECTRIC PYLON IN FRANCE.
image SOLAR ENERGY IN THE ALPES DE HAUTES PROVENCE, FRANCE.
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5.2electricitygeneration
The development of the electricity supply sector is charaterised
by a dynamically growing renewable energy market and an
increasing share of renewable electricity. This will compensate for
the phasing out of nuclear energy and reduce the number of fossil
fuel-fired power plants required for grid stabilisation. By 2050,
98% of the electricity produced in France will come from
renewable energy sources. ‘New’ renewables – mainly wind and
PV – will contribute 68% of electricity generation. Already by
2020 the share of renewable electricity production will be 32%
and 77% by 2030. The installed capacity of renewables will
reach 165 GW in 2030 and 189 GW by 2050.
Table 5.1 shows the comparative evolution of the different
renewable technologies in France over time. Up to 2020 hydro and
wind will remain the main contributors of the growing market
share. After 2020, the continuing growth of wind will be
complemented by electricity from biomass, photovoltaics,
geothermal and solar thermal (CSP) energy. The Energy
[R]evolution scenario will lead to a high share of fluctuating power
generation sources (photovoltaic and wind) of 57% by 2030,
therefore the expansion of smart grids, demand side management
(DSM) and storage capacity from the increased share of electric
vehicles will be used for a better grid integration and power
generation management.
table5.1:renewableelectricitygenerationcapacityunder
thereferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
IN GW
2020
28
28
3
2
25
32
0
0
5
10
1
0
0
0
62
72
2040
27
28
3
12
30
96
0
2
13
42
1
1
0
0
74
183
2050
27
28
3
21
30
91
0
3
19
43
1
2
0
0
81
189
Hydro
Biomass
Wind
Geothermal
PV
CSP
Ocean energy
Total
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
2030
27
28
3
5
30
92
0
1
8
38
1
1
0
0
69
165
2009
25
25
1
1
4
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31
31
figure5.5: electricitygenerationstructureunderthereferencescenario
andtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario(INCLUDING ELECTRICITY FOR ELECTROMOBILITY, HEAT PUMPS AND HYDROGEN GENERATION)
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5.3futurecostsofelectricitygeneration
Figure 5.6 shows that the introduction of renewable technologies
under the Energy [R]evolution scenario increases the future costs
of electricity up to 2030 compared to the Reference case.
However, this difference will be 2.9 €ct/kW at most. Because of
high prices for conventional fuels, the lower CO2 intensity of
electricity generation, and decreasing specific investment costs
for renewable technologies, electricity generation costs will
become more economically favorable under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario after 2030. By 2050, costs will be 
0.2 €ct/kWh below those in the Reference version.
Under the Reference scenario, on the other hand, unchecked
growth in demand, an increase in fossil fuel prices and the cost of
CO2 emissions result in total electricity supply costs rising from
today’s € 27 billion per year to more than € 66 billion in 2050.
Figure 5.6 shows that the Energy [R]evolution scenario not only
complies with France’s CO2 reduction targets, but also helps to
stabilise energy costs and relieve the economic pressure on
society. Increasing energy efficiency and shifting energy supply to
renewables lead to long term costs for electricity supply that are
more than 22% lower than in the Reference scenario.
figure5.6:totalelectricitysupplycostsandspecific
electricitygenerationcostsundertwoscenarios
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5.4futureinvestmentsinthepowersector
It would require € 490 billion in investment for the Energy
[R]evolution scenario to become reality (including investments
for replacement after the economic lifetime of the plants) -
approximately € 12 billion annually or € 4 billion less than in the
Reference scenario (€ 494 billion). Under the Reference version,
the levels of investment in conventional power plants add up to
almost 64% while approximately 36% would be invested in
renewable energy and cogeneration (CHP) until 2050.
Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario, France would shift
almost 96% of the entire investment towards renewables and
cogeneration. Until 2030, the fossil fuel share of power sector
investment would be focused mainly on CHP plants.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, the fuel cost savings
in the Energy [R]evolution scenario reach a total of € 130 billion
up to 2050, or € 3.3 billion per year. The renewable energy
sources would then go on to produce electricity without any
further fuel costs beyond 2050, while the costs for coal and gas
will continue to be a burden on national economies.
figure5.7: investmentshares-referencescenario
versusenergy[r]evolutionscenario(“CHP” INCLUDES FOSSIL AND
RENEWABLE CHP, “FOSSIL” AND “RENEWABLES” CONSEQUENTLY WITHOUT CHP}
REF 2011 - 2050
2% FOSSIL
62% NUCLEAR
3% CHP
33% RENEWABLES
Total € 494 billion
E[R] 2011 - 2050
4% FOSSIL
19% CHP
77% RENEWABLES
Total € 490 billion
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5.5heatingsupply
Today, renewables meet 16% of France’s heat demand, the main
Reference and the Energy [R]evolution scenario contribution
coming from the use of biomass. The existing district heating
network needs to be expanded to allow for the large scale
utilisation of geothermal and solar thermal energy. Dedicated
support instruments are required to ensure a dynamic
development. In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, renewables
provide 48% of France’s total heat demand in 2030 and 82% 
in 2050.
• Energy efficiency measures help to reduce the currently growing
energy demand for heating by 45% in 2050 (relative to the
reference scenario), in spite of improving living standards.
• In the industry, solar collectors, geothermal energy (incl. heat
pumps), as well as electricity and hydrogen from renewable
sources are increasingly substituting for fossil fuel-fired systems.
• A shift from coal and oil to natural gas in the remaining
conventional applications leads to a further reduction of 
CO2 emissions.
Table 5.2 shows the development of the different renewable
technologies for heating in France over time. Up to 2020 biomass
will remain the main contributors of the growing market share.
After 2020, the continuing growth of solar collectors and a
growing share of geothermal heat pumps will reduce the
dependence on fossil fuels.
table5.2:renewableheatingcapacitiesunderthe
referencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
IN GW
2020
504
427
39
75
123
135
0
0
666
638
2040
599
434
68
293
198
352
0
45
866
1,124
2050
619
454
85
270
226
371
0
57
929
1,152
Biomass
Solar
collectors
Geothermal
Hydrogen
Total
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
2030
567
424
56
258
168
252
0
15
791
949
2009
354
354
2
2
46
46
0
0
402
402
figure5.8: heatsupplystructureunderthereferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario (‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION
COMPARED TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO)
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5.6futureinvestmentsintheheatsector
Also in the heat sector the Energy [R]evolution scenario would
require a major revision of current investment strategies in
heating technologies. Especially the not yet so common solar and
geothermal and heat pump technologies need enourmous increase
in installations, if these potentials are to be tapped for the heat
sector. Installed capacities need to increase by the factor of 130
for solar thermal and still by a factor of 10 for geothermal and
heat pumps. These two technologies will be the main pillars of
heat supply in 2050.
Renewable heating technologies are extremely variable, from low
tech biomass stoves and unglazed solar collectors to very
sophisticated enhanced geothermal systems and solar themal
district heating plants with seasonal storage. Thus it can only
roughly be calculated, that the Energy [R]evolution scenario in
total requires around € 166 billion to be invested in renewable
heating technologies until 2050 (including investments for
replacement after the economic lifetime of the plants) -
approximately € 4 billion per year.
table5.3:renewableheatgenerationcapacitiesunderthe
referencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenarioIN
GW
2020
79
64
4
2
11
22
21
22
115
109
2040
88
32
4
7
20
82
32
42
143
164
2050
90
19
3
5
25
79
35
38
153
142
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Heat pumps
Total
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
2030
85
49
4
5
16
74
28
37
133
166
2009
68
68
0
0
1
1
9
9
78
78
figure5.9: investmentsforrenewableheatgenerationtechnologies
underthereferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
REF 2011 - 2050
17% SOLAR
4% GEOTHERMAL
39% BIOMASS
40% HEAT PUMPS
Total € 175 billion 
E[R] 2011 - 2050
46% SOLAR
40% HEAT PUMPS
5% BIOMASS
9% GEOTHERMAL
Total € 166 billion
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image WINDTURBINE IN FIELDS IN FRANCE.
image PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER PLANT IN PUYLOUBIER, SOUTHERN FRANCE.
5.8 transport
A key target in France is to introduce incentives for people to
drive smaller cars. In addition, it is vital to shift transport use to
efficient modes like rail, light rail and buses, especially in the
expanding large metropolitan areas. Together with rising prices
for fossil fuels, these changes reduce the huge growth in car sales
projected under the Reference scenario. Energy demand from the
transport sector is reduced by 732 PJ/a in 2050 compared to
today’s levels, saving 49% compared to the Reference scenario.
Energy demand in the transport sector will therefore decrease
between 2009 and 2050 by 59% to 768 PJ/a.
Highly efficient propulsion technology with hybrid, plug-in hybrid
and battery-electric power trains will bring large efficiency gains.
By 2030, electricity will provide 9% of the transport sector’s
total energy demand in the Energy [R]evolution, while in 2050
the share will be 58%.
table5.4:transportenergydemandbymodeunderthe
referencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
(WITHOUT ENERGY FOR PIPELINE TRANSPORT) IN PJ/A
2020
66
59
1,673
1,467
61
54
13
13
1,813
1,593
2040
76
67
1,438
813
71
35
14
13
1,599
928
2050
77
69
1,329
658
77
26
14
13
1,497
766
Rail
Road
Domestic
aviation
Domestic
navigation
Total
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
REF
E[R]
2030
73
64
1,552
1,123
66
49
13
13
1,704
1,248
2009
55
55
1,736
1,736
55
55
13
13
1,859
1,859
figure5.10: finalenergyconsumptionfortransportunderthereferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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image HIGH VOLTAGE ELECTRICAL PYLON OVER CHAMPAGNE VINEYARDS. IF
TEMPERATURES INCREASE BEYOND 2°C, FRANCE WILL BE FACED WITH A RUNAWAY
GEOGRAPHICAL DISPLACEMENT OF BOTH ITS NATURAL AND CULTIVATED
ECOSYSTEMS, AND THE EFFECTS ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF WINE PRODUCTION
WILL BE CATASTROPHIC FOR THE LOCAL INDUSTRY.
image AUTO BLUE ELECTRIC CARS AT A CHARGING POINT IN THE FRENCH CITY OF NICE.
5.9developmentofCO2 emissions
Whilst France’s emissions of CO2 will decrease by 49% between
2009 and 2050 under the Reference scenario, under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario they will decrease from 384 million tonnes in
2009 to 20 million tonnes in 2050. Annual per capita emissions
will drop from 5.9 tonnes to 0.3 tonnes. In spite of the phasing out
of nuclear energy and increasing demand, CO2 emissions will
decrease in the electricity sector. In the long run efficiency gains
and the increased use of renewable in vehicles will reduce emissions
in the transport sector. With a share of 42% of CO2, the transport
sector will be the largest sources of emissions in 2050. By 2050,
France’s CO2 emissions are 95% below 1990 levels.
5.10primaryenergyconsumption
Taking into account the assumptions discussed above, the
resulting primary energy consumption under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario is shown in Figure 5.11. Under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario, primary energy demand will decrease by
63% from today's 10,883 PJ/a to 4,040 PJ/a. Compared to the
Reference scenario, overall primary energy demand will be
reduced by 63% in 2050 under the Energy [R]evolution scenario
(Reference scenario: 10,971PJ in 2050).
The Energy [R]evolution version aims to phases out coal and oil as
fast as technically and economically possible. This is made possible
mainly by replacement of coal power plants with renewables and a
fast introduction of very efficient electric vehicles in the transport
sector to replace oil combustion engines. This leads to an overall
renewable primary energy share of 40% in 2030 and 84% in 2050.
Nuclear energy is phased out just after 2030.
figure5.12: developmentofCO2 emissionsbysector
undertheenergy[r]evolutionscenario(‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION
COMPARED TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO)
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figure5.11:primaryenergyconsumptionunderthereferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
(‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION COMPARED TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO)
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table5.6: investmentcostsforelectricitygenerationandfuelcostsavingsundertheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
comparedtothereferencescenario
INVESTMENT COSTS
DIFFERENCE E[R] VERSUS REF
Conventional (fossil & nuclear)
Renewables
Total
CUMULATED FUEL COST SAVINGS
SAVINGS CUMULATIVE E[R] VERSUS REF
Fuel oil
Gas
Hard coal
Lignite
Nuclear energy
Total
EURO
billion €
billion €
billion €
billion €/a
billion €/a
billion €/a
billion €/a
billion €/a
billion €/a
2021 - 2030
133.6
-122.3
11.3
-2.6
-38.1
3.6
0.0
30.7
-6.3
2011 - 2020
8.1
-11.2
-3.1
-1.7
-21.6
2.0
0.0
6.2
-15.0
2011 - 2050
298.6
-249.2
4.4
0.4
-44.3
10.9
0.0
163.4
130.5
2011 - 2050 
AVERAGE 
PER ANNUM
7.5
-7.3
0.2
0.0
-1.1
0.3
0.0
4.1
3.3
2041 - 2050
27.6
-115.0
87.4
2.0
38.2
1.7
0.0
70.5
112.4
2031 - 2040
129.3
-45.8
83.6
2.6
-22.8
3.7
0.0
55.9
39.4
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box2.3: biomassdisclaimerforthefrance
energy[r]evolution
Biomass, if sourced properly, can play a role in helping
countries getting rid of their dependency on fossil energies.
However, Greenpeace hopes to help set the forest bioenergy
sector back on track by highlighting the importance of
focusing on industrial leftovers rather than relying directly
on forests for energy. Biomass should be used locally,
sourced directly at the mills, and used primarily to produce
heat by replacing fossil based heating systems, with high air
quality standards. Wood harvested from forests and
plantations should be used in products that store carbon
rather than being burned for energy. Therefore, Greenpeace
opposes the use of standing trees for large-scale energy
production. Logging debris (branches and tree tops) can
play a very limited role in providing biomass for energy,
since they are key to soil fertility, biodiversity and forest
productivity. Any long distance transportation of raw or
transformed biomass for energy production leads to
considerable reduction in efficiency rates and massive GHG
emissions and must be avoided.
65
employmentprojections
METHODOLOGY TO CALCULATE JOBS FUTURE EMPLOYMENT IN THE
ENERGY SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT IN RENEWABLE
HEATING SECTOR
6
image THE CLOUDS CLEARED OVER MUCH OF EASTERN EUROPE, REVEALING SNOW TO THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE IMAGE. THE IMAGE ALSO PROVIDES A GLIMPSE OF
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE BALKANS, WHERE WINTER BLIZZARDS RESULTED IN STATES OF EMERGENCY. NORTH OF THE BALKANS, THE STORMS DUMPED UP TO
12 INCHES OF SNOW IN VIENNA, AND PARTS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC RECEIVED 16 INCHES OF SNOW, ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS.
economyand
ecologygoes
handinhandwith
newemployment.”“
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6.1methodologytocalculatejobs
Greenpeace International and the European Renewable Energy
Council have published four global Energy [R]evolution scenarios.
These compare a low-carbon Energy [R]evolution scenario to a
Reference scenario based on the International Energy Agency
(IEA) “business as usual” projections (from the World Energy
Outlook series, for example International Energy Agency, 2007,
2011). The Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) analysed the
employment effects of the 2008 and 2012 Energy [R]evolution
global scenarios. The methodology used in the 2012 global
analysis is used to calculate energy sector employment for
France’s Energy [R]evolution and Reference scenario. 
Employment is projected for France for both scenarios at 2015,
2020, and 2030 by using a series of employment multipliers and
the projected electrical generation, electrical capacity, heat
collector capacity, and primary consumption of coal, gas and
biomass (excluding gas used for transport). The results of the
energy scenarios are used as inputs to the employment modelling.
Only direct employment is included, namely jobs in construction,
manufacturing, operations and maintenance, and fuel supply associated
with electricity generation and direct heat provision. Indirect jobs and
induced jobs are not included in the calculations.  Indirect jobs
generally include jobs in secondary industries which supply the primary
industry sector, for example, catering and accommodation. Induced jobs
are those resulting from spending wages earned in the primary
industries. Energy efficiency jobs are also excluded, despite the fact
that the Energy [R]evolution includes significant development of
efficiency, as the uncertainties in estimation are too great. 
A detailed description of the methodology is given in Rutovitz
and Harris, 2012a.
6.1.1overview
Inputsforenergygenerationanddemandforeach
scenarioinclude:
• The amount of electrical and heating capacity that will be
installed each year for each technology.  
• The primary energy demand for coal, gas, and biomass fuels in
the electricity and heating sectors. 
• The amount of electricity generated per year from nuclear, oil,
and diesel.
Inputsforeachtechnologyforeachscenarioinclude:
• ‘Employment factors’, or the number of jobs per unit of capacity,
separated into manufacturing, construction, operation and
maintenance, and per unit of primary energy for fuel supply. 
• For the 2020 and 2030 calculations, a ‘decline factor’ for each
technology which reduces the employment factors by a certain
percentage per year to reflect the employment per unit
reduction as technology efficiencies improve.
• The percentage of local manufacturing and domestic fuel
production in each region, in order to calculate the number of
manufacturing and fuel production jobs in the region.
• The percentage of world trade which originates in the region
for coal and gas fuels, and renewable traded components.
The electrical capacity increase and energy use figures from each
scenario are multiplied by the employment factors for each of the
technologies, and the proportion of fuel or manufacturing
occurring locally. The calculation is summarised in Table 6.1. 
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MW INSTALLED 
PER YEAR IN REGION
MW EXPORTED
PER YEAR
MW INSTALLED 
PER YEAR
CUMULATIVE 
CAPACITY
ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION
PRIMARY ENERGY
DEMAND + EXPORTS
MW INSTALLED
PER YEAR
MANUFACTURING
2010 EMPLOYMENT FACTOR ×TECHNOLOGY DECLINE FACTOR(NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER 2010)
MANUFACTURING 
(FOR LOCAL USE)
MANUFACTURING 
(FOR EXPORT)
CONSTRUCTION 
OPERATION &
MAINTENANCE
FUEL SUPPLY 
(NUCLEAR)
FUEL SUPPLY
(COAL, GAS & BIOMASS)
HEAT SUPPLY
JOBS
EMPLOYMENT FACTOR 
AT 2020 OR 2030
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
+ +
×
×
+
MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT FACTOR
MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT FACTOR
CONSTRUCTION
EMPLOYMENT FACTOR
O&M 
EMPLOYMENT FACTOR
FUEL EMPLOYMENT
FACTOR 
FUEL EMPLOYMENT
FACTOR 
EMPLOYMENT FACTOR
FOR HEAT
CONSTRUCTION OPERATION &
MAINTENANCE (O&M)
% OF LOCAL
MANUFACTURING
% OF LOCAL 
PRODUCTION
FUEL SUPPLY + HEAT
table 6.1:methodologyoverview
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
A SUSTAINABLE FRANCE ENERGY OUTLOOK
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6.1.2limitations
Employment numbers are indicative only, as a large number of
assumptions are required to make calculations. Quantitative data
on present employment based on actual surveys is difficult to
obtain, so it is not possible to calibrate the methodology against
time series data, or even against current data in many regions.
However, within the limits of data availability, the figures
presented are indicative of electricity sector employment levels
under the two scenarios. However, there are some significant
areas of employment which are not included, including
replacement of generating plant, and energy efficiency jobs. 
Insufficient data means it was not possible to include a
comprehensive assessment for the heat supply sector. Only a
partial estimate of the jobs in heat supply is included, as biomass,
gas, and coal jobs in this sector include only fuel supply jobs
where heat is supplied directly (that is, not via a combined heat
and power plant), while jobs in heat from geothermal and solar
collectors primarily include manufacturing and installation. 
6.1.3employmentfactors
The employment factors used in the 2012 analysis are shown in Table
6.3 on the following page, with the main source given in the notes. 
Local factors have been used for nuclear O&M and large hydro
O&M. OECD Europe factors from the 2012 global analysis
(Rutovitz & Harris, 2012a) are used in all other cases.
6.1.4coal,gas,andrenewabletechnologytrade
It is assumed that all manufacturing for energy technologies other
than wind and PV occurs within France. It is assumed that only 30%
of manufacturing for wind occurs in France, reflecting the fact that
the turbines themselves are likely to be imported. 
It is assumed that 30% of PV manufacturing will occur within the
country, regardless of where modules are sourced, to allow for
components such as support frames. The percentage of PV module
manufacturing occurring within the country is set assuming the
current French PV manufacturing capacity of 200 MW will remain
constant, so where annual installation is less than 200 MW it is
assumed all manufacturing occurs domestically. Otherwise, domestic
manufacturing is reduced according to the excess installation above
200 MW per year. The proportions that result are: in the Reference
scenario 100% of manufacturing occurs within France throughout
the projection, and in the [R]evolution scenario 100% of PV
manufacturing occurs domestically in 2010, falling to 56% in 2020,
and rising slightly to 61% in 2030. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding future exports of
nuclear technology. AREVA is currently engaged in building four
EPRs, one in France, two in China and one in Finland. AREVA is
also in negotiations to build four more reactors, two at Hinkley
Point in the UK and two at Jaitapur in India (Cormier, 2012). It
is assumed that those currently underway will be under
construction in 2015 in both the Reference and the Energy
[R]evolution scenario. It is further assumed in the Reference
scenario that the four additional reactors will be under
construction by 2020, and that just two of them will be
unfinished in 2030. No new construction of EPR reactors is
undertaken in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
France currently imports virtually all gas and coal for energy supply,
which is anticipated to continue. 
6.1.5adjustmentforlearningrates–declinefactors
Employment factors are adjusted to take into account the
reduction in employment per unit of electrical capacity as
technologies and production techniques mature. The learning rates
assumed have a significant effect on the outcome of the analysis,
and are given in Table 6.2 below. These decline rates are
calculated directly from the cost data used in the Energy
[R]evolution modelling (Teske et al., 2012). 
The factor for nuclear decommissioning has been taken as the
average decline across all other technologies. 
table 6.2: technologycostdeclinefactors
ANNUAL DECLINE IN JOB FACTORS
2020-30
0.5%
0.4%
1.0%
0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.7%
-0.9%
-0.9%
0.2%
4.5%
4.9%
7.3%
2.8%
7.0%
0.5%
0.5%
1.0%
0.8%
2.2%
4.5%
1.8%
0.9%
2015-2020
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
-0.6%
-0.6%
2.8%
7.2%
6.4%
5.4%
5.1%
6.5%
0.3%
0.3%
1.0%
0.4%
2.2%
3.2%
2.0%
0.9%
2010-2015
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
1.6%
-0.6%
-0.6%
3.6%
3.1%
5.3%
3.5%
5.6%
4.8%
0.3%
0.3%
0.9%
0.4%
2.0%
2.6%
1.6%
0.0%
Uses decline factor for solar thermal power
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Biomass
Hydro-large
Hydro-small
Wind onshore
Wind offshore
PV
Geothermal power
Solar thermal power
Ocean
Coal CHP
Lignite CHP
Gas CHP
Oil CHP
Biomass CHP
Geothermal CHP
Nuclear decommissioning
Geothermal - heat
Solar thermal heat
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image THROUGH BURNING OF WOOD CHIPS THE
POWER PLANT GENERATES ELECTRICITY, ENERGY
OR HEAT. HERE WE SEE THE STOCK OF WOOD CHIPS
WITH A CAPACITY OF 1000 M3 ON WHICH THE
PLANT CAN RUN, UNMANNED, FOR ABOUT FOUR
DAYS. LELYSTAD, THE NETHERLANDS. 
manufacturing using the ratio used by the EWEA (European Wind Energy
Association, 2009). The O&M factor is an average of eight reports from USA, Europe,
the UK and Australia (see Appendix 3, Rutovitz and Harris 2012a for details).
8. Wind – offshore: All factors are from a German report (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2012).  
9. Solar PV: The Solar PV installation employment factor is the average of five
estimates in Germany and the US (see Appendix 4, Rutovitz and Harris 2012a for
details), while manufacturing is taken from the JEDI model (National Renewable
Energy Laboratory, 2010), a Greek study (Tourkolias & Mirasgedis, 2011), a
Korean national report (Korea Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO) & New
and Renewable Energy Center (NREC), 2012), and ISF research for Japan
(Rutovitz & Ison, 2011). 
10. Geothermal: The construction and O&M factors are the weighted averages from
employment data reported for thirteen power stations totalling 1050 MW in the US,
Canada, Greece and Australia (some of them hypothetical). The manufacturing factor is
derived from a US study (Geothermal Energy Association, 2010). 
11. Solar thermal power: The OECD Europe figure is used for the EU27, and is higher
than the overall OECD factors of 8.9 job years/MW (construction) and 0.5
jobs/MW (O&M). Overall OECD figures were derived from a weighted average of 19
reported power plants (3,223 MW), while the OECD Europe figure includes only
European data (951 MW).The manufacturing factor is unchanged from the 2010
analysis (European Renewable Energy Council, 2008, page 16).
12. Ocean: These factors are unchanged from the 2010 analysis. The construction factor used
in this study is a combined projection for wave and tidal power derived from data for
offshore wind power (Batten & Bahaj, 2007). A study of a particular wave power
technology, Wave Dragon, provided the O&M factor (Soerensen, 2008). 
13. Geothermal and heat pumps: One overall factor has been used for jobs per MW installed,
from the US EIA annual reporting (US Energy Information Administration, 2010),
adjusted to include installation using data from WaterFurnace (WaterFurnace, 2009)
14. Solar thermal heating: One overall factor has been used for jobs per MW installed, as this
was the only data available on any large scale. This may underestimate jobs, as it may not
include O&M. The global figure is derived from the IEA heating and cooling program
report (International Energy Agency Solar Heating and Cooling Program, 2011). 
15. Nuclear decommissioning: The weighted average decommissioning employment over the
first 20 years from one UK study and two German studies was used to derive a factor for
decommissioning employment (Cogent Sector Skills Council, 2009, 2011b; Wuppertal
Institute for Climate Environment and Energy, 2007). See Rutovitz and Harris, 2012 for
more details. Unfortunately the French nuclear industry has not undertaken detailed
analysis of the employment requirements for dismantling of reactors. Analysis of cost data
presented for would indicate a lower figure. The factor derived for earlier reactors is
between 0.2 – 1.33 jobs per MW (derived from data presented in Cours des Comptes,
2012), and up to 8.6 jobs per MW (derived from data preseneted for Marcoule in
Wuppertal Institute for Climate Environment and Energy, 2007b), while the employment
factor calculated from EdF data is 0.1 jobs/ MW excluding waste management (derived
from data in Cours des Comptes, 2012).
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notesonemploymentfactors
1. Coal: Construction, manufacturing and operations and maintenance factors are
from the JEDI model (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2011a). Jobs per PJ
fuel have been derived using data from EURACOAL and the IEA  (European
Association for Coal and Lignite, 2011; International Energy Agency, 2012). 
2. Gas, oil and diesel: Installation and manufacturing factors are from the JEDI model
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2011b). O&M factor is an average of the
figure from the 2010 report, the JEDI model (National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, 2011b), a US study (National Commission on Energy Policy, 2009) and
ISF research (Rutovitz & Harris, 2012b). The fuel factor per PJ is the weighted
average of US, Canadian, and Russian employment in gas production, derived from
US and Canadian information (America’s Natural Gas Alliance, 2008; IHS Global
Insight (Canada) Ltd, 2009; Zubov, 2012).
3. Nuclear: Local factors have been used for nuclear O&M and construction. The O&M factor
is based on employment and installed nuclear capacity figures reported by Électricité de
France (EdF) (see Appendix 1) who operate 62,500 MW out of a total 63,100 MW
nuclear capacity (International Atomic Energy Agency PRIS Database, 2012; Électricité
de France, 2012a), combined with fuel management data from a Price Waterhouse
Coopers study of French nuclear employment (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011, page 70).
Note that the combined fuel management and operation and maintenance is more than
double the factor of 0.3 jobs/MW derived from the UK, US, South Korean and Australian
data and used in global estimates. The construction factor of 11.6 jobyears/MW is from
the Price Waterhouse Coopers study, as is the construction employment factor of 5.2
jobyears/MW employment occurring in France for AREVA reactors built outside the
country (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011, page 70). The manufacturing factor is the
average of two UK reports (Cogent Sector Skills Council, 2010, 2011a). The fuel factor
was derived by ISF in 2009 (Rutovitz & Atherton, 2009).
4. Bioenergy: Employment factors for construction, manufacturing, and O&M use the average
values of studies from Greece, the UK, Spain, USA, and one Europe wide (Kjaer, 2006;
Moreno & López, 2008; Thornley, 2006; Thornley et al., 2009; Thornley, Rogers, & Huang,
2008; Tourkolias & Mirasgedis, 2011). Fuel employment per PJ primary energy is derived
from five studies, all in Europe (Domac, Richards, & Risovic, 2005; EPRI, 2001; Hillring,
2002; Thornley, 2006; Upham & Speakman, 2007; Valente, Spinelli, & Hillring, 2011).
5. Hydro – large: A local factor was used to calculate the O&M employment factor for
France’s large hydro sector. Employment and capacity figures reported by EdF (see
Appendix 1)  - who hold 20,775 MW of France’s approximately 25,000 MW of installed
capacity – were used to deduce the figure (Électricité de France, 2012b). Construction
and manufacturing factors are from a US study (Navigant Consulting, 2009). 
6. Hydro – small: Factors are the average a Canadian study, the JEDI model, a US study and
a Spanish study (Moreno & López, 2008; National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2011c;
Navigant Consulting, 2009; Pembina Insitute, 2004)
7. Wind – onshore: The installation factor used is from the European Wind Energy
Association. The manufacturing factor is derived using the employment per MW in
turbine manufacture at Vestas from 2007 – 2011 (Vestas, 2011), adjusted for total
table 6.3: employmentfactorsusedin2012analysisforfrance
CONSTRUCTION
/INSTALLATION
Job years/MW
7.7
1.7
12
14
6.0
15
2.5
7.1
11
6.8
15
9.0
MANUFACTURING
Jobs years/MW
3.5
1.0
1.3
2.9
1.5
5.5
6.1
11
6.9
3.9
4.0
1.0
CONSTRUCTION
TIMES
Years
5
2
10
2
2
2
2
4
1
2
2
2
3.0 jobs/ MW (construction and manufacturing)
7.4 jobs/ MW (construction and manufacturing)
0.95 jobs per MW decommissioned 
CHP technologies use the factor for the technology, i.e. coal, gas,
biomass, geothermal, etc, increased by a factor of 1.5 for O&M only.
Use the employment factors for gas
OPERATION & 
MAINTENANCE
Jobs/MW
0.1
0.08
0.7
1.5
0.16
2.4
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
1.0
0.32
Note 1
Note 2
Note 3
Note 4
Note 5
Note 6
Note 7
Note 8
Note 9
Note 10
Note 11
Note 12
Note 13
Note 14
Note 15
FUEL – PRIMARY 
ENERGY DEMAND
Jobs/PJ
38
22
0.001 jobs per GWh
(final energy demand)
32
Coal
Gas
Nuclear
Biomass
Hydro-large
Hydro-small
Wind onshore
Wind offshore
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Ocean
Geothermal - heat
Solar - heat
Nuclear decommissioning
Combined heat and power
Oil and diesel
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image A WORKER SURVEYS THE EQUIPMENT AT
ANDASOL 1 SOLAR POWER STATION, WHICH IS
EUROPE’S FIRST COMMERCIAL PARABOLIC TROUGH
SOLAR POWER PLANT. ANDASOL 1 WILL SUPPLY UP
TO 200,000 PEOPLE WITH CLIMATE-FRIENDLY
ELECTRICITY AND SAVE ABOUT 149,000 TONNES OF
CARBON DIOXIDE PER YEAR COMPARED WITH A
MODERN COAL POWER PLANT.
6.2futureemploymentintheenergysector
Energy sector jobs in France grow over the period in both the
Energy [R]evolution and the Reference scenarios. At 2015, the
Reference scenario has 6,000 more jobs than the Energy
[R]evolution. In 2020 the Energy [R]evolution scenario has
15,000 more jobs, while at 2030 the Reference scenario has
19,000 more jobs.
• There are approximately 130,000 energy sector jobs in the
Reference scenario and 124,000 in the Energy [R]evolution
scenario in 2015, up from 117,000 in 2010.
• In 2020, there are nearly 159,000 jobs in the Energy [R]evolution
scenario, and nearly 143,000 in the Reference scenario.
• In 2030, there are approximately 139,000 jobs in the Energy
[R]evolution scenario and approximately 158,000 in the
Reference scenario.
Figure 6.1 shows the change in job numbers under both scenarios
for each technology between 2010 and 2030. Jobs in the
Reference scenario increase by 34% between 2010 and 2030,
almost entirely due to increases in the nuclear industry.
Extremely strong growth in renewable energy leads to an increase
of 35% in total energy sector jobs in the Energy [R]evolution
scenario between 2010 and 2020. Energy sector jobs then fall to
2030, but remain 18% above the 2010 level. Renewable energy
accounts for 65% of energy jobs by 2030, with biomass having
the greatest share (25%) followed by wind, solar heat and PV.
REFERENCE ENERGY
[R]EVOLUTION
2010 2015 2020 2030 2015 2020 2030
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
D
ir
ec
t 
jo
bs
 -
 t
ho
us
an
ds
figure6.1: employmentintheenergysectorunderthe
referenceandenergy[r]evolutionscenarios
•GEOTHERMAL & HEAT PUMP• SOLAR HEAT• SOLAR THERMAL POWER• OCEAN ENERGY• GEOTHERMAL POWER• PV
•WIND• HYDRO• BIOMASS• NUCLEAR• GAS, OIL & DIESEL• COAL
table6.4: totalemploymentintheenergysectorJOBS
Coal
Gas, oil & diesel
Nuclear
Renewable
Total jobs
Construction and installation
Manufacturing
Operations and maintenance
Fuel supply (domestic)
Coal and gas export
Total jobs
2015
900
4,100
51,000
68,100
124,100
32,900
12,700
56,800
21,700
-
124,100
2020
1,000
4,200
49,500
103,900
158,600
68,100
21,600
48,000
20,900
-
158,600
2030
1,100
3,000
44,600
90,400
139,000
69,500
11,400
37,200
21,000
-
139,000
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2015
1,100
2,200
57,500
69,300
130,000
33,600
12,300
58,700
25,500
-
130,000
2010
1,300
1,800
52,800
61,400
117,400
29,000
11,600
55,000
21,800
-
117,400
2020
700
2,300
83,500
56,800
143,300
42,100
8,200
62,600
30,300
-
143,300
2030
400
2,100
93,000
62,300
157,800
55,500
11,300
62,100
28,900
-
157,800
REFERENCE
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
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table 6.5: employmentintheenergysectorbytechnology,twoscenariosJOBS
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
58,500
6,900
37,200
21,000
-
15,500
139,100
1,100
3,000
44,600
90,400
35,200
8,000
19,700
10,500
600
800
60
12,100
3,400
139,000
2020
55,200
16,000
48,000
20,900
-
18,500
158,600
1,000
4,200
49,500
103,900
26,100
7,700
31,700
19,000
300
500
100
13,100
5,400
158,600
2015
27,500
10,700
56,800
21,700
-
7,500
124,200
900
4,100
51,000
68,100
24,600
8,900
15,400
11,000
100
400
300
6,300
1,100
124,100
REFERENCE
2030
53,800
10,500
62,100
28,900
-
2,600
157,900
400
2,100
93,000
62,200
34,000
7,700
9,400
8,000
-
500
60
1,300
1,200
157,800
2020
36,800
5,700
62,600
30,300
-
7,800
143,200
700
2,300
83,500
56,800
34,800
5,800
4,200
3,600
-
500
100
4,900
2,900
143,300
2015
27,300
9,200
58,700
25,500
-
9,400
130,100
1,100
2,200
57,500
69,500
31,500
8,800
12,800
5,700
100
800
300
5,200
4,300
130,000
2010
21,400
7,000
55,000
21,800
-
12,100
117,300
1,300
1,800
52,800
61,600
25,900
8,800
10,400
3,200
-
800
300
3,500
8,700
117,400
By sector
Construction and installation
Manufacturing
Operations and maintenance
Fuel supply (domestic)
Coal and gas export
Solar and geothermal heat
Total jobs
By technology
Coal
Gas, oil & diesel
Nuclear
Renewable
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
PV
Geothermal power
Solar thermal power
Ocean
Solar - heat
Geothermal & heat pump
Total jobs
Note: totals differ because of rounding
figure6.2: employmentintheenergysectorbytechnologyin2010and2030
2010 - BOTH SCENARIOS
1% COAL
52% RENEWABLE
2% GAS
45% NUCLEAR117,000 jobs
2030 - REFERENCE SCENARIO
0.3% COAL
39% RENEWABLE
1.3% GAS
59% NUCLEAR158,000 jobs
2030 - ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2.2% GAS
0.8% COAL
65% RENEWABLE
32% NUCLEAR
139,000 jobs
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6.3employmentintherenewableheatingsector
Employment in the renewable heat sector includes jobs in
installation, manufacturing, and fuel supply. However, this analysis
includes only jobs associated with fuel supply in the biomass
sector, and jobs in installation and manufacturing for direct heat
from solar, geothermal and heat pumps. It will therefore be an
underestimate of jobs in this sector.
6.3.1employmentinsolarheating
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, solar heating would provide
14% of total heat supply by 2030, and would employ approximately
12,000 people. Growth is much more modest in the Reference
Scenario, with solar heating providing 2.3% of heat supply, and
employing approximately 1,000 people.
6.3.2employmentingeothermalandheatpumpheating
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, geothermal and heat pump
heating would provide 14% of total heat supply by 2030, and
would employ approximately 3,000 people. Growth is much more
modest in the Reference scenario, with geothermal and heat
pump heating providing 7% of heat supply, and employing
approximately 1,000 people.
6.3.3employmentinbiomassheat
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, biomass heat would provide
23% of total heat supply by 2030, and would employ approximately
19,000 people. Growth is very similar in the Reference Scenario,
with biomass heat providing 23% of heat supply, and employing
about 18,000 people.
table 6.6: solarheating:capacity,investmentanddirectjobs
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
74
258
14%
3.8
12,100
2020
22
75
3%
3.1
13,100
2015
7
23
0.9%
1.1
6,300
REFERENCE
2030
16
56
2.3%
0.4
1,300
2020
11
39
1.6%
1.1
4,900
2015
6
19
0.8%
0.9
5,200
UNIT
GW
PJ
%
GW
jobs
Energy
Installed capacity
Heat supplied
Share of total heat supply
Annual increase in capacity
Employment in the energy sector
Direct jobs in installation and manufacture
table 6.7: geothermalandheatpumpheating:capacity,investmentanddirectjobs
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
43
252
14%
1.3 
3,400
2020
24
135
6%
1.9
5,400
2015
14
79
3.3%
0.4 
1,100
REFERENCE
2030
32
168
7%
0.5
1,200
2020
24
123
5%
1.0
2,900
2015
19
-
-
1.4 
4,300
UNIT
GW
PJ
%
GW
jobs
Energy
Installed capacity
Heat supplied
Share of total heat supply
Annual increase in capacity
Employment in the energy sector
Direct jobs in installation and manufacture
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image WIND ENERGY PARK NEAR DAHME. WIND
TURBINE IN THE SNOW OPERATED BY VESTAS.
table 6.8: biomassheat:directjobsinfuelsupply
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
424
23%
19,000
2020
427
19%
15,000
2015
400
17%
14,000
REFERENCE
2030
567
23%
18,000
2020
504
20%
16,000
2015
420
16%
16,000
UNIT
PJ
%
jobs
Energy 
Heat supplied
Share of total heat supply
Employment 
Direct jobs in fuel supply
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6.3.4employmentinsolarphotovoltaics
The rapid growth in PV in the Energy [R]evolution scenario results
in 11,000 jobs in 2015 and nearly 19,000 PV jobs in 2020.
Construction and installation account for 70% of solar PV jobs in
2020. Employment in PV drops significantly by 2030, mainly
because the installation rate falls from 2,155 MW per year in 2020
to 596 MW per year in 2030. Solar PV would provide 10% of total
electricity generation in 2030, and would employ approximately
11,000 people. 
Growth is much more modest in the Reference scenario, with solar
photovoltaics providing 1.5% of generation, and employing
approximately 8,000 people in 2030.
6.3.5employmentinwindenergy
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, wind energy would provide
47% of total electricity generation by 2030, and would employ
approximately 20,000 people. Growth is more modest in the
Reference Scenario, with wind energy providing 9% of
generation, and employing approximately 9,000 people.
6.3.6employmentinbiomass
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, biomass would provide
4.2% of total electricity generation by 2030, and would employ
approximately 35,000 people. Growth is slightly lower in the
Reference Scenario, with biomass providing 2.1% of generation,
and employing approximately 34,000 people. Jobs in heating
from biomass fuels are included here.
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table 6.9: photovoltaics:capacity,generationanddirectjobs
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
38.4
46.0
10%
0.6
10,500
2020
9.9
12.0
2.3%
2.2
19,000
2015
4.1
5.0
0.9%
0.8
11,000
REFERENCE
2030
8.2
9.8
1.5%
0.4
8,000
2020
4.9
5.9
0.9%
0.3
3,600
2015
2.2
2.6
0.4%
0.4
5,700
UNIT
GW
TWh
%
GW
jobs
Energy
Installed capacity
Total generation
Share of total supply
Annual increase in capacity
Employment in the energy sector
Direct jobs in construction, manufacture, O&M
table 6.10: windenergy:capacity,generationanddirectjobs
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
92
220
47%
0.3
19,700
2020
32
73
14%
4.8
31,700
2015
17
39
7%
2.3
15,400
REFERENCE
2030
30
61
9%
0.1
9,400
2020
25
58
9%
0.1
4,200
2015
13
31
5%
1.8
12,800
UNIT
GW
TWh
%
GW
jobs
Energy
Installed capacity
Total generation
Share of total supply
Annual increase in capacity
Employment in the energy sector
Direct jobs in construction, manufacture, O&M
table 6.11: biomass:capacity,generationanddirectjobs
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
5.3
19.8
4%
0.6
35,200
2020
1.5
8.4
2%
0.2 
26,100
2015
1.1
6.3
1%
0.1 
24,600
REFERENCE
2030
3.0
14.0
2%
0.02
34,000
2020
3.0
17.2
3%
0
34,800
2015
1.9
10.5
2%
0.2 
31,500
UNIT
GW
TWh
%
GW
jobs
Energy
Installed capacity
Total generation
Share of total supply
Annual increase in capacity
Employment in the energy sector
Direct jobs in construction, manufacture, O&M
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image TESTING THE SCOTRENEWABLES TIDAL
TURBINE OFF KIRWALL IN THE ORKNEY ISLANDS.
6.5.10employmentincoal
Jobs in the coal sector drop in both the Reference scenario and
the Energy [R]evolution scenario. In the Reference scenario coal
employment drops from 1,100 to only 400 jobs between 2015
and 2030.
Coal sector employment in the Energy [R]evolution scenario falls
to zero, reflecting a complete phase out of coal generation
between 2015 and 2030. Coal jobs in both scenarios include coal
used for heat supply.
6.5.11employmentingas,oil&diesel
Employment in the gas sector drops by 5% in both scenarios
between 2015 and 2030. In the Reference scenario this reflects
the reduction in gas generation.
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, employment at 2015
includes approximately 1,000 people employed in expansion of
CHP plants. This is established by 2020, and employment falls
although generation does not change. Gas sector jobs in both
scenarios include heat supply jobs from gas.
6.5.12employmentinnuclearenergy
Employment in nuclear energy nearly doubles in the Reference
scenario between 2015 and 2030, while nuclear generation increases
by only 11%. The jobs are mainly in construction, as the long
construction period for nuclear power means 2030 employment
includes the workforce building capacity due to come on line in
2039. Construction employment is boosted by the estimated 32 GW
required to replace capacity taken out of service at the end of its life.
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario generation is reduced by 83%
between 2015 and 2030, representing a virtual phase out of nuclear
power. However, employment in the nuclear sector falls by only 13%
in the same period. This is because the accelerated closure of nuclear
plants results in a signifcant increase in nuclear decomissioning
employment. It is expected these jobs will persist for 20 - 30 years.
Employment estimates for nuclear energy in 2010 are nearly 50%
lower than the 2011 Price Waterhouse Coopers report into
employment in the French Nuclear industry. That study estimated that
for every direct job in the three main nuclear employers (EdF, AREVA,
and CEA) there was an additional direct job in the supply chain. This
study defines direct jobs more narrowly, and does not include nuclear
employment associated with military or research operations.
table 6.12: fossilfuelsandnuclearenergy:capacity,investmentanddirectjobs
ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
1,100
3,000
44,600
2
3
1%
-0.1
25 
43 
9%
0.4 
9
62
13%
-1.7
2020
1,000
4,200
49,500
4
8
2%
-0.3
22 
46 
9%
0.7 
44
303
58%
-3.0
2015
900
4,100
51,000
6
13
2%
-0.5
20
43 
8%
1.3 
62
369
68%
-0.3
REFERENCE
2030
400
2,100
93,000
2
11
2%
-0.2
10
23
3%
0.02
66
475
72%
0
2020
700
2,300
83,500
5
15
2%
-0.4
11
23
4%
-0.04
66
451
70%
0.3
2015
1,100
2,200
57,500
7
21
3%
-0.3
12
26
4%
0
65
430
73%
0.3
UNIT
jobs
jobs
jobs
GW
TWh
%
GW
GW
TWh
%
GW
GW
TWh
%
GW
Employment in the energy sector
- fossil fuels and nuclear
coal
gas, oil & diesel
Nuclear energy
COAL
Energy
Installed capacity
Total generation
Share of total supply
Annual increase in capacity
GAS, OIL & DIESEL
Energy
Installed capacity
Total generation
Share of total supply
Annual increase in capacity
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Energy
Installed capacity
Total generation
Share of total supply
Annual increase in capacity
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appendix 1: localemploymentdatafornuclearandhydro
JOBS/MW
0.26
0.61
0.51
0.29
0.51
0.34
0.30
0.36
0.43
0.56
0.38
0.35
0.41
0.39
0.32
0.32
0.51
0.38
0.36
0.4
0.18
0.12
0.18
0.26
0.15
0.16 
TOTAL JOBS
688
2,200
1,850
1,500
1,830
1,000
906
1,294
1,550
1,000
992
900
2,200
1,015
1,674
835
1,318
684
1,294
24,730
500
1,000
500
700
700
3,400
TOTAL CAPACITY
(MW)
2,600
3,600
3,600
5,200
3,600
2,900
3,000
3,600
3,600
1,800
2,600
2,600
5,400
2,600
5,200
2,600
2,600
1,800
3,600
62,500
2,715
8,100
2,715
2,645
4,600
20,775
Installed capacity and number of persons employed as reported on the EdF website (EdF 2012) were used
to calculate weighted average local employment factors for nuclear and large hydro O&M. Fuel
management operations employment is estimated at 500 jobs per EPR of 1600 MW (Price Waterhouse
Coopers, 2011, page 70), which adds 0.3 jobs/MW to the weighted average figure for nuclear O&M factor. 
POWER STATION
Nuclear – operations and
maintenance (O&M)
Belleville Nuclear Centre
Blayais Nuclear Centre
Bugey Nuclear Centre
Cattenom NC
Chinon
Chooz
Civaux
Craus
Dampierre
Fessenheim
Flamanville
Golfech
Gravelins
Nogent-sur-seine
Paluel
Penly
Saint Alban
Saint Laurent Des Eaux
Tricastin
Weighted average
Hydro – operations and
maintenance (O&M)
Unite de Production Est
Production Alps
Production Mediterranee 
Su-Ouest
Production Centre
Weighted average
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image WORKERS BUILD A WIND TURBINE IN A
FACTORY IN PATHUM THANI, THAILAND. THE
IMPACTS OF SEA-LEVEL RISE DUE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE ARE PREDICTED TO HIT HARD ON COASTAL
COUNTRIES IN ASIA, AND CLEAN RENEWABLE
ENERGY IS A SOLUTION.
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appendix 2: abbreviations
Électricité de France
Energy Information Administration (USA)
European Wind Energy Association
Full Time Equivalent
Gigawatt hour
International Energy Agency
Institute for Sustainable Futures
Megawatt 
National Renewable Energy Laboratories (U.S)
Operations and Maintenance
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Photovoltaic
PriceWaterhouse Coopers
Renewables Global Status Report
Terawatt hour
EdF
EIA
EWEA
FTE
GWh
IEA
ISF
MW 
NREL
O&M 
OECD
PV
PWC
REN21
TWh
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thesilentrevolution
–pastandcurrentmarketdevelopments
POWER PLANT MARKETS GLOBAL MARKET SHARES 
IN THE POWER PLANT MARKET AND
THE EU 27 POSITION
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INSTALLED POWER PLANT
CAPACITY IN EUROPE
7
technology SOLAR PARKS PS10 AND PS20, SEVILLE, SPAIN. THESE ARE PART OF A LARGER PROJECT INTENDED TO MEET THE ENERGY NEEDS OF SOME 180,000 HOMES —
ROUGHLY THE ENERGY NEEDS OF SEVILLE BY 2013, WITHOUT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS.
thebright
futurefor
renewableenergy
isalreadyunderway.”“
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A new analysis of the global power plant market shows that since
the late 1990s, wind and solar installations grew faster than any
other power plant technology across the world - about 430,000
MW total installed capacities between 2000 and 2010. However,
it is too early to claim the end of the fossil fuel based power
generation, because more than 475,000 MW of new coal power
plants were built with embedded cumulative emissions of over 55
billion tonnes CO2 over their technical lifetime.
The global market volume of renewable energies constructed in
2010 was on average, equal to the total global energy market
volume (all kinds) added each year between 1970 and 2000. There
is a window of opportunity for new renewable energy installations
to replace old plants in OECD countries and for electrification in
developing countries. However, the window will close within the
next few years without good renewable energy policies and legally
binding CO2 reduction targets.
Between 1970 and 1990, the OECD44 global power plant market
was dominated by countries that electrified their economies mainly
with coal, gas and hydro power plants. The power sector was in the
hands of state-owned utilities with regional or nationwide supply
monopolies. The nuclear industry had a relatively short period of
steady growth between 1970 and the mid 1980s - with a peak in
1985, one year before the Chernobyl accident - and went into
decline in following years, with no recent signs of growth. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the global power plant industry went
through a series of changes. While OECD countries began to
liberalise their electricity markets, electricity demand did not
match previous growth, so fewer new power plants were built.
Capital-intensive projects with long payback times, such as coal
and nuclear power plants, were unable to get sufficient financial
support. The decade of gas power plants started. 
The economies of developing countries, especially in Asia, started
growing during the 1990s, triggering a new wave of power plant
projects. Similarly to the US and Europe, most of the new
markets in the ‘tiger states’ of Southeast Asia partly deregulated
their power sectors. A large number of new power plants in this
region were built from Independent Power Producer (IPPs), who
sell the electricity mainly to state-owned utilities. The majority of
new power plant technology in liberalised power markets is
fuelled by gas, except for in China which focused on building new
coal power plants. Excluding China, the rest of the global power
plant market has seen a phase-out of coal since the late 1990s
with growing gas and renewable generation, particularly wind. 
reference
44 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
figure7.1:globalpowerplantmarket1970-2010
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image NESJAVELLIR GEOTHERMAL PLANT GENERATES ELECTRICITY AND HOT WATER BY
UTILIZING GEOTHERMAL WATER AND STEAM. IT IS THE SECOND LARGEST GEOTHERMAL POWER
STATION IN ICELAND. THE STATION PRODUCES APPROXIMATELY 120MW OF ELECTRICAL POWER,
AND DELIVERS AROUND 1,800 LITRES (480 US GAL) OF HOT WATER PER SECOND, SERVICING THE
HOT WATER NEEDS OF THE GREATER REYKJAVIK AREA. THE FACILITY IS LOCATED 177 M (581 FT)
ABOVE SEA LEVEL IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, NEAR THE HENGILL VOLCANO.
Europe: About five years after the US began deregulating the
power sector, the European Community started a similar process
with similar effect on the power plant market. Investors backed
fewer new power plants and extended the lifetime of the existing
ones. New coal and nuclear power plants have seen a market share
of well below 10% since then. The growing share of renewables,
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figure7.2:globalpowerplantmarket1970-2010,excludingchina
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figure7.3:europe(eu27):powerplantmarket1970-2010
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1997 - deregulation
of the EU electricity
market began
especially wind and solar photovoltaic, are due to a legally-binding
target and the associated feed-in laws which have been in force in
several member states of the EU 27 since the late 1990s. Overall,
new installed power plant capacity jumped to a record high
because the aged power plant fleet in Europe needed re-powering.
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7.1theglobalmarketsharesinthepowerplant
marketandtheEU27position:renewables
gainingground
Since the year 2000, the wind power market gained a growing
market share within the global power plant market. Initially only
a handful of countries, namely Germany, Denmark and Spain,
dominated the wind market, but the wind industry now has
projects in over 70 countries around the world. Following the
example of the wind industry, the solar photovoltaic industry
experienced an equal growth since 2005. Between 2000 and
2010, 26% of all new power plants worldwide were renewable-
powered – mainly wind – and 42% run on gas. So, two-thirds of
all new power plants installed globally are gas power plants and
renewable, with close to one-third as coal. Nuclear remains
irrelevant on a global scale with just 2% of the global market
share. About 430,000 MW of new renewable energy capacity has
been installed over the last decade, while 475,000 MW of new
coal, with embedded cumulative emissions of more than 55
billion tonnes CO2 over their technical lifetime, came online –
78% or 375,000 MW in China.
global power plant market shares 2000-2010
2% NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
30% COAL POWER PLANTS
42% GAS POWER PLANTS 
(INCL. OIL)
26% RENEWABLES
global power plant market shares 2000-2010 - excluding china
2% NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
10% COAL POWER PLANTS
60% GAS POWER PLANTS
(INCL. OIL)
28% RENEWABLES
china: power plant market shares 2000-2010
2% NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
69% COAL POWER PLANTS
5% GAS POWER PLANTS (INCL. OIL)
24% RENEWABLES
usa: power plant market shares 2000-2010
4% COAL POWER PLANTS
81% GAS POWER PLANTS
(INCL. OIL)
15% RENEWABLES
EU 27: power plant market shares 2000-2010 - excluding china
3% NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
6% COAL POWER PLANTS
46% GAS POWER PLANTS
(INCL. OIL)
45% RENEWABLES
source PLATTS, IEA, BREYER, TESKE, GWAC, EPIA.
figure7.4: powerplantmarketshares
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KANAKO NISHIKATA, HER TWO CHILDREN KAITO
AND FUU AND TATSUKO OGAWARA VISIT A WIND
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The energy revolution has started on a global level already. This
picture is even clearer when we look into the global market
shares but exclude China, the only country with a massive
expansion of coal. About 28% of all new power plants since
2000 have been renewables and 60% have been gas power plants
(88% in total). Coal gained a market share of only 10%
globally, excluding China. Between 2000 and 2010, China has
added over 350,000 MW of new coal capacity: twice as much as
the entire coal capacity of the EU. However, China has also
recently kick-started its wind market, and solar photovoltaics is
expected to follow in the years to come.
7.2developmentoftheinstalledpowerplant
capacityineurope(EU27)
Figure 7.5 provides shows the new installed capacity and
decommissioned power plant capacity. The trend away from nuclear
towards renewable energy – especially wind and solar pv – and gas
has been quite robust over recent years. However, in 2011 more
coal power plants have been connected to the grid than
decommissioned which will lead to high and long term carbon
emissions.
figure7.5:newinstalledcapacityanddecommissionedcapacityinmw,2011.total35,468mw.
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energyresourcesandsecurityofsupply
GLOBAL OIL
GAS
COAL
NUCLEAR
RENEWABLE ENERGY
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image POLAND’S ROSPUDA VALLEY IS A WETLAND AREA THAT COLLECTS DEAD PLANT MATERIAL. ALTHOUGH PEAT BOGS WERE ONCE COMMON IN COOL, TEMPERATE
CLIMATES LIKE NORTHERN EUROPE’S, FEW HAVE SURVIVED THE CHANGES PEOPLE HAVE MADE TO THE LANDSCAPE FOR AGRICULTURE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT. THE
PEAT BOG IN ROSPUDA VALLEY IS ONE OF EUROPE’S LAST PRISTINE WETLANDS.
theissueof
securityof
supplyisnowatthe
topoftheenergy
policyagenda.”
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The issue of security of supply is at the top of the energy policy
agenda. Concern is focused both on price security and the
security of physical supply for countries with none if their own
resources. At present around 80% of global energy demand is
met by fossil fuels. The world is currently experiencing an
unrelenting increase in energy demand in the face of the finite
nature of these resources. At the same time, the global
distribution of oil and gas resources does not match the
distribution of demand. Some countries have to rely almost
entirely on fossil fuel imports. 
Table 8.1 shows estimated deposits and current use of fossil energy
sources. There is no shortage of fossil fuels; there might a shortage
of conventional oil and gas. Reducing global fossil fuel consumption
for reasons of resource scarcity alone is not mandatory, even
though there may be substantial price fluctuations and regional or
structural shortages as we have seen in the past.
The presently known coal resources and reserves alone probably
amount to around 3,000 times the amount currently mined in a
year. Thus, in terms of resource potential, current-level demand could
be met for many hundreds of years to come. Coal is also relatively
evenly spread across the globe; each continent holds considerable
deposits. However, the supply horizon is clearly much lower for
conventional mineral oil and gas reserves at 40–50 years. If some
resources or deposits currently still classified as ‘unconventional’ are
included, the resource potentials exceed the current consumption
rate by far more than one hundred years. However, serious
ecological damage is frequently associated with fossil energy mining,
particularly of unconventional deposits in oil sands and oil shale.
Over the past few years, new commercial processes have been
developed in the natural gas extraction sector, allowing more
affordable access to gas deposits previously considered
‘unconventional’, many of which are more frequently found and
evenly distributed globally than traditional gas fields. However,
tight gas and shale gas extraction can potentially be accompanied
by seismic activities and the pollution of groundwater basins and
inshore waters. It therefore needs special regulations. It is
expected that an effective gas market will develop using the
existing global distribution network for liquid gas via tankers and
loading terminals. With greater competitiveness regards price
fixing, it is expected that the oil and gas prices will no longer be
linked. Having more liquid gas in the energy mix (currently
around 10% of overall gas consumption) significantly increases
supply security, e.g. reducing the risks of supply interruptions
associated with international pipeline networks. 
Gas hydrates are another type of gas deposit found in the form of
methane aggregates both in the deep sea and underground in
permafrost. They are solid under high pressure and low temperatures.
While there is the possibility of continued greenhouse gas emissions
from such deposits as a consequence of arctic permafrost soil thaw
or a thawing of the relatively flat Siberian continental shelf, there is
also potential for extraction of this energy source. Many states,
including the USA, Japan, India, China and South Korea have
launched relevant research programmes. Estimates of global deposits
vary greatly; however, all are in the zettajoule range, for example
70,000–700,000 EJ (Krey et al., 2009). The Global Energy
Assessment report estimates the theoretical potential to be
2,650–2,450,000 EJ (GEA, 2011), i.e. possibly more than a
thousand times greater than the current annual total energy
consumption. Approximately a tenth (1,200–245,600 EJ) is rated as
potentially extractable. The WBGU advised against applied research
for methane hydrate extraction, as mining bears considerable risks
and methane hydrates do not represent a sustainable energy source
(‘The Future Oceans’, WBGU, 2006).
PRODUCTION
IN 2008 (EJ)
170
23
118
12
150
473
26
-
HISTORICAL PRODUCTION 
UP TO 2008 (EJ)
6,500
500
3,400
160
7,100
17,660
1,300
-
FURTHER 
DEPOSITS (EJ)
-
47,000
-
490,000
-
537,000
-
2,600,000
RESOURCES
(EJ)
4,967
34,000
8,041
56,500
440,000
543,507
7,400
4,100
RESERVES
(EJ)
6,350
3,800
6,000
42,500
21,000
79,650
2,400
-
table8.1:globaloccurancesoffossilandnuclearsources
THERE ARE HIGH UNCERTAINTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF RESERVES AND RESOURCES.
FUEL
Conventional oil
Unconventional oil
Conventional gas
Unconventional gas
Coal
Total fossil sources
Conventional uranium
Unconventional uranium
source
The representative figures shown here are WBGU estimates on the basis of the GEA, 2011. 
8
en
erg
yreso
u
rcesa
n
d
secu
rityo
fsu
p
p
ly
|
E
N
E
R
G
Y
 R
E
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
 A
N
D
 S
E
C
U
R
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
U
P
P
LY
©
 G
P
/M
A
R
K
E
L
 R
E
D
O
N
D
O
image AERIAL PHOTO OF THE ANDASOL 1 SOLAR
POWER STATION, EUROPE’S FIRST COMMERCIAL
PARABOLIC TROUGH SOLAR POWER PLANT. ANDASOL
1 WILL SUPPLY UP TO 200,000 PEOPLE WITH
CLIMATE-FRIENDLY ELECTRICITY AND SAVE ABOUT
149,000 TONNES OF CARBON DIOXIDE PER YEAR
COMPARED WITH A MODERN COAL POWER PLANT.
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PRODUCTION
IN 2008
(GT CO2)
13
2
7
1
14
36
HISTORICAL
PRODUCTION 
UP TO 2008
(GT CO2)
505
39
192
9
666
1,411
FURTHER 
DEPOSITS
(GT CO2)
-
3,649
-
27,724
-
31,373
RESOURCES
(GT CO2)
386
2,640
455
3,197
41,277
47,954
RESERVES
(GT CO2)
493
295
339
2,405
1,970
5,502
table8.2:overviewoftheresultingemissionsifallfossilresourceswereburned
POTENTIAL EMISSIONS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE USE OF FOSSIL RESERVES AND RESOURCES. ALSO ILLUSTRATED IS THEIR POTENTIAL FOR
ENDANGERING THE 2ºC GUARD RAIL. THIS RISK IS EXPRESSED AS THE FACTOR BY WHICH, ASSUMING COMPLETE EXHAUSTION OF THE RESPECTIVE
RESERVES AND RESOURCES, THE RESULTANT CO2 EMISSIONS WOULD EXCEED THE 750 GT C02 BUDGET PERMISSIBLE FROM FOSSIL SOURCES UNTIL 2050.
FOSSIL FUEL
Conventional oil
Unconventional oil
Conventional gas
Unconventional gas
Coal
Total fossil fuels
source
GEA, 2011. 
TOTAL
RESERVES,
RESOURCES
AND FURTHER
OCCURENCES
(GT CO2)
879
6,584
794
33,325
43,247
84,829
FACTOR BY
WHICH THESE
EMISSIONS
ALONE 
EXCEED THE
2ºC EMISSIONS
BUDGET
1
9
1
44
58
113
8.1oil
Oil is the lifeblood of the modern global economy, as the effects
of the supply disruptions of the 1970s made clear. It is the
number one source of energy, providing about one third of the
world’s needs and the fuel employed almost exclusively for
essential uses such as transportation. However, a passionate
debate has developed over the ability of supply to meet increasing
consumption, a debate obscured by poor information and stirred
by recent soaring prices.
8.1.1thereserveschaos
Public information about oil and gas reserves is strikingly
inconsistent, and potentially unreliable for legal, commercial,
historical and sometimes political reasons. The most widely
available and quoted figures, those from the industry journals Oil
and Gas Journal and World Oil, have limited value as they report
the reserve figures provided by companies and governments
without analysis or verification. Moreover, as there is no agreed
definition of reserves or standard reporting practice, these figures
usually represent different physical and conceptual magnitudes.
Confusing terminology - ‘proved’, ‘probable’, ‘possible’,
‘recoverable’, ‘reasonable certainty’ - only adds to the problem. 
Historically, private oil companies have consistently
underestimated their reserves to comply with conservative stock
exchange rules and through natural commercial caution.
Whenever a discovery was made, only a portion of the geologist’s
estimate of recoverable resources was reported; subsequent
revisions would then increase the reserves from that same oil
field over time. National oil companies, mostly represented by
OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), have
taken a very different approach. They are not subject to any sort
of accountability and their reporting practices are even less clear.
In the late 1980s, the OPEC countries blatantly overstated their
reserves while competing for production quotas, which were
allocated as a proportion of the reserves. Although some revision
was needed after the companies were nationalised, between 1985
and 1990, OPEC countries increased their apparent joint reserves
by 82%. Not only were these dubious revisions never corrected,
but many of these countries have reported untouched reserves for
years, even if no sizeable discoveries were made and production
continued at the same pace. Additionally, the Former Soviet
Union’s oil and gas reserves have been overestimated by about
30% because the original assessments were later misinterpreted. 
Whilst private companies are now becoming more realistic about
the extent of their resources, the OPEC countries hold by far the
majority of the reported reserves, and their information is as
unsatisfactory as ever. Their conclusions should therefore be
treated with considerable caution. To fairly estimate the world’s
oil resources would require a regional assessment of the mean
backdated (i.e. ‘technical’) discoveries.
box8.1:theenergy[r]evolutionfossilfuelpathway
The Energy [R]evolution scenario will phase-out fossil fuel not
simply as they are depleted, but to achieve a greenhouse gas
reduction pathway required to avoid dangerous climate change.
Decisions new need to avoid a “lock-in” situation meaning that
investments in new oil production will make it more difficult to
change to a renewable energy pathway in the future. Scenario
development shows that the Energy [R]evolution can be made
without any new oil exploration and production investments in
the arctic or deep sea wells. Unconventional oil such as
Canada’s tars and or Australia’s shale oil is not needed to
guarantee the supply oil until it is phased out under the Energy
[R]evolution scenario (see chapter 3).
85
8.1.2non-conventionaloilreserves
A large share of the world’s remaining oil resources is classified as
‘non-conventional’. Potential fuel sources such as oil sands, extra
heavy oil and oil shale are generally more costly to exploit and
their recovery involves enormous environmental damage. The
reserves of oil sands and extra heavy oil in existence worldwide are
estimated to amount to around 6 trillion barrels, of which between
1 and 2 trillion barrels are believed to be recoverable if the oil
price is high enough and the environmental standards low enough.
One of the worst examples of environmental degradation resulting
from the exploitation of unconventional oil reserves is the oil
sands that lie beneath the Canadian province of Alberta and form
the world’s second-largest proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia.
The ‘tar sands’ are a heavy mixture of bitumen, water, sand and
clay found beneath more than 54,000 square miles45 of prime
forest in northern Alberta, an area the size of England and
Wales. Producing crude oil from this resource generates up to
four times more carbon dioxide, the principal global warming gas,
than conventional drilling. The booming oil sands industry will
produce 100 million tonnes of CO2 a year (equivalent to a fifth of
the UK’s entire annual emissions) by 2012, ensuring that Canada
will miss its emission targets under the Kyoto treaty. The oil rush
is also scarring a wilderness landscape: millions of tonnes of plant
life and top soil are scooped away in vast opencast mines and
millions of litres of water diverted from rivers. Up to five barrels
of water are needed to produce a single barrel of crude and the
process requires huge amounts of natural gas. It takes two tonnes
of the raw sands to produce a single barrel of oil. 
8.2gas
Natural gas has been the fastest growing fossil energy source
over the last two decades, boosted by its increasing share in the
electricity generation mix. Gas is generally regarded as an
abundant resource and there is lower public concern about
depletion than for oil, even though few in-depth studies address
the subject. Gas resources are more concentrated and a few
massive fields make up most of the reserves. The largest gas field
in the world holds 15% of the Ultimate Recoverable Resources
(URR), compared to 6% for oil. Unfortunately, information about
gas resources suffers from the same bad practices as oil data
because gas mostly comes from the same geological formations,
and the same stakeholders are involved. 
Most reserves are initially understated and then gradually revised
upwards, giving an optimistic impression of growth. By contrast,
Russia’s reserves, the largest in the world, are considered to have
been overestimated by about 30%. Owing to geological
similarities, gas follows the same depletion dynamic as oil, and
thus the same discovery and production cycles. In fact, existing
data for gas is of worse quality than for oil, with ambiguities
arising over the amount produced, partly because flared and
vented gas is not always accounted for. As opposed to published
reserves, the technical ones have been almost constant since
1980 because discoveries have roughly matched production. 
8.2.1shalegas46
Natural gas production, especially in the United States, has
recently involved a growing contribution from non-conventional
gas supplies such as shale gas. Conventional natural gas deposits
have a well-defined geographical area, the reservoirs are porous
and permeable, the gas is produced easily through a wellbore and
does not generally require artificial stimulation. 
Natural gas obtained from unconventional reserves (known as
“shale gas” or “tight gas”) requires the reservoir rock to be
fractured using a process known as hydraulic fracturing or
“fracking”. Fracking is associated with a range of environmental
impacts some of which are not fully documented or understood.
In addition, it appears that the greenhouse gas “footprint” of
shale gas production may be significantly greater than for
conventional gas and is claimed to be even worse than for coal.
Research and investment in non-conventional gas resources has
increased significantly in recent years due to the rising price of
conventional natural gas. In some areas the technologies for
economic production have already been developed, in others it is
still at the research stage. Extracting shale gas, however, usually
goes hand in hand with environmentally hazardous processes.
Even so, it is expected to increase. 
Greenpeace is opposed to the exploitation of unconventional
gas reserves and these resources are not needed to guarantee
the needed gas supply under the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
8.3coal
Coal was the world’s largest source of primary energy until it was
overtaken by oil in the 1960s. Today, coal supplies almost one
quarter of the world’s energy. Despite being the most abundant of
fossil fuels, coal’s development is currently threatened by
environmental concerns; hence its future will unfold in the context
of both energy security and global warming.
Coal is abundant and more equally distributed throughout the
world than oil and gas. Global recoverable reserves are the
largest of all fossil fuels, and most countries have at least some.
Moreover, existing and prospective big energy consumers like the
US, China and India are self-sufficient in coal and will be for the
foreseeable future. Coal has been exploited on a large scale for
two centuries, so both the product and the available resources are
well known; no substantial new deposits are expected to be
discovered. Extrapolating the demand forecast forward, the world
will consume 20% of its current reserves by 2030 and 40% by
2050. Hence, if current trends are maintained, coal would still
last several hundred years.
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image ON A LINFEN STREET, TWO MEN LOAD UP A CART WITH COAL THAT WILL BE
USED FOR COOKING. LINFEN, A CITY OF ABOUT 4.3 MILLION, IS ONE OF THE MOST
POLLUTED CITIES IN THE WORLD. CHINA’S INCREASINGLY POLLUTED
ENVIRONMENT IS LARGELY A RESULT OF THE COUNTRY’S RAPID DEVELOPMENT
AND CONSEQUENTLY A LARGE INCREASE IN PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION,
WHICH IS ALMOST ENTIRELY PRODUCED BY BURNING COAL.
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map 8.1: oilreferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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map 8.2: gasreferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
WORLDWIDE SCENARIO
NON RENEWABLE RESOURCE
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map 8.3: coalreferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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WATER
map 8.4: waterdemandforthermalpowergeneration
WORLDWIDE SCENARIO
The Energy [R]evolution is the first global energy scenario to quantify
the water needs of different energy pathways. The water footprint of
thermal power generation and fuel production is estimated by taking the
production levels in each scenario and multiplying by technology-
specific water consumption factors. Water consumption factors for
power generation technologies are taken from U.S. Department of
Energy and University of Texas and adjusted for projected region-
specific thermal efficiencies of different operating power plant types.i
Water footprints of coal, oil and gas extraction are based on data from
Wuppertal Institute, complemented by estimates of water footprint of
unconventional fossil fuels as well as first and second generation
transport biofuels.ii As a detailed regional breakdown of fuel production
by region is not available for the reference scenario, the water footprint
of fuel production is only estimated on the global level.
Benefits of the Energy [R]evolution for water:
• Electric technologies with low to no water requirements – energy
efficiency, wind and solar PV – substituted for thermal power
generation with high water impacts.
• Reduced water use and contamination from fossil fuel production:
no need for unconventional fossil fuels; lowered consumption of
conventional coal and oil.
• Bioenergy is based on waste-derived biomass and cellulosic biomass
requiring no irrigation (no food for fuel). As a result, water intensity of
biomass use is a fraction of that in IEA scenarios.
• Energy efficiency programmes reduce water consumption in
buildings and industry.
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• Rapid CO2 emission reductions protect water resources from
catastrophic climate change.
Global water consumption for power generation and fuel production has
almost doubled in the past two decades, and the trend is projected to
continue. The OECD predicts that in a business-as-usual scenario, the
power sector would consume 25% of the world’s water in 2050 and be
responsible for more than half of additional demand.iii The Energy
[R]evolution pathway would halt the rise in water demand for energy,
mitigating the pressures and conflicts on the world’s already stressed
water resources. Approximately 90 billion cubic meters of water would
be saved in fuel production and thermal power generation by 2030,
enough to satisfy the water needs of 1.3 billion urban dwellers, or to
irrigate enough fields to produce 50 million tonnes of grain, equal to the
average direct consumption of 300-500 million people.iv
references(waterscenario)
i NATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY 2009: WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR EXISTING AND
EMERGING THERMOELECTRIC PLANT TECHNOLOGIES. US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. AUGUST 2008
(APRIL 2009 REVISION); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 2006: ENERGY DEMANDS ON WATER
RESOURCES. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCY OF ENERGY AND WATER.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS & ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND 2009: ENERGY‐WATER NEXUS IN TEXAS.
ii WUPPERTAL INSTITUT: MATERIAL INTENSITY OF MATERIALS, FUELS, TRANSPORT SERVICES,
FOOD. HTTP://WWW.WUPPERINST.ORG/UPLOADS/TX_WIBEITRAG/MIT_2011.PDF; WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM 2009: ENERGY VISION UPDATE 2009. THIRSTY ENERGY; HARTO ET AL: LIFE
CYCLE WATER CONSUMPTION OF ALTERNATIVE, LOW-CARBON TRANSPORTATION ENERGY
SOURCES. FUNDED BY ARIZONA WATER INSTITUTE.
iii OECD ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK TO 2050: THE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION.
HTTP://WWW.OECD.ORG/DOCUMENT/11/0,3746,EN_2649_37465_49036555_1_1_1_37465,00.HTML
iv USING TYPICAL URBAN RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSUMPTION OF 200 LITERS/PERSON/DAY.
AVERAGE GRAIN CONSUMPTION RANGES FROM 8 KG/PERSON/MONTH (US) TO 14 (INDIA).
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8.4nuclear
Uranium, the fuel used in nuclear power plants, is a finite
resource whose economically available reserves are limited. Its
distribution is almost as concentrated as oil and does not match
global consumption. Five countries - Canada, Australia,
Kazakhstan, Russia and Niger - control three quarters of the
world’s supply. As a significant user of uranium, however, Russia’s
reserves will be exhausted within ten years.
Secondary sources, such as old deposits, currently make up nearly
half of worldwide uranium reserves. However, these will soon be
used up. Mining capacities will have to be nearly doubled in the
next few years to meet current needs. 
A joint report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the
International Atomic Energy Agency47 estimates that all existing
nuclear power plants will have used up their nuclear fuel,
employing current technology, within less than 70 years. Given
the range of scenarios for the worldwide development of nuclear
power, it is likely that uranium supplies will be exhausted
sometime between 2026 and 2070. This forecast includes the use
of mixed oxide fuel (MOX), a mixture of uranium and plutonium. 
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47 ‘URANIUM 2003: RESOURCES, PRODUCTION AND DEMAND’.
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107,498
2,829
142,460
7,808
142,460
7,808
2040
197,522
32,275
53,030
8,665
179,878
4,734
73,452
1,933
224,487
10,879
58,732
2,556
2050
211,365
34,537
29,942
4,893
195,804
5,153
35,557
936
226,245
10,880
19,484
846
2030
185,993
30,391
95,169
15,550
155,412
4,090
106,228
2,795
209,195
10,349
105,219
4,707
2020
173,236
28,306
133,712
21,848
131,682
3,465
124,069
3,265
186,742
9,633
142,833
7,119
table8.3: assumptionsonfossilfueluseintheglobalenergy[r]evolutionscenario
FOSSIL FUEL
Oil
Reference (PJ/a)
Reference (million barrels/a)
E[R] (PJ/a)
E[R] (million barrels/a)
Gas
Reference (PJ/a)
Reference (billion cubic metres = 10E9m/a)
E[R] (PJ/a)
E[R] (billion cubic metres = 10E9m/a)
Coal
Reference (PJ/a)
Reference (million tonnes)
E[R] (PJ/a)
E[R] (million tonnes)
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8.5renewableenergy
Nature offers a variety of freely available options for producing
energy. Their exploitation is mainly a question of how to convert
sunlight, wind, biomass or water into electricity, heat or power as
efficiently, sustainably and cost-effectively as possible.
On average, the energy in the sunshine that reaches the earth is
about one kilowatt per square metre worldwide. According to the
IPCC Special Report Renewables (SRREN)49 solar power is a
renewable energy source gushing out at 7,900 times more than
the energy currently needed in the world. In one day, the sunlight
which reaches the earth produces enough energy to satisfy the
world’s current energy requirements for twenty years, even before
other renewable energy sources such as wind and ocean energy
are taken into account. Even though only a percentage of that
potential is technically accessible, this is still enough to provide
up to ten times more energy than the world currently requires.
Before looking at the part renewable energies can play in the
range of scenarios in this report, it is worth understanding the
upper limits of their regional potential and by when this potential
can be exploited. 
The overall technical potential of renewable energy is huge and
several times higher than current total energy demand. Technical
potential is defined as the amount of renewable energy output
obtainable by full implementation of demonstrated technologies
or practices that are likely to develop. It takes into account the
primary resources, the socio-geographical constraints and the
technical losses in the conversion process. Calculating renewable
energy potentials is highly complex because these technologies
are comparatively young and their exploitation involves changes
to the way in which energy is both generated and distributed. The
technical potential is dependent on a number of uncertainties,
e.g. a technology breakthrough, for example, could have a
dramatic impact, changing the technical potential assessment
within a very short time frame. Further, because of the speed of
technology change, many existing studies are based on out of date
information. More recent data, e.g. significantly increased
average wind turbine capacity and output, would increase the
technical potentials still further.
box8.1: definitionoftypesofenergy
resourcepotential48
Theoretical potential The physical upper limit of the energy
available from a certain source. For solar energy, for
example, this would be the total solar radiation falling on a
particular surface.
Conversion potential This is derived from the annual
efficiency of the respective conversion technology. It is
therefore not a strictly defined value, since the efficiency of
a particular technology depends on technological progress.
Technical potential This takes into account additional
restrictions regarding the area that is realistically available
for energy generation. Technological, structural and
ecological restrictions, as well as legislative requirements,
are accounted for.
Economic potential The proportion of the technical potential
that can be utilised economically. For biomass, for example,
those quantities are included that can be exploited
economically in competition with other products and land uses.
Sustainable potential This limits the potential of an energy
source based on evaluation of ecological and socio-
economic factors.
ANNUAL FLUX (EJ/a)
1,548
3,900,000
1,400
147
7,400
6,000
TOTAL RESERVE 
-
-
-
-
-
-
RATIO
(ANNUAL ENERGY FLUX/
2008 PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY)
3.1
7,900
2.8
0.3
15
12
table8.4: renewableenergytheoreticalpotential
RE
Bioenergy
Solar energy
Geothermal energy
Hydro power
Ocean energy
Wind energy
references
48 WBGU (GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE).
49 IPCC, 2011: IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION. PREPARED BY WORKING GROUP III OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [O. EDENHOFER, R. PICHS-MADRUGA, Y. SOKONA, K. SEYBOTH, P. MATSCHOSS, S. KADNER, T.
ZWICKEL, P. EICKEMEIER, G. HANSEN, S. SCHLÖMER, C. VON STECHOW (EDS)]. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, UNITED KINGDOM AND NEW YORK, NY, USA, 1075 PP.
image THE BIOENERGY VILLAGE OF JUEHNDE,
WHICH IS THE FIRST COMMUNITY IN GERMANY THAT
PRODUCES ALL ITS ENERGY NEEDED FOR HEATING
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map 8.5: solarreferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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map 8.6: windreferencescenarioandtheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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A wide range of estimates is provided in the literature but studies
have consistently found that the total global technical potential
for renewable energy is substantially higher than both current and
projected future global energy demand. Solar has the highest
technical potential amongst the renewable sources, but substantial
technical potential exists for all forms. (SRREN, May 2011) 
Taking into account the uncertainty of technical potential estimates,
Figure 8.1 provides an overview of the technical potential of various
renewable energy resources in the context of current global
electricity and heat demand as well as global primary energy supply.
Issues related to technology evolution, sustainability, resource
availability, land use and other factors that relate to this technical
potential are explored in the relevant chapters. The regional
distribution of technical potential is addressed in map 8.7.
The various types of energy cannot necessarily be added together
to estimate a total, because each type was estimated
independently of the others (for example, the assessment did not
take into account land use allocation; e.g. PV and concentrating
solar power cannot occupy the same space even though a
particular site is suitable for either of them).
Given the large unexploited resources which exist, even without
having reached the full development limits of the various
technologies, the technical potential is not a limiting factor to
expansion of renewable energy generation. It will not be
necessary nor desirable to exploit the entire technical potential.
Implementation of renewable energies must respect sustainability
criteria in order to achieve a sound future energy supply. Public
acceptance is crucial, especially bearing in mind that renewable
energy technologies will be closer to consumers than today’s
more centralised power plants. Without public acceptance, market
expansion will be difficult or even impossible.
In addition to the theoretical and technical potential discussions,
this report also considers the economic potential of renewable
energy sources that takes into account all social costs and
assumes perfect information and the market potential of
renewable energy sources. Market potential is often used in
different ways. The general understanding is that market potential
means the total amount of renewable energy that can be
implemented in the market taking into account existing and
expected real-world market conditions shaped by policies,
availability of capital and other factors. The market potential
may therefore in theory be larger than the economic potential. To
be realistic, however, market potential analyses have to take into
account the behaviour of private economic agents under specific
prevailing conditions, which are of course partly shaped by public
authorities. The energy policy framework in a particular country
or region will have a profound impact on the expansion of
renewable energies. 
figure8.1: rangesofglobaltechnicalpotentialsofrenewableenergysources
source
IPCC/SRREN.
note
RANGES OF GLOBAL TECHNICAL POTENTIALS OF RE SOURCES DERIVED FROM STUDIES PRESENTED IN CHAPTERS 2 THROUGH 7 IN THE IPCC REPORT. BIOMASS AND SOLAR ARE SHOWN AS PRIMARY ENERGY DUE TO THEIR
MULTIPLE USES. NOTE THAT THE FIGURE IS PRESENTED IN LOGARITHMIC SCALE DUE TO THE WIDE RANGE OF ASSESSED DATA.
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8.6biomassinthe2012energy[r]evolution
(4thedition)
The 2012 Energy [R]evolution (4th edn.) is an energy scenario
which shows a possible pathway for the global energy system to
move from fossil fuels dominated supply towards energy efficiency
and sustainable renewable energy use. The aim is to only use
sustainable bioenergy and reduce the use of unsustainable
bioenergy in developing countries which is currently in the range of
30 to 40 EJ/a. The fourth edition of the Energy [R]evolution again
decreases the amount of bioenergy used significantly due to
sustainability reasons, and the lack of global environmental and
social standards. The amount of bioenergy used in this report is
based on bioenergy potential surveys which are drawn from
existing studies, but not necessarily reflecting all the ecological
assumptions that Greenpeace would use. It is intended as a coarse-
scale, “order-of-magnitude” example of what the energy mix would
look like in the future (2050) with largely phased-out fossil fuels.
The rationale underpinning the use of biomass in the 2012 Energy
[R]evolution is explained here but note the amount of bioenergy
included in the Energy [R]evolution does not mean that
Greenpeace per se agrees to the amount without strict criteria.
The Energy [R]evolution takes a precautionary approach to the
future use of bioenergy. This reflects growing concerns about the
greenhouse gas balance of many biofuel sources, and also the risks
posed by expanded biofuels crop production to biodiversity (forests,
wetlands and grasslands) and food security. It should be stressed,
however, that this conservative approach is based on an assessment
of today’s technologies and their associated risks. The development
of advanced forms of bio energies which do not involve significant
land take, are demonstrably sustainable in terms of their impacts
on the wider environment, and have clear greenhouse gas benefits,
should be an objective of public policy, and would provide
additional flexibility in the renewable energy mix.
All energy production has some impact on the environment. What
is important is to minimise the impact on the environment,
through reduction in energy usage, increased efficiency and
careful choice of renewable energy sources. Different sources of
energy have different impacts and these impacts can vary
enormously with scale. Hence, a range of energy sources are
needed, each with its own limits of what is sustainable.
Biomass is part of the mix of a wide variety of non-finite fuels that,
together, provide a practical and possible means to eliminate our
dependency on fossil fuels. Thereby we can minimise greenhouse gas
emissions, especially from fossil carbon, from energy production.
Concerns have also been raised about how countries account for the
emissions associated with biofuels production and combustion. The
lifecycle emissions of different biofuels can vary enormously. To
ensure that biofuels are produced and used in ways which maximise
its greenhouse gas saving potential, these accounting problems will
need to be resolved in future. The Energy [R]evolution prioritises
non-combustion resources (wind, solar etc.). Greenpeace does not
consider biomass as carbon, or greenhouse gas neutral because of
the time biomass takes to regrow and because of emissions arising
from direct and indirect land use changes. The Energy [R]evolution
scenario is an energy scenario, therefore only energy-related CO2
emissions are calculated and no other GHG emissions can be
covered, e.g. from agricultural practices. However, the Energy
[R]evolution summarises the entire amount of bioenergy used in the
energy model and indicates possible additional emissions connected
to the use of biofuels. As there are many scientific publications
about the GHG emission effects of bioenergy which vary between
carbon neutral to higher CO2 emissions than fossil fuels a range is
given in the Energy [R]evolution.
Bioenergy in the Energy [R]evolution scenario is largely limited
to that which can be gained from wood processing and
agricultural (crop harvest and processing) residues as well as
from discarded wood products. The amounts are based on existing
studies, some of which apply sustainability criteria but do not
necessarily reflect all Greenpeace’s sustainability criteria. Large-
scale biomass from forests would not be sustainable.50 The Energy
[R]evolution recognises that there are competing uses for
biomass, e.g. maintaining soil fertility, use of straw as animal feed
and bedding, use of woodchip in furniture and does not use the
full potential. Importantly, the use of biomass in the 2012 Energy
[R]evolution has been developed within the context of
Greenpeace’s broader bioenergy position to minimise and avoid
the growth of bioenergy and in order to prevent use of
unsustainable bioenergy. The Energy [R]evolution uses the latest
available bioenergy technologies for power and heat generation,
as well as transport systems. These technologies can use different
types of fuel and biogas is preferred due to higher conversion
efficiencies. Therefore the primary source for biomass is not fixed
and can be changed over time. Of course, any individual bioenergy
project developed in reality needs to be thoroughly researched to
ensure our sustainability criteria are met.
Greenpeace supports the most efficient use of biomass in stationary
applications. For example, the use of agricultural and wood
processing residues in, preferably regional and efficient cogeneration
power plants, such as CHP (combined heat and power plants). 
reference
50 SCHULZE, E-D., KÖRNER, C., LAW, B.E .HABERL, H. & LUYSSAERT, S. 2012. LARGE-SCALE BIOENERGY
FROM ADDITIONAL HARVEST OF FOREST BIOMASS IS NEITHER SUSTAINABLE NOR GREENHOUSE GAS
NEUTRAL. GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY BIOENERGY DOI: 10.1111/J.1757-1707.2012.01169.X.
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8.6.1howmuchbiomass
Roughly 55 EJ/a of bioenergy was used globally in 201151
(approximately 10% of the world’s energy52). The Energy
[R]evolution assumes an increase to 80 EJ/a. in 2050. Currently,
much biomass is used in low-efficiency traditional uses and
charcoal.53 The Energy [R]evolution assumes an increase in the
efficiency of biomass usage for energy globally by 2050. In
addition to efficiencies in burning, there are potentially better
uses of local biogas plants from manure (in developing countries
at least), better recovery of residues not suitable as feed and an
increase in food production using ecological agriculture. The
Energy [R]evolution assumes biofuels will only be used for heavy
trucks, marine transport and – after 2035 – to a limited extent
for aviation. In those sectors, there are currently no other
technologies available – apart from some niche technologies
which are not proven yet and therefore the only option to replace
oil. No import/export of biomass between regions (e.g. Canada
and Europe) is required for the Energy [R]evolution. 
In the 2012 Energy [R]evolution, the bioenergy potential has not
been broken down into various sources, because different forms of
bioenergy (e.g. solid, gas, fluid) and technical development
continues so the relative contribution of sources is variable.
Dedicated biomass crops are not excluded, but are limited to
current amounts of usage. Similarly, 10% of current tree
plantations are already used for bioenergy54, and the Energy
[R]evolution assumes the same usage.
There have been several studies on the availability of biomass for
energy production and the consequences for sustainability. Below
are brief details of examples of such studies on available biomass.
These are not Greenpeace studies, but serve to illustrate the range
of estimates available and their principal considerations. 
The Energy [R]evolution estimate of 80 EJ/yr is at the low end
of the spectrum of estimates of available biomass. The Energy
[R]evolution doesn’t differentiate between forest and agricultural
residues as there is too much uncertainty regarding the amounts
available regionally now and in the future.
box8.2: whatisanexajoule?
• One exajoule (EJ) is a billion billion joules
• One exajoule is about equal to the energy content of 30
million tons of coal. It takes 60 million tons of dry
biomass to generate one exajoule.
• Global energy use in 2009 was approximately 500 EJ 
references
51 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY 2011. WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011
HTTP://WWW.WORLDENERGYOUTLOOK.ORG/PUBLICATIONS/WEO-2011/
52 IPCC, 2011: IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION. PREPARED BY WORKING GROUP III OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [O. EDENHOFER, R. PICHS-MADRUGA, Y. SOKONA, K. SEYBOTH, P. MATSCHOSS, S. KADNER, T.
ZWICKEL, P. EICKEMEIER, G. HANSEN, S. SCHLÖMER, C. VON STECHOW (EDS)]. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, UNITED KINGDOM AND NEW YORK, NY, USA.
53 IPCC, 2011: IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION. PREPARED BY WORKING GROUP III OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [O. EDENHOFER, R. PICHS-MADRUGA, Y. SOKONA, K. SEYBOTH, P. MATSCHOSS, S. KADNER, T.
ZWICKEL, P. EICKEMEIER, G. HANSEN, S. SCHLÖMER, C. VON STECHOW (EDS)]. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, UNITED KINGDOM AND NEW YORK, NY, USA.
54 FAO 2010. WHAT WOODFUELS CAN DO TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE. FAO FORESTRY PAPER 162. FAO,
ROME . HTTP://WWW.FAO.ORG/DOCREP/013/I1756E/I1756E00.PDF
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IN GERMANY TO PRODUCE ALL ITS ENERGY NEEDED FOR HEATING AND
ELECTRICITY, WITH CO2 NEUTRAL BIOMASS.
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Current studies estimating the amount of biomass 
give the following ranges:
• IPCC (2011) pg. 223. Estimates “From the expert review of
available scientific literature, potential deployment levels of
biomass for energy by 2050 could be in the range of 100 to
300 EJ. However, there are large uncertainties in this potential
such as market and policy conditions, and it strongly depends
on the rate of improvement in the production of food and
fodder as well as wood and pulp products.”
• WWF (2011) Ecofys Energy Scenario (for WWF) found a
2050 total potential of 209 EJ per year with a share of
waste/residue-based bioenergy of 101 EJ per year (for 2050),
a quarter of which is agricultural residues like cereal straw.
Other major sources include wet waste/residues like sugar beet/
potato, oil palm, sugar cane/cassava processing residues or
manure (35 EJ), wood processing residues and wood waste (20
EJ) and non-recyclable renewable dry municipal solid waste
(11 EJ).55 However, it’s not always clear how some of the
numbers were calculated.
• Beringer et al. (2011) estimate a global bioenergy potential of
130-270 EJ per year in 2050 of which 100 EJ per year is
waste/residue based.56
• WBGU (2009) estimate a global bioenergy potential of 80-
170 EJ per year in 2050 of which 50 EJ per year is
waste/residue based.57
• Deutsches Biomasse Forschungs Zentrum (DBFZ), 2008 did a
survey for Greenpeace International where the sustainable
bioenergy potentials for residuals have been estimated at 87.6
EJ/a and energy crops at a level of 10 to 15 EJ/a (depending
on the assumptions for food production). The DBFZ technical
and sustainable potential for growing energy crops has been
calculated on the assumption that demand for food takes
priority. As a first step the demand for arable and grassland for
food production has been calculated for each of 133 countries
in different scenarios. These scenarios are: 
Business as usual (BAU) scenario: Present agricultural
activity continues for the foreseeable future
Basic scenario: No forest clearing; reduced use of fallow
areas for agriculture 
Sub-scenario 1: Basic scenario plus expanded ecological
protection areas and reduced crop yields 
Sub-scenario 2: Basic scenario plus food consumption
reduced in industrialised countries 
Sub-scenario 3: Combination of sub-scenarios 1 and 2. 
In a next step the surpluses of agricultural areas were classified
either as arable land or grassland. On grassland, hay and grass
silage are produced, on arable land fodder silage and Short
Rotation Coppice (such as fast-growing willow or poplar) are
cultivated. Silage of green fodder and grass are assumed to be
used for biogas production, wood from SRC and hay from
grasslands for the production of heat, electricity and synthetic
fuels. Country specific yield variations were taken into
consideration. The result is that the global biomass potential from
energy crops in 2050 falls within a range from 6 EJ in Sub-
scenario 1 up to 97 EJ in the BAU scenario. 
Greenpeace’s vision of ecological agriculture means that low
input agriculture is not an option, but a pre-requisite. This means
strongly reduced dependence on capital intensive inputs. The shift
to eco-agriculture increases the importance of agricultural
residues as synthetic fertilisers are phased out and animal feed
production and water use (irrigation and other) are reduced. We
will need optimal use of residues as fertiliser, animal feed, and to
increase soil organic carbon and the water retention function of
the soils etc. to make agriculture more resilient to climate
impacts (droughts, floods) and to help mitigate climate change. 
references
55 WWF 2011. WWF ENERGY REPORT 2011. PRODUCED IN COLLABORATION WITH ECOFYS AND OMA.
HTTP://WWF.PANDA.ORG/WHAT_WE_DO/FOOTPRINT/CLIMATE_CARBON_ENERGY/ENERGY_SOLUTIONS/RE
NEWABLE_ENERGY/SUSTAINABLE_ENERGY_REPORT/. SOURCES FOR BIOENERGY ARE ON PGS. 183-18.
56 BERINGER, T. ET AL. 2011. BIOENERGY PRODUCTION POTENTIAL OF GLOBAL BIOMASS PLANTATIONS
UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL CONSTRAINTS. GCB BIOENERGY, 3:299–312.
DOI:10.1111/J.1757-1707.2010.01088.X 
57 WBGU 2009. FUTURE BIOENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE LAND USE. EARTHSCAN, LONDON AND STERLING, VA
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THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSPORT
SECTOR IN THE ENERGY
[R]EVOLUTION SCENARIO
TECHNICAL AND BEHAVIOURAL
MEASURES TO REDUCE TRANSPORT
ENERGY CONSUMPTION
LDV (PASSENGER CARS)
PROJECTION OF THE FUTURE
VEHICLE SEGMENT SPLIT
CONCLUSION
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image CARS ON THE ROAD NEAR MANCHESTER. ROAD TRANSPORT IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST SOURCES OF POLLUTION IN THE UK, CONTRIBUTING TO POOR AIR QUALITY,
CLIMATE CHANGE, CONGESTION AND NOISE DISTURBANCE. OF THE 33 MILLION VEHICLES ON OUR ROADS, 27 MILLION ARE CARS.
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Sustainable transport is needed to reduce the level of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, just as much as a shift to renewable
heat production. Today, more than a quarter (27%) of energy use
comes from the transport sector, including road and rail, as well
as intra-European and domestic (and intra-European at EU
level) aviation and shipping. This chapter provides an overview of
the measures required to develop a more energy efficient and
sustainable transport system in the future, with a focus on:
• reducing transport demand, 
• shifting transport modes (from high to low energy intensity), and
• energy efficiency improvements through technology development.
If some technologies will have to be adapted for greater energy
efficiency. In other situations, a simple modification will not be
enough. The transport of people in urban areas will have to be
almost entirely re-organised and individual transport must be
complemented or even substituted by public transport systems.
Car sharing and public transport on demand are only the
beginning of the transition needed for a system that carries more
people more quickly and conveniently to their destination while
using less energy. 
The Energy [R]evolution scenario is based on an analysis  of the
entire global transport sector made by the German DLR Institute of
Vehicle Concepts. This section outlines the key findings of the
analysis’ calculations for the whole EU 27 region which provides the
assumptions for France transport sector energy demand calculations
used in the Reference and the Energy [R]evolution scenarios.
9.1thefutureofthetransportsector
A detailed EU27 Reference scenario has been constructed, which
includes detailed shares and energy intensity data per mode of
transport up to 2050. Based on this Reference scenario, deviating
transport performance and technical parameters have been
applied to create the ambitious Energy [R]evolution scenario for
reducing energy consumption. Traffic performance is assumed to
decline for the high energy intensity modes and further energy
reduction potentials were assumed to come from efficiency gains,
alternative power trains and fuels. 
International shipping and intercontinental air transport have been
left out whilst calculating the baseline figures, because it spreads
across all regions of the world and is difficult to assign to the EU
27. The total is therefore made up of light-duty vehicles (LDVs),
heavy and medium-duty trucks (HDV and MDV), rail, domestic and
intra-EU air transport and inland water transport. Although energy
use from international marine bunkers (international shipping fuel
suppliers) is not included in these calculations, it is still estimated
to account for 9% of today’s worldwide transport final energy
demand and 7% by 2050. It is therefore very important to
improve the energy efficiency of international shipping. Possible
options are examined later in this chapter. 
The definitions of the transport modes for the scenarios59 are:
• Light-duty vehicles (LDV) are four-wheel vehicles used
primarily for personal passenger road travel. These are typically
cars, sports utility vehicles (SUVs), small passenger vans (up
to eight seats) and personal pickup trucks. Light-duty vehicles
are also simply called ‘cars’ within this chapter.
reference
58 EEA (2011).
59 FULTON & EADS (2004).
box9.1:eutransportpolicy
Transport is the only major sector in the EU that has seen a
continuous rise in GHG emissions. Emissions increased by 27%
between 1990 and 2009, according to the EEA.58 It is also the
only sector that is still almost entirely dependent on fossil fuels.
However, the EU’s policy response has been slow. A reduction in
transport demand is still seen as a worrying symptom of
economic recession rather than a policy goal in itself, and
progress on measures to promote a shift to more
environmentally friendly transport modes, such as road pricing,
has been slow. The European Commission’s White Paper on
Transport of 2011 fails to provide a credible blueprint on how
to lower the climate impact of the EU’s transport operations
and replace fossil fuels with sustainable renewable energy.
Flagship measures include the EU’s low carbon performance
standards for transport fuels as well as road vehicles, including
passenger cars and vans. The car standards in particular have
helped to accelerate improvements significantly. The annual
rate of emission reductions is now about twice what it was
before the introduction of mandatory targets. However, for
trucks no standards are in place yet. The EU’s low carbon fuel
standard, or Article 7a of the Fuel Quality Directive, is still
not being fully implemented. 
There has been little progress on aviation and shipping. While
the aviation sector is covered by the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), the aviation industry continues to benefit from
all kinds of economic support, such as VAT and fuel tax
exemptions and regional airport subsidies. A European plan to
manage shipping emissions has been pushed back despite an
agreed deadline of 2011. 
Besides regulation to reduce carbon emissions, the EU has
also agreed a target to increase renewable energy use in
transport to 10% by 2020. However, insufficient sustainability
safeguards and erroneous carbon accounting rules have led
member states to plan for large amounts of unsustainable
biofuels to meet the target. 
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• Medium-duty vehicles (MDV) include medium-haul trucks,
light-duty trucks and delivery vehicles.
• Heavy-duty vehicles (HDV) are long-haul trucks operating
almost exclusively on diesel fuel. These trucks carry large loads
with lower energy intensity (energy use per tonne-kilometre of
haulage) than medium-duty trucks.
• Aviation denotes domestic and intra-European 27 air travel.
• Inland navigation denotes freight shipping with vessels
operating on rivers and canals or in coastal areas for 
domestic transport purposes.
Figure 9.3 shows the breakdown of final energy demand for the
transport modes in 2009 and 2050 in the Reference scenario.
As can be seen from the below figures, the largest share of energy
demand comes from passenger road transport (mainly transport by
car), although it decreases from 63% in 2009 to 39% in 2050. Of
particular note is the high share of road transport in total
transport energy demand: 93% in 2009 and 90% in 2050. As of
2009, overall energy demand in the transport sector of the EU 27
added up to about 13.5 EJ. This level is projected to remain nearly
constant up to 2050 in the Reference scenario. In the ambitious
Energy [R]evolution scenario, implying the implementation of all
efficiency and behavioral measures described in Chapter 9.2, we
calculated in fact a decrease of energy demand to 6.2 EJ, which is
less than half of the total transport energy consumption in 2009.
figure9.1: developmentoffinalenergyusepertransportmodefrom2009to2050inthereferencescenario
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9.2technicalandbehaviouralmeasurestoreduce
transportenergyconsumption
The following section describes how the transport modes
contribute to total and relative energy demand. Then, a selection
of measures for reducing total and specific energy transport
consumption are put forward for each mode.
The three ways to decrease energy demand in the transport
sector examined are: 
• reduction of transport demand of high-energy intensity modes
• modal shift from high-energy intensive transport to low-energy
intensity modes
• energy efficiency improvements.
Table 9.1 summarises these options and the indicators 
used to quantify them.
9.2.1step1:reductionoftransportdemand
To use less transport overall means reducing the amount of
passenger-kilometres (p-km or passenger-km) travelled per capita
and reducing freight transport demand. The amount of freight
transport is to a large extent linked to GDP development and
therefore difficult to influence. However, by improved logistics, for
example optimal load profiles for trucks, using multimodal
transport chains or a shift to regionally-produced and shipped
goods demand can be limited.
Passenger transport The study focussed on the change in
passenger-km per capita of high-energy intensity air transport and
personal vehicles modes. Passenger transport by light-duty vehicles
(LDV), for example, is energy demanding both in absolute and
relative terms. Policy measures that enforce a reduction of passenger-
km travelled by individual transport modes are an effective means to
reduce transport energy demand.
Policy measures for reducing passenger transport demand in general
could include:
• charge and tax policies that increase transport costs for
individual transport
• price incentives for using public transport modes
• installation or upgrading of public transport systems
• incentives for working from home
• stimulating the use of video conferencing in business
• improved cycle paths in cities.
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table9.1: selectionofmeasuresandindicators
MEASURE
Reduction of 
transport demand
Modal shift
Energy efficiency
improvements
INDICATOR 
Passenger-km/capita
Tonne-km/unit of GDP
MJ/tonne-km
MJ/Passenger-km
MJ/Passenger-km,|
MJ/tonne-km
MJ/Passenger-km,
MJ/tonne-km
MJ/Passenger-km,
MJ/tonne-km
REDUCTION OPTION
Reduction in volume of passenger transport in comparison to the Reference scenario
Reduction in volume of freight transport in comparison to the Reference scenario
Modal shift from trucks to rail
Modal shift from cars to public transport
Shift to energy efficient passenger car drive trains (battery electric vehicles, hybrid and fuel cell
hydrogen cars) and trucks (fuel cell hydrogen, hybrid, battery electric, catenary or inductive supplied)
Shift to powertrain modes that can be fuelled by renewable energy (electric, fuel cell hydrogen)
Autonomous efficiency improvements of transport modes over time
table9.2:LDVpassenger-kmpercapita
EU 27
2050 E[R]
9,015
2020 E[R]
10,799
2050 REF
13,769
2020 REF
11,455
2009
9,818
109
The reduction in passenger-km per capita in the Energy
[R]evolution scenario compared to the Reference scenario comes
with a general reduction in car use due to behavioral and traffic
policy changes and partly with a shift of transport to public
modes. A shift from energy-intensive individual transport to low-
energy intensive demand public transport of course aligns with an
increase in low-energy intensive public transport passenger-km.
9.2.2step2:changesintransportmode
In order to figure out which vehicles or transport modes are the
most efficient for each purpose requires an analysis of the
current state of transport modes’ technologies. Then, the energy
use and intensity for each type of transport is used to calculate
energy savings resulting from a transport mode shift. The
following information is required:
• Passenger transport: Energy demand per passenger-kilometre,
measured in MJ/p-km.
• Freight transport: Energy demand per kilometre of transported
tonne of goods, measured in MJ/tonne-km.
For the purpose of this study, passenger transport includes light-
duty vehicles, passenger rail and air transport. Freight transport
includes medium-duty vehicles, heavy-duty vehicles, inland
navigation, marine transport and freight rail. WBCSD 2004 data
was used as baseline data and updated where more recent
information was available.
Passenger transport Travelling by rail is the most efficient –
but car transport improves strongly. Figure 9.2 shows the
average specific energy consumption (energy intensity) by
transport mode in 2009 and in the Energy [R]evolution scenario
in 2050. Passenger transport by rail will consume on a per
passenger-km basis 18% less energy in 2050 than car transport
and 84% less than aviation. 
Figure 9.2 shows that in order to reduce transport energy
demand, passengers will need to shift from cars and especially air
transport to the lower energy intensive passenger rail transport. 
In the [E]nergy [R]evolution scenario it is assumed that a certain
portion of passenger-kilometer of domestic air traffic and
intraregional air traffic (i. e., traffic among two countries within
the EU 27) is suitable to be substituted by high speed rail
(HSR). For international aviation there is obviously no
substitution potential to other modes whatsoever.
We assumed for the Energy [R]evolution scenario that by 2050 a
maximum of 40% of passenger-km in domestic air traffic and
20% in intra-EU 27 air traffic can be substituted by high speed
rail services. This requires massive infrastructure investments as
suggested in the EU White Paper on Transport where the
European high-speed rail network is intended to be tripled by
2030 compared to today’s corridor length. 
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figure9.2: stock-weightedpassengertransportenergy
intensityfor2009and2050
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image ITALIAN EUROSTAR TRAIN.
image TRUCK.
Figure 9.5 and 9.6 show the resulting passenger-km of all modes
in the Reference and Energy [R]evolution scenario; the Energy
[R]evolution scenario includes the decreasing LDV passenger-km
compared to the Reference scenario.
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Figures 9.3 and 9.4 shows how passenger-km of both domestic
aviation and rail passenger traffic would change due to modal
shift in the Energy [R]evolution scenario against the Reference
scenario (the rail passenger-km includes, besides the modal shift,
a general increase in rail passenger-km as people use rail over
individual transport).
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figure9.3: aviationpassenger-kminthereferenceand
energy[r]evolutionscenario
2009
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figure9.4: railpassenger-kminthereferenceand
energy[r]evolutionscenario
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figure9.5: passenger-kmovertimeinthereference
scenario
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figure9.6: passenger-kmovertimeintheenergy
[r]evolutionscenario
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image TRANSPORT POLLUTION.
Freight transport Similar to Figure 9.2 which showed average
specific energy consumption for passenger transport modes,
Figure 9.7 shows the respective energy consumption for various
freight transport modes in 2009 and in the Energy [R]evolution
scenario 2050. The values are weighted according to stock-and-
traffic performance. The energy intensity of all modes of
transport is expected to decrease by 2050. In absolute terms,
road transport shows the largest efficiency gains whereas
transport on rail and water remain the modes with the lowest
relative energy demand per tonne-km. Rail freight transport will
consume 85% less energy per tonne-km in 2050 than long haul
HDV. This shows the large energy savings achievable by a modal
shift from road to rail.
Modal shifts for transporting goods in the Energy
[R]evolution scenario The figures above indicate that as much
road freight as possible should be shifted from road-bound freight
transport to less energy intensive freight rail, in order to achieve
maximum energy savings from modal shifts. Since the use of
ships largely depends on the geography of a country, no modal
shift is proposed for inland navigation but instead a shift towards
freight rail. As the goods transported by medium-duty vehicles
are mainly going to regional destinations (and are therefore
unsuitable for the long distance nature of freight rail transport),
no modal shift to rail is assumed for this type of transport. For
long-haul heavy-duty vehicle transport, however, especially low
value density, heavy goods that are transported on a long range
are suitable for a modal shift to railways.60 We assumed an
increasing share over time of tonne-km being shifted from HDV
to rail up to 2050 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario. That is,
up to 30% of total HDV-tonne-km in 2050.
Figure 9.8 and Figure 9.9 show the resulting tonne-km of the
modes in the Reference scenario and Energy [R]evolution
scenario. In the Energy [R]evolution scenario freight transported
by rail is larger in absolute numbers than freight transported by
heavy-duty vehicles. 
A modal shift in this range needs to be accompanied by massive
investments into the railroad network. Infrastructure
enhancements comprise new tracks, intermodal freight terminals,
a more rigoruous introduction of a common train control and
management systems, just to mention a few. Not least, seamless
multi-country rail transport will need harmonisation across
borders for development and operation.
figure9.7: average(stock-weighted)freighttransportenergy
intensityintheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
Railway Inland navigation HDV MDV
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figure9.8: tonne-kmovertimeinthereferencescenario
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figure9.9: tonne-kmovertimeintheenergy
[r]evolutionscenario
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60 TAVASSZY AND VAN MEIJEREN 2011.
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9.2.3step3:efficiencyimprovements
Energy efficiency improvements are the third important way of
reducing transport energy demand. This section explains ways of
improving energy efficiency up to 2050 for each type of
transport, namely:
• air transport
• passenger and freight trains
• trucks
• inland navigation and marine transport
• cars.
In general, an integral part of any energy reduction scheme is an
increase in the load factor – this applies both for freight and
passenger transport. As the load factor increases, fewer transport
vehicles are needed and thus the energy intensity decreases when
measured on a passenger-km or tonne-km base. There are already
sophisticated efforts in aviation to optimise the load factor,
however for other modes such as road and rail freight transport
there is still room for improvement. Increasing the load factor may
be achieved through improved logistics and supply chain planning
for freight transport and in enhanced capacity utilisation in
passenger transport.
Air transport A study conducted by NASA in 2011 shows that
energy use of new subsonic aicrafts can be reduced by up to 58%
up to 2035. Akerman (2005) reports that a more than 50%
reduction in fuel use is technically feasible by 2050. Technologies
to reduce fuel consumption of aircrafts mainly comprise:
• Aerodynamic adaptations to reduce the drag of the aircraft, for
example by improved control of laminar flow, the use of riblets
and multi-functional structures, the reduction in fasteners, flap
fairings and the tail size as well as by advanced supercritical
airfoil technologies.
• Structural technologies to reduce the weight of the aircraft while
at the same time increasing the stiffness. Examples include the
use of new lightweight materials like advanced metals,
composites and ceramics, the use of improved coatings as well as
the optimised design of multi-functional, integrated structures.
• Subsystem technologies including, for example, advanced power
management and generation as well as optimised flight avionics
and wiring.
• Propulsion technologies like advanced gas turbines for powering
the aircraft more efficiently; this could also include:
• improved combustion emission measures, improvements in
cold and hot section materials, and the use of turbine
blade/vane technology;
• investigation of all-electric, fuel-cell gas turbine and electric
gas turbine hybrid propulsion devices; 
• the usage of electric propulsion technologies comprise
advanced lightweight motors, motor controllers and power
conditioning equipment.
The scenario projects a halving in specific energy consumption on a
per passenger-km basis for future aircrafts in 2050 based on 2009
energy intensities. Figure 9.10 shows the energy intensities in the
Energy [R]evolution scenario for international, intra-EU and
domestic aviation.
Passenger and freight trainsTransport of passengers and freight
by rail is currently one of the most energy efficient means of
transport. However, there is still potential to reduce the specific
energy consumption of trains. Apart from operational and policy
measures to reduce energy consumption like raising the load factor
of trains, technological measures to reduce energy consumption of
future trains are also necessary. Key technologies are:
• reducing the total weight of a train; this is seen as the most
significant measure to reduce traction energy consumption. By
using lightweight structures and lightweight materials, the
energy needed to overcome inertial and grade resistances as
well as friction from tractive resistances can be reduced.
• aerodynamic improvements to reduce aerodynamic drag,
especially important when running at high velocity. A reduction
of aerodynamic drag is typically achieved by streamlining the
profile of the train. 
• switch from diesel-fuelled to more energy efficient electrically
powered trains.
• improvements in the traction system to further reduce frictional
losses. Technical options include improvements of the major
components as well as improvements in the energy
management software of the system.
• regenerative braking to recover waste energy. The energy can
either be transferred back into the grid or stored on-board in
an energy storage device. Regenerative braking is especially
effective in regional traffic with frequent stops.
figure9.10: energyintensity(MJ/p-km)forair
transportintheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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MJ/p-km 0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
•2009 REFERENCE• 2050 ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
references
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image CHARGING AN ELECTRIC CAR.
The Energy [R]evolution scenario uses energy intensity data of
the EU-project TOSCA, 2011 for electric and diesel fuelled trains
in Europe as input for our calculations. These data were available
for 2009 and as forecasts for 2025 and 2050. 
Figure 9.11 and 9.12 shows the weighted average share of
electric and diesel traction today and as of 2030 and 2050 in the
Energy [R]evolution scenario.
Electric trains as of today are about 2 to 3.5 times less energy
intensive (on a tank-to-wheel-perspective) than diesel trains
depending on the specific type of rail transport. As an increasing
share of electric energy is to come from renewable sources in the
future, the projections to 2050 include a massive shift away from
diesel to electric traction in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
• improved space utilisation to achieve a more efficient energy
consumption per passenger-kilometre. The simplest way to
achieve this is to transport more passengers per train. This can
either be achieved by a higher average load factor, more flexible
and shorter trainsets or by the use of double-deck trains on
highly frequented routes.
• improved accessory functions, e.g. for passenger comfort. A
substantial amount of energy in a train needed is to ensure the
comfort of the train’s passengers by heating and cooling.
Strategies to enhance efficiency include adjustments to the
cabin design, changes to air intakes and using waste heat from
the propulsion system.
By research on developing an advanced high-speed train, DLR’s
‘Next Generation Train’ project aims to reduce the specific energy
consumption per passenger-kilometre by 50% relative to today’s
state-of-the-art high speed trains.61
figure9.11: fuelshareofelectricanddieselrail
tractionforpassengertransportinp-km
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figure9.12: fuelshareofelectricanddieselrail
tractionforfreighttransportintonne-km
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Heavy and medium-duty vehicles (freight by road) Freight
transport on the road forms the backbone of logistics in the 
EU 27 today. But it is, apart from air freight transport, the most
energy intensive way of moving goods around. However, gradual
progress is being made in the fields of drivetrain efficiency,
lightweight construction, alternative power trains and fuels.
This study models a major shift in drivetrain market share of
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles in our Energy R]evolution
scenario in the future. Today, the great majority of MDV and
HDV is powered by internal combustion engines, fuelled mainly by
diesel and in MDV as well by a small share of gasoline and gas
(CNG and LPG). The Energy [R]evolution scenario to 2050
includes a considerable shift to electric and fuel cell hydrogen
powered vehicles (FCV), as well as autonomous diesel hybrids.
The electric MDV stock in the model will be mainly composed of
battery electric vehicles (BEV), and a relevant share of hybrid electric
vehicles (HEV). Hybrid drivetrains will replace conventional internal
combustion engines also in heavy-duty vehicles. In addition to this,
both hybrid electric vehicles supplied with current via overhead
catenary lines and BEV are modeled in the Energy [R]evolution
scenario for HDV applications. In recent years, several field test have
been conducted by truck manufacturers and research bodies on
powering heavy-duty trucks with electric energy via an overhead
catenary. Siemens has proved the technical feasibility of the catenary
technology for trucks with experimental vehicles in its eHighway
project (Figure 9.15). 
Figure 9.13 shows the energy intensity per region in the Energy
[R]evolution scenario for passenger rail and Figure 9.14 shows the
energy intensity per region in the Energy [R]evolution scenario for
freight rail, both in comparison to the other IEA world regions.
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figure9.13: energyintensitiesforpassengerrail
transportintheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
•2009• 2050 ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION •
2009 EU 27
• 2050 ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION EU 27
• 2009 EU 27• 2050 ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION EU 27
figure9.14: energyintensitiesforfreightrailtransport
intheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
figure9.15: HDVoperatingfullyelectricallyunder
acatenary(picturebySiemens)62
•2009• 2050 ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
reference
62 SACHVERSTÄNDIGENRAT FÜR UMWELTFRAGEN (2012).
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The trucks are equipped with a hybrid diesel powertrain to be able to
operate when not connected to the overhead line. When under a
catenary the trucks can operate fully electric at speeds of up to 90
km/h. Similar tests with pantograph-equipped hybrid trucks are
underway in Sweden run by a consortium of research and industry
stakeholders. While this technology is seen often as a niche
application, the ‘Umweltrat’, an expert advisory board to the German
federal government, has suggested to electrify the right lanes of all
major German highways. 
In addition to the electrified power trains in the Energy
[R]evolution scenario, FCV were integrated into the vehicle stock,
too. FCV are beneficial especially for long haul transports where
no overhead catenary lines are available and the driving range of
BEV would not be sufficient.
Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17 show the market shares of the
power train technologies discussed here for MDV and HDV in
2009, in the 2030 Energy [R]evolution and in the 2050 Energy
[R]evolution scenario. These figures form the basis of the energy
consumption calculation in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
Energy [R]evolution fleet-average transport energy intensities for
MDV and HDV were derived using region-specific IEA energy
intensity data of MDV and HDV transport until 205063, with 
the specific energy consumption factors of Figure 9.18 applied to
the IEA data and weighted with the market shares of the power
train technologies.
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figure9.16: fuelshareofmediumdutyvehiclesby
transportperformance(tonne-km)
2009 2030 E[R] 2050 E[R]
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figure9.17: fuelshareofheavydutyvehicles
bytransportperformance(tonne-km)
2009 2030 E[R] 2050 E[R]
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image DEUTSCHE BAHN AG IN GERMANY, USING RENEWABLE ENERGY. WIND PARK
MAERKISCH LINDEN (BRANDENBURG) RUN BY THE DEUTSCHE BAHN AG.
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table9.3: EU27averageenergyintensitiesforMDVand
HDVin2009and2050overtimeintheenergy[r]evolution
MDV
HDV
2050 E[R]
2.36 MJ/t-km
0.47 MJ/t-km
2030 E[R]
3.87 MJ/t-km
1.12MJ/t-km
2020 E[R]
4.19 MJ/t-km
1.32 MJ/t-km
2009
4.56 MJ/t-km
1.46 MJ/t-km
reference
63 FULTON & EADS (2004).
The reduction in energy intensity on a per tonne-km basis
between 2009 and 2050 Energy [R]evolution is then 48% for
MDV and 68% for HDV.
Inland Navigation Technical measures to reduce energy
consumption of inland vessels include:64
• aerodynamic improvements to the hull to reduce 
friction resistance
• improving the propeller design to increase efficiency
• enhancing engine efficiency.
For inland navigation we assumed a reduction of 40% of
average energy intensity in relation to a 2009 value of 
0.5 MJ/t-km. This means a reduction to 0.3 MJ/t-km.
Marine Transport Several technological measures can be applied
to new vessels in order to reduce overall fuel consumption in
national and international marine transport. These technologies
comprise for example:
• weather routing to optimise the vessel’s route 
• autopilot adjustments to minimise steering 
• improved hull coatings to reduce friction losses 
• improved hull openings to optimise water flow
• air lubrication systems to reduce water resistances
• improvements in the design and shape of the hull and rudder 
• waste heat recovery systems to increase overall efficiency 
• improvement of the diesel engine (e.g. common-rail technology)
• installing towing kites and wind engines to use wind energy 
for propulsion
• using solar energy for onboard power demand.
Adding up each technology’s effectiveness as stated by ICCT
(2011), these technologies have an overall potential to improve
energy efficiency of new vessels between 18.4% and about 57%.
Another option to reduce energy demand of ships is simply to reduce
operating speeds. Up to 36% of fuel consumption can be saved by
reducing the vessel’s speed by 20%.65 Eyring et al. (2005) report
that a 25% reduction of fuel consumption for an international
marine diesel fleet is achievable by using more efficient alternative
propulsion devices only.66 Up to 30% reduction in energy demand is
reported by Marintek (2000) only by optimising the hull shape and
propulsion devices of new vessels.67
9.3Light-dutyvehicles
9.3.1projectionoftheCO2 emissiondevelopment
This section draws on a study on future vehicle technologies
conducted by the DLR’s Institute of Vehicle Concepts. The
approach shows the potential of different technologies to increase
the energy efficiency of future cars (light-duty vehicles) and gives
a detailed analysis of possible cost developments.68
Many technologies can be used to improve the fuel efficiency of
conventional passenger cars. Examples include improvements in
engines, weight reduction as well as friction and drag reduction.
The impact of the various measures on fuel efficiency can be
substantial. The introduction of hybrid vehicles, combining a
conventional internal combustion engine with an electric motor
and a battery, can further reduce fuel consumption. Applying
advanced lightweight materials, in combination with new
propulsion technologies, can bring fuel consumption levels down
to 1 litre ge/100 km.
The figure below shows the energy intensities of light-duty vehicles
in the Reference scenario and in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
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64 BASED ON VAN ROMPUY, 2010.
65 ICCT, 2011.
66 EYRING ET AL., 2005.
67 MARINTEK, 2000.
68 DLR, 2011.
figure9.18: energyintensities(litresge/v-km)oflight-duty
vehicles(stock-weightedfleetaverage)inthereference
andenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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Although the average fuel consumption of the passenger car fleet
is projected to decrease significantly until 2050 compared to the
2009 value in the Reference scenario, we project an even bigger
reduction potential in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
With a combination of continuous, rigorous drivetrain efficiency
improvements, a shift of large to medium and medium to small
vehicles and a rapid introduction of conventional hybrids, PHEVs
and BEV fleet average tailpipe CO2 emissions in new cars can be
reduced to 80 g/km in 2020 and 60 g/km in 2025 in the Energy
[R]evolution scenario. Figure 9.19 and 9.20 shows the projected
CO2 emission development in both scenarios for the 
EU 27 vehicle stock and sales alike. 
The Reference scenario shows a continous decrease in average car
energy intensity over time. The more ambitious changes described
in the Energy [R]evolution scenario translate into even lower
tailpipe emissions than in the Reference scenario.
Table 9.4 summarises the energy efficiency improvement for
passenger transport in the Energy [R]evolution scenario and Table
9.5 shows the energy efficiency improvement for freight transport
in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
figure9.19: tailpipeCO2 emissionsforlight-dutyvehicles
(stockweightedfleetaverage)inthereferenceandenergy
[r]evolutionscenario
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figure9.20: tailpipeCO2 emissionsforlight-dutyvehicles
(stockweightedsalesaverage)inthereferenceand
energy[r]evolutionscenario
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table9.4:technicalefficiencypotentialfor
passengertransport
MJ/P-KM
LDV
Air (Domestic)
Buses
Mini-buses
Two wheels
Three wheels
Passenger rail
2050 E[R]
0.3
1.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.2
2030 E[R]
0.5
1.8
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.3
2020E[R]
0.9
2.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.4
2009
1.3
2.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.5
table9.5: technicalefficiencypotentialforfreight
transport
MJ/T-KM
MDV
HDV
Freight rail
Inland navigation
2050 E[R]
2.9
0.8
0.1
0.3
2030 E[R]
3.9
1.2
0.2
0.4
2020 E[R]
4.2
1.3
0.2
0.4
2009
4.6
1.5
0.2
0.5
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figure9.21: LDVvehiclesalesbysegmentin2009and
2050intheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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9.3.2projectionsofthefuturesegmentsplit
For the future vehicle segment split the scenario deals with the
light-duty vehicle sales in three segments: small, medium and
large vehicles. For our purposes we divide up the numerous car
types as follows:
• The very small and small sized car bracket includes city,
supermini, minicompact cars as well as one and two seaters,
compact and subcompact cars, micro and subcompact vans and
small SUVs. 
• The medium sized bracket includes car derived vans and small
station wagons, upper medium class, midsize cars and station
wagons, executive class, compact passenger vans, car derived
pickups, medium SUVs, 2WD and 4WD. 
• The large car bracket includes all kinds of luxury class, luxury
multi-purpose vehicles, medium and heavy vans, compact and
full-size pickup trucks (2WD, 4WD), standard and luxury SUVs. 
The segment split is shown in Figure 9.21. In the Energy
[R]evolution scenario we projected a shift of sales from large to
medium and medium to small up to 2050 compared to 2009, which
supports in delivering significant energy demand reductions.
9.3.3projectionofthefuturetechnologymix
Further to incremental efficiency improvements, greater occupancy
rates and a shift toward smaller vehicle segments, a radical shift is
needed in the fuels used in cars to achieve the CO2 reduction
targets in the Energy [R]evolution scenario. This means that
conventional fossil fuelled cars are no longer sold in 2050 and that
the petrol and diesel fuelled autonomous hybrids and plug-in
hybrids (PHEV) that we have today are also phased out by 2050.
That is, two generations of hybrid technologies will pave the way
for the complete transformation toward light-duty vehicles with full
battery electric or hydrogen fuel cell powertrains. Since it may not
be possible to power LDVs for all purposes by rechargeable
batteries only, hydrogen is introduced as a renewable fuel especially
for larger long-range LDVs. Biofuels and remaining oil would be
used in other sectors where a substitution is even harder to achieve
than for LDVs. Figures 9.22 to 9.24 show the development of
powertrain sales shares over time for small, medium and large
LDVs up to 2050 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
figure9.22: salesshareofvehicletechnologiesinsmall
LDVsupto2050intheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
17
20
19
20
21
20
23
20
25
20
27
20
29
20
31
20
33
20
35
20
37
20
39
20
41
20
43
20
45
20
47
20
49
•FCV• BEV• PHEV DIESEL• PHEV OTTO
• CONVENTIONAL HYBRID DIESEL• CONVENTIONAL HYBRID OTTO• DIESEL• OTTO
119
9
tra
n
sp
o
rt
|
P
R
O
JE
C
T
IO
N
 O
F
 T
H
E
 F
U
T
U
R
E
 V
E
H
IC
L
E
 S
E
G
M
E
N
T
 S
P
L
IT
©
 S
T
E
V
E
 M
O
R
G
A
N
/G
P
image A SIGN PROMOTES A HYDROGEN REFUELING STATION IN REYKJAVIK. THESE
STATIONS ARE PART OF A PLAN TO TRY AND MAKE ICELAND A ‘HYDROGEN ECONOMY.’
image PARKING SPACE FOR HYBRIDS ONLY.
©
 T
A
R
A
N
55
/D
R
E
A
M
ST
IM
E
figure9.23: salesshareofvehicletechnologiesinmedium
LDVsupto2050intheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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figure9.24: salesshareofvehicletechnologiesinlarge
LDVsupto2050intheenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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9.3.4projectionoftheEU27vehiclestockdevelopment
There is a well-established correlation between GDP and passenger
car sales. As GDP rises, car sales grow and thus vehicle stock and
ownership increase as well. However, this scenario analysis found
that technology shift in LDVs alone – although linked to enormous
efficiency gains and fuel switch – is not sufficient to achieve the
ambitious Energy [R]evolution CO2-reduction targets. A slow-down
of vehicle sales growth and a limitation or even reduction in vehicle
ownership per capita compared to the Reference scenario was
therefore required. Trends such as urbanisation processes as well as
decreasing vehicle ownership rate in developed cities, support a
different scenario compared to the Reference case. To break the
global pattern of a century, this development needs to be supported
by policy interventions to promote modal shift and alternative
forms of car usage. The development of the EU 27 car stock in the
Energy [R]evolution scenario is shown in Figure 9.25.
9.3.5projectionoffuturekilometresdrivenperyear
Until a full shift from fossil to renewable fuels has taken place,
driving on the road will create CO2 emissions. A reduction in driving
therefore contributes to our target for emissions reduction.
However, this shift does not have to lead to reduced mobility
because there are many opportunities for shifts from individual
passenger road transport towards less CO2 intensive public or non-
motorised transport. The scenario is based on from the state-of-
the-art knowledge on how LDVs are driven in the EU and then
projects a decline in car usage. This is a further major building
block of the Energy [R]evolution scenario, which goes hand in hand
with new mobility concepts like co-modality and car-sharing
concepts. Our projections of annual kilometres driven (AKD) by
LDVs in the EU 27 is shown in Figure 9.26. We project a decrease
in AKD in the EU 27 by about 0.25% per year until 2050
compared to 2009 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario.
figure9.25: developmentoftheLDVstockovertimein
theenergy[r]evolutionscenario
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figure9.26: averageannualLDVkilometresdriveninthe
energy[r]evolutionscenario
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9.3.6renewableenergyinthetransportsector
In the Energy [R]evolution scenario, over half of the CO2 reduction in
the transport sector is achieved through a reduction in transport
energy demand by 2050, through both behavioural measures and
vehicle efficiency improvements. The remaining energy demand needs
to be covered largely by renewable sources, to achieve the required
CO2 reductions in a sustainable manner. As petrol and diesel fuelled
vehicles are phased out, alternative vehicle technologies are brought
to market which can tap into electricity and hydrogen from
renewable energy sources. By 2050, 85% of transport energy comes
from renewable sources, compared to 4% in 2009.
The Energy [R]evolution assumes that the potential for sustainable
biomass is limited. For the EU 27 transport sector, there are no more
than around 600 PJ available by 2050, given that other sectors such
as heat production will also partly rely on biomass energy. 
It is also assumed that battery electric vehicles will not be able
to fully meet road transport demand. This is why our alternative
scenario envisages hydrogen as a third renewable energy option
for the transport sector.
Hydrogen can be produced through the electrolysis of water using
power from renewable sources. If this is done at decentralised units,
there is no need to transport the hydrogen along expensive pipeline
networks. However, some level of central production will also be
needed, in combination with distribution e.g. by trucks during on-
peak times. This is because storage capacity at filling stations will
likely remain limited for reasons of public acceptance. 
Electrolysers that produce hydrogen with limited full load hours
can also help to stabilise the power grid, by using excess
electricity and avoiding additional peak loads in the system.
However, the future development of both electrolyser and fuel cell
technologies is highly uncertain. This is why hydrogen used in fuel
cell vehicles should be considered as a placeholder in our scenario
for “chemical storage of renewable power”. Alternatively, the
renewable hydrogen could be converted into synthetic methane or
liquid fuels depending on the economic benefits (storage costs vs.
additional losses) as well as technology and market development
in the transport sector (combustion engines vs. fuel cells). These
different pathways are currently all explored in parallel. While all
of them involve significant energy conversion losses, they are
considered a valid alternative to the non-use of excess renewable
power, and may finally be required to phase out crude oil and run
85% of transport operations on renewable energy in 2050.
9.4conclusion
In a business as usual world, described in the French Reference
scenario, we only see a very slight decrease in transport energy demand
until 2050. The aim of this Transport Chapter was therefore to show
ways to dramatically reduce transport energy demand in general, and
the dependency on climate-damaging fossil fuels in particular, also in
view of the ever rising transport energy demand in other world regions. 
The findings of our scenario calculations show that in order to
reach the ambitious energy reduction goals of the Energy
[R]evolution scenario a combination of behavioral changes and
tremendous technical efforts is needed:
• a decrease of passenger- and freight-kilometres on a per capita base,
• a massive shift to electrically and hydrogen (and other
synthetic gas) powered vehicles whose energy sources are
produced from renewable sources,
• a gradual decrease of all modes’ energy intensities,
• a modal shift from aviation to high speed rail and from road
freight to rail freight.
These measures should be accompanied by major efforts on the
installation and extension of the necessary infrastructures, e. g.
railway networks, charging and fueling infrastructure for electric
vehicles, just to mention a few.
France should give full support to ambitious EU transport policies
and for instance it should contribute to European Union tightening of
existing vehicle efficiency and fuel regulations and introducing new
standards for trucks and other vehicle categories. In parallel, it should
contribute to EU adoption of regulations to control both fossil and
renewable fuel production such that the energy demand in transport is
met by truly sustainable, low-carbon energy. France should also adopt
relevant research and innovation efforts and promote, at the EU level,
the standardisation and roll-out of refuelling infrastructure for
alternative fuels across all member states.
Also, it should yet commit to a sustainable transport plan framed
by the measures and analysis developed in the transport chapter,
allowing France to reach a 95% fall of GHG emissions and a
60% energy consumption reduction in the transport sector.
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box9.2:eurenewableenergytargetsintransport
The EU’s Renewable Energy Directive sets a target of 10%
final energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020.
Under the Energy [R]evolution a level of 6.2% is achieved,
based on energy demand reductions, electrification of road and
rail transport and the use of sustainable biofuels. This is in line
with the requirements of the Directive since biofuels produced
from waste and residues are counted twice, whereas renewable
electricity in road vehicles is counted 2.5 times. 
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table9.6:francefinalenergyconsumptiontransport
PJ/A
2040
1,552
1,288
200
13
0
51
73
10
0
62
13
13
0
66
65
1
1,704
1,377
201
13
0
113
227
13.3%
1,124
929
73
52
21
18
52
64
7
1
56
13
12
1
49
45
3
1,249
993
99
31
18
108
196
15.7%
2040
1,439
1,090
260
17
0
71
76
10
1
65
14
13
1
71
69
2
1,600
1,183
264
17
0
136
298
18.6%
815
460
43
90
63
34
188
67
4
1
63
13
10
3
35
27
9
930
500
119
27
34
251
385
41.4%
2050
1,332
880
325
21
0
106
77
10
1
66
14
13
1
77
73
4
1,500
977
331
21
0
172
377
25.1%
660
90
0
151
151
45
375
69
2
0
67
13
6
6
26
13
13
768
111
170
0
45
442
647
84.2%
2020
1,673
1,496
153
9
0
15
66
10
0
56
13
13
0
61
61
0
1,813
1,580
153
9
0
71
170
9.4%
1,467
1,352
91
15
2
0
10
59
9
0
50
13
13
0
54
54
1
1,594
1,427
93
13
0
60
113
7.1%
2015
1,741
1,603
124
7
0
7
63
10
0
53
13
13
0
59
58
0
1,876
1,685
124
7
0
61
136
7.2%
1,668
1,553
102
7
0
0
6
57
10
0
47
13
13
0
56
56
0
1,794
1,632
102
7
0
53
114
6.3%
2009
1,736
1,630
103
3
0
0
55
10
0
45
13
13
0
55
55
0
1,859
1,708
103
3
0
45
109
5.9%
1,736
1,630
103
3
0
0
0
55
10
0
45
13
13
0
55
55
0
1,859
1,708
103
3
0
45
109
5.9%
Reference scenario
Road
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Natural gas
Hydrogen
Electricity
Rail
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Electricity
Navigation
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Aviation
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Total
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Natural gas
Hydrogen
Electricity
Total RES
RES share
Energy [R]evolution scenario
Road
Fossil fuels
Liquid biofuels
Natural gas/biogas
of which biogas
Hydrogen
Electricity
Rail
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Electricity
Navigation
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Aviation
Fossil fuels
Biofuels
Total
Fossil fuels
Biofuels (incl. biogas)
Natural gas
Hydrogen
Electricity
Total RES
RES share
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10
GLOSSARY OF COMMONLY USED
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
DEFINITION OF SECTORS FRANCE: SCENARIO RESULTS DATA
glossary&appendix
10
image ICEBERGS FLOATING IN MACKENZIE BAY ON THE THE NORTHEASTERN EDGE OF ANTARCTICA’S AMERY ICE SHELF, EARLY FEBRUARY 2012.
becauseweuse
suchinefficient
lighting,80coalfired
powerplantsare
runningdayand
nighttoproduce
theenergythat
iswasted.”
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10.1glossaryofcommonlyusedterms
andabbreviations
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
CO2 Carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
(means of assessing a country’s wealth)
PPP Purchasing Power Parity (adjustment to GDP assessment 
to reflect comparable standard of living)
IEA International Energy Agency
J Joule, a measure of energy: 
kJ (Kilojoule) = 1,000 Joules
MJ (Megajoule) = 1 million Joules
GJ (Gigajoule) = 1 billion Joules
PJ (Petajoule) = 1015 Joules
EJ (Exajoule) = 1018 Joules
W Watt, measure of electrical capacity: 
kW (Kilowatt) = 1,000 watts
MW (Megawatt) = 1 million watts
GW (Gigawatt) = 1 billion watts
TW (Terawatt) = 112 watts
kWh Kilowatt-hour, measure of electrical output: 
kWh (Kilowatt-hour) = 1,000 watt-hours 
TWh (Terawatt-hour) = 1012 watt-hours 
t Tonnes, measure of weight: 
t = 1 tonne
Gt = 1 billion tonnes
10.2definitionofsectors
The definition of different sectors follows the sectorial break
down of the IEA World Energy Outlook series.
All definitions below are from the IEA Key World Energy Statistics.
Industry sector: Consumption in the industry sector includes the
following subsectors (energy used for transport by industry is not
included -> see under “Transport”)
• Iron and steel industry
• Chemical industry 
• Non-metallic mineral products e.g. glass, ceramic, cement etc.
• Transport equipment
• Machinery
• Mining
• Food and tobacco
• Paper, pulp and print
• Wood and wood products (other than pulp and paper)
• Construction
• Textile and Leather
Transport sector: The Transport sector includes all fuels from
transport such as road, railway, aviation, domestic navigation. 
Fuel used for ocean, coastal and inland fishing is included 
in “Other Sectors”.
Other sectors: “Other Sectors” covers agriculture, forestry, fishing,
residential, commercial and public services.
Non-energy use: Covers use of other petroleum products such as
paraffin waxes, lubricants, bitumen etc.
table10.1: conversionfactors-fossilfuels
MJ/kg
MJ/kg
GJ/barrel
kJ/m3
1 cubic
1 barrel
1 US gallon
1 UK gallon
0.0283 m3
159 liter
3.785 liter
4.546 liter
FUEL
Coal
Lignite
Oil
Gas
23.03
8.45
6.12
38000.00
table10.2: conversionfactors-differentenergyunits
Gcal
238.8
1
107
0.252
860
Mbtu
947.8
3.968
3968 x 107
1
3412
GWh
0.2778
1.163 x 10-3
11630
2.931 x 10-4
1
FROM
TJ
Gcal
Mtoe
Mbtu
GWh
Mtoe
2.388 x 10-5
10(-7)
1
2.52 x 10-8
8.6 x 10-5
TO: TJ
MULTIPLY BY
1
4.1868 x 10-3
4.1868 x 104
1.0551 x 10-3
3.6
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france:scenarioresultsdata
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france:investment&employment
table10.15: france:totalinvestmentinpowersector
MILLION € 2041-2050
29,632
31,947
61
9,070
11,936
8,143
0
2,499
238
2,033
111,272
83
9,070
74,231
23,592
0
4,041
255
2011-2050
316,009
161,347
8,990
38,128
82,133
23,386
0
7,237
1,472
17,422
379,699
2,835
41,686
248,476
71,043
3,787
10,325
1,547
2011-2050
AVERAGE
PER YEAR
7,900
4,034
225
953
2,053
585
0
181
37
436
9,492
71
1,042
6,212
1,776
95
258
39
2031-2040 
135,356
44,772
4,026
8,780
23,542
6,770
0
1,409
245
6,015
65,772
696
8,780
41,008
9,923
1,603
3,512
251
2021-2030
137,713
22,175
221
4,933
12,363
3,862
0
597
199
4,144
132,761
1,542
9,183
91,184
26,528
2,184
1,941
199
2011-2020
13,308
62,453
4,681
15,346
34,292
4,611
0
2,732
790
5,229
69,894
515
14,653
42,052
11,000
0
832
842
Reference scenario
Conventional (fossil & nuclear)
Renewables
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal power plants
Ocean energy
Energy [R]evolution
Conventional (fossil & nuclear)
Renewables
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal power plants
Ocean energy
table10.16: france:totalinvestmentinrenewableheatingonly
(EXCLUDING INVESTMENTS IN FOSSIL FUELS)
2041-2050
23,166
4,058
0
6,032
13,076
12,062
0
3,143
6,837
2,082
2011-2050
175,437
69,327
6,269
29,636
70,205
165,833
7,770
15,903
75,620
66,540
2011-2050
AVERAGE
PER YEAR
4,386
1,733
157
741
1,755
4,146
194
398
1,890
1,663
2031-2040 
35,311
8,351
0
9,865
17,095
26,942
0
5,872
9,880
11,190
2021-2030
49,412
24,825
0
4,407
20,181
79,270
3,171
3,955
40,777
31,368
2011-2020
67,548
32,094
6,269
9,332
19,854
I47,559
4,600
2,932
18,126
21,901
MILLION €
Reference scenario
Renewables
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar
Heat pumps
Energy [R]evolution scenario
Renewables
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar
Heat pumps
table10.17: france:totalemployment
THOUSAND JOBS
2010
21,400
7,000
55,000
21,800
-
12,100
117,300
1,300
1,800
52,800
61,600
25,900
8,800
10,400
3,200
-
800
300
3,500
8,700
117,400
2015
27,300
9,200
58,700
25,500
-
9,400
130,100
1,100
2,200
57,500
69,500
31,500
8,800
12,800
5,700
100
800
300
5,200
4,300
130,000
2020
36,800
5,700
62,600
30,300
-
7,800
143,200
700
2,300
83,500
56,800
34,800
5,800
4,200
3,600
-
500
100
4,900
2,900
143,300
REFERENCE ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION
2030
53,800
10,500
62,100
28,900
-
2,600
157,900
400
2,100
93,000
62,200
34,000
7,700
9,400
8,000
-
500
60
1,300
1,200
157,800
2015
27,500
10,700
56,800
21,700
-
7,500
124,200
900
4,100
51,000
68,100
24,600
8,900
15,400
11,000
100
400
300
6,300
1,100
124,100
2020
55,200
16,000
48,000
20,900
-
18,500
158,600
1,000
4,200
49,500
103,900
26,100
7,700
31,700
19,000
300
500
100
13,100
5,400
158,600
2030
58,500
6,900
37,200
21,000
-
15,500
139,100
1,100
3,000
44,600
90,400
35,200
8,000
19,700
10,500
600
800
60
12,100
3,400
139,000
By sector
Construction and installation
Manufacturing
Operations and maintenance
Fuel supply (domestic)
Coal and gas export
Solar and geothermal heat
Total jobs
By technology
Coal
Gas, oil & diesel
Nuclear
Total renewables
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
PV
Geothermal power
Solar thermal power
Ocean
Solar - heat
Geothermal & heat pump
Total jobs
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france:referencescenario
Condensation power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Combined heat & power production
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
CO2 emissions power generation 
(incl. CHP public)
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil & diesel
CO2 emissions by sector
% of 1990 emissions
Industry1)
Other sectors1)
Transport
Power generation2)
District heating & other conversion
Population (Mill.)
CO2 emissions per capita (t/capita)
1) including CHP autoproducers. 2) including CHP public
District heating
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Solar collectors
Geothermal
Heat from CHP 
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydrogen
Direct heating1)
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Solar collectors
Geothermal2)
Electric direct heating3)
Hydrogen
Total heat supply1)
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Solar collectors
Geothermal2)
Electric direct heating3)
Hydrogen
RES share (including RES electricity)
Electricity consumption heat pumps (TWh/a)
1) including cooling 2) including heat pumps 3) excluding heat pumps.
2015
6,853
6,288
1,876
1,685
7
124
61
12
0
7.2%
1,568
507
99
6
4
169
280
493
0
114
0
0
13.8%
2,845
1,034
202
186
127
8
464
771
19
287
76
0
25.0%
1,063
16.9%
565
512
53
0
2020
6,593
6,017
1,813
1,580
9
153
71
17
0
9.4%
1,587
523
126
7
5
147
245
503
0
162
0
0
18.5%
2,617
955
230
191
143
5
366
666
39
297
98
0
30.9%
1,272
21.1%
576
522
54
0
2030
6,510
5,916
1,704
1,377
13
201
113
26
0
13.3%
1,566
523
122
11
8
96
230
525
0
175
6
0
19.9%
2,646
1,080
252
205
161
7
219
639
56
314
126
0
34.3%
1,447
24.5%
594
538
56
0
2040
6,383
5,768
1,600
1,183
17
264
136
34
0
18.6%
1,546
523
130
14
10
59
215
527
0
187
21
0
22.6%
2,622
1,163
290
197
152
5
171
557
68
326
135
0
37.1%
1,618
28.1%
615
557
58
0
2050
6,165
5,532
1,500
977
21
331
172
46
0
25.1%
1,480
516
139
16
11
3
196
507
0
204
39
0
26.6%
2,551
1,198
322
195
146
5
128
464
85
336
139
0
40.3%
1,799
32.5%
633
573
60
0
Total (incl. non-energy use)
Total (energy use)
Transport
Oil products
Natural gas
Biofuels
Electricity
RES electricity
Hydrogen
RES share Transport
Industry
Electricity
RES electricity
District heat
RES district heat
Coal + lignite
Oil products
Gas
Solar
Biomass and waste
Geothermal
Hydrogen
RES share Industry
Other Sectors
Electricity
RES electricity
District heat
RES district heat
Coal + lignite
Oil products
Gas
Solar
Biomass and waste
Geothermal
Hydrogen
RES share Other Sectors
Total RES
RES share
Non energy use
Oil
Gas
Coal
2009
6,710
6,212
1,859
1,708
3
103
45
6
0
5.9%
1,156
417
56
0
0
91
245
304
0
98
0
0
13.3%
3,198
1,062
142
159
10
16
642
966
2
318
31
0
15.7%
766
12.3%
498
446
49
3
table10.3:france:electricitygeneration
TWh/a
table10.6: france:installedcapacity
GW
table10.7: france:primaryenergydemand
PJ/a
table10.5: france:co2 emissions
MILL t/a
table10.4: france:heatsupply
PJ/a
2015
566
20
0
4
0
0
1
430
7
70
31
8
3
0
0
1
26
1
0
20
0
1
4
0
0
12
14
592
47
21
0
24
2
1
430
0
116
70
31
3
10
0
0
1
25
56
0
445
34
5.8%
19.5%
2020
617
14
0
1
0
0
0
451
12
72
58
18
6
0
1
1
27
1
0
21
0
1
5
0
0
13
15
644
38
15
0
22
1
0
451
0
155
72
58
6
17
0
1
1
35
79
0
430
65
10.1%
24.1%
2030
634
10
0
0
0
0
1
475
8
67
61
18
10
0
1
1
29
1
0
22
0
0
6
0
0
13
16
663
34
11
0
22
1
1
475
0
155
67
61
10
14
0
1
1
35
51
0
477
72
10.8%
23.3%
2040
662
5
0
0
0
0
1
490
8
67
73
26
15
0
2
1
31
1
0
23
0
0
6
0
0
14
17
692
30
6
0
23
1
1
490
0
173
67
73
15
14
1
2
1
35
52
0
506
90
12.9%
24.9%
2050
677
0
0
0
0
0
1
493
7
67
83
30
23
0
2
1
33
1
0
24
0
0
7
0
0
15
19
710
26
1
0
25
0
1
493
0
191
67
83
23
14
1
2
1
34
52
0
524
107
15.1%
26.9%
Power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
of which from H2
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
of which wind offshore
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal power plants
Ocean energy
Combined heat & power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
of which from H2
Oil
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydrogen
CHP by producer
Main activity producers
Autoproducers
Total generation
Fossil
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Hydrogen
Renewables
Hydro
Wind
PV
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Ocean energy
Distribution losses
Own consumption electricity
Electricity for hydrogen production
Final energy consumption (electricity)
Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)
Share of fluctuating RES
RES share (domestic generation)
2009
514
24
0
5
0
5
1
410
4
57
8
0
0
0
0
0
24
2
0
19
0
1
2
0
0
12
12
538
56
26
0
24
6
1
410
0
72
57
8
0
6
0
0
0
33
55
0
424
9
1.6%
13.4%
2015
119
7
0
1
1
1
65
1
27
13
3
2
0
0
0
11
0
0
7
3
1
0
0
4
6
130
20
7
0
8
4
1
65
0
45
27
13
2
2
0
0
0
16
12.2%
34.7%
2020
133
5
0
0
0
1
66
2
28
25
6
5
0
1
0
11
0
0
9
1
1
0
0
5
6
144
16
5
0
9
2
1
66
0
62
28
25
5
3
0
1
0
30
20.9%
43.0%
2030
138
2
0
0
0
1
66
2
27
30
9
8
0
1
0
11
0
0
9
1
1
0
0
5
6
149
14
2
0
9
1
1
66
0
69
27
30
8
3
0
1
0
39
25.9%
46.5%
2040
143
1
0
0
0
1
68
2
27
30
9
13
0
1
0
12
0
0
9
1
1
0
0
5
7
155
13
1
0
9
1
1
68
0
74
27
30
13
3
0
1
0
43
27.9%
48.0%
2050
148
0
0
0
0
1
67
1
27
30
8
19
0
1
0
12
0
0
10
1
2
0
0
5
7
160
12
0
0
10
1
1
67
0
81
27
30
19
3
0
1
0
50
31.0%
50.6%
Power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
of which wind offshore
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal power plants
Ocean energy
Combined heat & power production
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydrogen
CHP by producer
Main activity producers
Autoproducers
Total generation
Fossil
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Hydrogen
Renewables
Hydro
Wind
PV
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Ocean energy
Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)
Share of fluctuating RES
RES share (domestic generation)
2009
112
9
0
2
6
1
63
1
25
4
0
0
0
0
0
8
1
0
7
1
0
0
0
4
4
121
26
10
0
9
7
1
63
0
31
25
4
0
1
0
0
0
5
4.1%
26.1%
2015
11,465
5,455
514
1
1,687
3,252
4,686
1,324
253
110
32
842
83
3
11.4%
2020
11,587
4,954
437
1
1,559
2,956
4,921
1,712
258
208
69
1,065
107
4
14.4%
2030
11,406
4,428
348
2
1,529
2,549
5,183
1,795
241
220
102
1,088
141
4
15.4%
2040
11,282
3,963
261
2
1,434
2,267
5,346
1,972
241
263
138
1,159
167
4
17.2%
2050
10,971
3,420
158
2
1,288
1,973
5,379
2,171
241
299
185
1,249
193
4
19.5%
Total
Fossil
Hard coal
Lignite
Natural gas
Crude oil
Nuclear
Renewables
Hydro
Wind
Solar
Biomass
Geothermal/ambient heat
Ocean energy
RES share
2009
10,883
5,457
530
1
1,558
3,368
4,471
955
206
28
3
685
31
2
8.7%
2015
19
17
0
2
0
0
20
2
0
15
3
39
18
0
17
4
371
100%
65
91
127
26
62
67.0
5.5
2020
13
12
0
1
0
0
18
2
0
15
2
31
13
0
16
2
328
89%
61
77
119
19
53
68.9
4.8
2030
9
8
0
0
0
0
19
2
0
16
1
28
10
0
16
2
281
76%
56
65
104
15
41
72.3
3.9
2040
4
4
0
0
0
0
20
2
0
16
1
24
6
0
17
2
241
65%
52
57
90
11
31
74.2
3.2
2050
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
2
0
16
1
19
2
0
16
1
195
53%
44
48
74
6
22
76.1
2.6
2009
27
20
0
3
3
0
18
2
0
13
3
45
22
0
16
6
384
104%
44
115
128
34
63
64.7
5.9
2015
68
0
68
0
0
138
117
21
1
0
2,773
1,918
331
19
98
406
0
2,980
2,035
420
19
99
406
0
20.7%
8.0
2020
93
0
93
0
0
129
103
26
1
0
2,600
1,695
386
39
122
360
0
2,823
1,797
504
39
123
360
0
26.7%
9.3
2030
113
0
113
0
0
129
97
30
2
0
2,517
1,527
424
56
166
344
0
2,759
1,624
567
56
168
344
0
31.6%
12.3
2040
106
0
106
0
0
130
94
34
2
0
2,460
1,377
459
68
196
359
0
2,696
1,471
599
68
198
359
0
35.4%
13.8
2050
96
0
96
0
0
140
98
39
3
0
2,333
1,180
484
85
223
361
0
2,569
1,279
619
85
226
361
0
40.0%
14.9
2009
4
0
4
0
0
155
139
16
0
0
2,681
1,874
333
2
46
425
0
2,840
2,013
354
2
46
425
0
16.2%
4.2
table10.8: france:finalenergydemand
PJ/a
Condensation power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Combined heat & power production
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
CO2 emissions power generation 
(incl. CHP public)
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil & diesel
CO2 emissions by sector
% of 1990 emissions
Industry1)
Other sectors1)
Transport
Power generation2)
District heating & other conversion
Population (Mill.)
CO2 emissions per capita (t/capita)
‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Ref.)
1) including CHP autoproducers. 2) including CHP public
District heating
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Solar collectors
Geothermal
Heat from CHP 
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydrogen
Direct heating1)
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Solar collectors
Geothermal2)
Electric direct heating3)
Hydrogen
Total heat supply1)
Fossil fuels
Biomass
Solar collectors
Geothermal2)
Electric direct heating3)
Hydrogen
RES share (including RES electricity)
Electricity consumption heat pumps (TWh/a)
1) including cooling 2) including heat pumps 3) excluding heat pumps.
france:energy[r]evolutionscenario
2015
6,501
5,965
1,794
1,632
7
0
102
53
12
0
6.3%
1,342
462
102
10
6
66
225
435
4
138
3
0
18.9%
2,829
1,016
225
187
120
103
487
725
18
242
50
0
23.2%
1,023
17.1%
537
470
51
16
2020
5,961
5,442
1,594
1,427
15
2
92
60
19
0
7.1%
1,279
472
151
26
18
34
183
403
8
137
15
0
25.7%
2,569
950
303
209
142
61
373
599
65
233
79
0
32.0%
1,263
23.2%
518
418
49
52
2030
4,851
4,376
1,250
993
52
21
78
108
83
18
15.7%
1,105
438
337
88
68
0
72
335
14
106
38
14
52.0%
2,021
833
642
241
189
15
174
240
228
153
137
0
66.7%
2,119
48.4%
475
299
38
138
2040
3,934
3,504
930
500
90
63
56
251
235
34
41.4%
931
396
370
157
141
0
11
182
24
71
66
25
74.6%
1,642
735
688
287
259
11
59
65
233
100
152
0
87.2%
2,512
71.7%
431
189
26
215
2050
3,369
2,989
768
111
151
151
20
442
433
45
84.2%
781
356
348
151
149
0
0
70
60
40
81
23
89.7%
1,440
676
662
325
324
0
5
29
195
74
136
0
96.6%
2,738
91.6%
380
137
15
228
Total (incl. non-energy use)
Total (energy use)
Transport
Oil products
Natural gas/biogas
Biogas
Liquid biofuels
Electricity
RES electricity
Hydrogen
RES share Transport
Industry
Electricity
RES electricity
District heat
RES district heat
Coal + lignite
Oil products
Gas
Solar
Biomass and waste
Geothermal
Hydrogen
RES share Industry
Other Sectors
Electricity
RES electricity
District heat
RES district heat
Coal + lignite
Oil products
Gas
Solar
Biomass and waste
Geothermal
Hydrogen
RES share Other Sectors
Total RES
RES share
Non energy use
Oil
Gas
Coal
2009
6,710
6,212
1,859
1,708
3
0
103
45
6
0
5.9%
1,156
417
56
0
0
91
245
304
0
98
0
0
13.3%
3,198
1,062
142
159
10
16
642
966
2
318
31
0
15.7%
766
12.3%
498
446
49
3
table10.9: france:electricitygeneration
TWh/a
table10.12: france:installedcapacity
GW
table10.13: france:primaryenergydemand
PJ/a
table10.11: france:co2 emissions
MILL t/a
table10.10: france:heatsupply
PJ/a
2015
517
12
0
18
0
2
1
369
2
69
39
8
5
0
0
1
28
1
0
22
0
1
4
0
0
14
15
546
56
13
0
40
3
1
369
0
121
69
39
5
6
0
0
1
30
54
0
425
45
8.2%
22.1%
2020
488
8
0
16
0
1
1
303
2
71
73
18
12
0
0
1
36
1
0
27
0
1
6
0
0
18
17
524
54
8
0
43
2
1
303
0
167
71
73
12
8
1
0
1
30
51
0
412
86
16.5%
31.9%
2030
422
3
0
11
0
1
1
62
2
72
220
104
46
3
1
1
51
0
0
31
0
0
17
2
0
27
24
473
46
3
0
41
1
1
62
1
364
72
220
46
20
5
1
1
30
39
16
383
267
56.5%
77.0%
2040
406
2
0
6
1
0
1
0
3
72
266
147
50
4
2
1
69
0
0
20
2
0
39
8
2
40
29
475
26
2
0
23
0
1
0
5
444
72
266
50
42
11
2
1
30
29
43
384
318
66.9%
93.6%
2050
409
0
0
2
1
0
1
0
0
72
276
157
52
2
3
1
85
0
0
2
1
0
65
13
6
55
30
494
3
0
0
3
0
1
0
7
484
72
276
52
65
14
3
1
30
20
54
409
330
66.7%
98.0%
Power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
of which from H2
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
of which wind offshore
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal power plants
Ocean energy
Combined heat & power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas
of which from H2
Oil
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydrogen
CHP by producer
Main activity producers
Autoproducers
Total generation
Fossil
Coal
Lignite
Gas
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Hydrogen
Renewables
Hydro
Wind
PV
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Ocean energy
Distribution losses
Own consumption electricity
Electricity for hydrogen production
Final energy consumption (electricity)
Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)
Share of fluctuating RES
RES share (domestic generation)
2009
514
24
0
5
0
5
1
410
4
57
8
0
0
0
0
0
24
2
0
19
0
1
2
0
0
12
12
538
56
26
0
24
6
1
410
0
72
57
8
0
6
0
0
0
33
55
0
424
9
1.6%
13.4%
2015
128
6
0
6
4
1
62
0
27
17
3
4
0
0
0
9
0
0
7
1
1
0
0
5
4
137
26
6
0
14
5
1
62
0
50
27
17
4
1
0
0
0
22
15.9%
36.2%
2020
130
4
0
6
2
1
44
0
28
32
6
10
0
0
0
14
0
0
12
1
1
0
0
8
6
144
27
4
0
18
3
1
44
0
72
28
32
10
2
0
0
0
42
29.6%
50.4%
2030
181
2
0
6
3
1
9
1
28
92
34
38
0
1
0
20
0
0
15
0
5
0
0
11
9
201
26
2
0
20
3
1
9
0
165
28
92
38
5
1
1
0
130
64.9%
82.3%
2040
177
1
0
5
1
1
0
1
28
96
42
42
1
1
0
25
0
0
12
0
12
1
1
15
10
202
17
1
0
14
1
1
0
2
183
28
96
42
12
2
1
0
138
68.4%
90.3%
2050
170
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
28
91
41
43
0
2
0
26
0
0
1
0
21
2
1
17
9
195
4
0
0
2
0
1
0
3
189
28
91
43
21
3
2
0
135
69.0%
96.7%
Power plants
Coal
Lignite
Gas (incl. H2)
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Biomass
Hydro
Wind
of which wind offshore
PV
Geothermal
Solar thermal power plants
Ocean energy
Combined heat & power production
Coal
Lignite
Gas (incl. H2)
Oil
Biomass
Geothermal
Hydrogen
CHP by producer
Main activity producers
Autoproducers
Total generation
Fossil
Coal
Lignite
Gas (without H2)
Oil
Diesel
Nuclear
Hydrogen
Renewables
Hydro
Wind
PV
Biomass
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Ocean energy
Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)
Share of fluctuating RES
RES share (domestic generation)
2009
112
9
0
2
6
1
63
1
25
4
0
0
0
0
0
8
1
0
7
1
0
0
0
4
4
121
26
10
0
9
7
1
63
0
31
25
4
0
1
0
0
0
5
4.1%
26.1%
2015
10,568
5,336
461
0
1,754
3,121
4,028
1,204
250
140
42
711
57
3
11.3%
896
2020
9,451
4,648
365
0
1,626
2,656
3,307
1,496
256
263
122
734
117
4
15.1%
2,136
2030
6,361
3,099
282
0
1,155
1,662
678
2,584
258
792
433
815
281
4
40.5%
5,045
2040
4,853
1,684
294
0
578
811
0
3,169
258
958
493
999
457
4
65.5%
6,429
2050
4,040
654
253
0
135
266
0
3,387
258
995
484
1,160
484
4
84.1%
6,930
Total
Fossil
Hard coal
Lignite
Natural gas
Crude oil
Nuclear
Renewables
Hydro
Wind
Solar
Biomass
Geothermal/ambient heat
Ocean energy
RES share
‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Ref.)
2009
10,883
5,457
530
1
1,558
3,368
4,471
955
206
28
3
685
31
2
8.7%
0
2015
22
10
0
10
1
0
20
2
0
16
3
42
12
0
26
4
352
95%
48
99
123
29
53
67.0
5.3
19
2020
17
6
0
10
1
0
23
1
0
19
3
40
7
0
29
4
293
79%
40
80
108
26
38
68.9
4.2
36
2030
10
2
0
6
1
0
22
0
0
22
0
32
3
0
28
1
182
49%
25
39
76
20
22
72.3
2.5
99
2040
5
1
0
3
0
0
13
0
0
13
0
18
1
0
16
1
88
24%
12
16
39
10
10
74.2
1.2
153
2050
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
2
0
20
5%
5
2
8
1
3
76.1
0.3
175
2009
27
20
0
3
3
0
18
2
0
13
3
45
22
0
16
6
384
104%
44
115
128
34
63
64.7
5.9
0
2015
65
1
64
0
1
141
118
22
1
0
2,593
1,792
314
23
77
388
0
2,799
1,911
400
23
79
388
0
20.6%
6.6
2020
89
0
85
2
3
160
124
32
4
0
2,311
1,456
310
73
128
343
0
2,560
1,580
427
75
135
343
0
28.1%
10.4
2030
138
0
110
17
11
224
118
89
16
1
1,704
740
225
242
225
260
13
2,066
857
424
258
252
260
15
48.3%
16.8
2040
130
0
78
36
16
358
66
203
68
21
1,188
282
153
257
268
204
24
1,675
347
434
293
352
204
45
68.2%
18.6
2050
33
0
13
15
5
489
4
338
113
35
889
82
102
255
253
174
22
1,412
86
454
270
371
174
57
82.0%
16.1
2009
4
0
4
0
0
155
139
16
0
0
2,681
1,874
333
2
46
425
0
2,840
2,013
354
2
46
425
0
16.2%
4.2
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Greenpeace is a global organisation that
uses non-violent direct action to tackle the
most crucial threats to our planet’s
biodiversity and environment. Greenpeace is
a non-profit organisation, present in 40
countries across Europe, the Americas,
Africa, Asia and the Pacific. It speaks for
2.8 million supporters worldwide, and
inspires many millions more to take action
every day. To maintain its independence,
Greenpeace does not accept donations from
governments or corporations but relies on
contributions from individual supporters and
foundation grants. Greenpeace has been
campaigning against environmental
degradation since 1971 when a small boat of
volunteers and journalists sailed into
Amchitka, an area west of Alaska, where the
US Government was conducting underground
nuclear tests. This tradition of ‘bearing
witness’ in a non-violent manner continues
today, and ships are an important part of all
its campaign work.
greenpeace france
13 rue d’Enghien, 75010 Paris, France
t/f: +33 1 80 96 96 96
contact.fr@greenpeace.org
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European Renewable Energy Council (EREC)
Created in April 2000, the European
Renewable Energy Council (EREC) is the
umbrella organisation of the European
renewable energy industry, trade and research
associations active in the sectors of bioenergy,
geothermal, ocean, small hydro power, solar
electricity, solar thermal and wind energy.
EREC thus represents the European renewable
energy industry with an annual turnover of
€70 billion and employing 550,000 people.
Renewable Energy House, 63-67 rue d’Arlon 
B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
t +32 2 546 1933  f+32 2 546 1934
erec@erec.org  www.erec.org
The Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC)
is the voice of the global wind energy sector.
GWEC works at highest international
political level to create better policy
environment for wind power. GWEC’s mission
is to ensure that wind power established
itself as the answer to today’s energy
challenges, producing substantial
environmental and economic benefits. GWEC
is a member based organisation that
represents the entire wind energy sector. The
members of GWEC represent over 1,500
companies, organisations and institutions in
more than 70 countries, including
manufacturers, developers, component
suppliers, research institutes, national wind
and renewables associations, electricity
providers, finance and insurance companies.
Rue d’Arlon 80
1040 Brussels, Belgium
t +32 2 213 1897  f+32 2 213 1890
info@gwec.net  www.gwec.net
